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ABSTRACT 
Previous research has shown that the subjective expenence of ease or difficulty 
evoked by memory retrieval operations can play an important role in shaping a range 
of people's judgments (e.g., Schwarz, 1998). Rather than basing their outputs on the 
products of the retrieval process, people use experiential cues to guide response 
generation. Extending work of this kind, the present research investigated the extent 
to which experiences associated with prior processing operations (e.g., memory 
encoding and memory retrieval) may affect people's judgments of elapsed time. In 
Experiments 1-5, participants committed material to memory under encoding 
conditions that varied in difficulty. Estimates were then taken of the duration and 
subjective difficulty of the encoding task. As predicted, the subjective ease or 
difficulty of prior processing operations was shown to guide people's retrospective 
duration judgments. Specifically, judgments of elapsed time were shorter under 
difficult processing conditions. In Experiments 6-8, this prediction was further 
supported when differential demands were placed on the memory retrieval process. 
That is, when retrieving information was experienced as difficult rather than easy, 
people judged that less time had elapsed. In Experiment 9, the same experiential 
effects emerged when immersive virtual environment technology was used to create 
a more dynamic task environment. These results are considered in the context of 
contemporary work on retrospective temporal estimation, with particular emphasis 
on the role of experiential factors in social cognition . 
.. 
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1.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT: WHAT TYPE OF 
INFORMATION DO WE USE? 
As human beings living in a complex world, we are routinely faced with the task of 
making decisions and judgments. Although many of our judgments about the world 
are stored in memory (e.g., a Porsche is a fast car), on other occasions judgments 
must be computed on-line. For example, a friend may ask you whether your school 
days were enjoyable or, more generally, whether life is going well for you at the 
moment. When we meet a new person for the first time, we must quickly form some 
kind of impression of him or her. Scenarios such as these confront us everyday of our 
lives. For this reason, psychologists have been intrigued to discover how our 
judgments of situations and people are formed. When we do not have access to a 
stored judgment, how is a relevant decision made? What type of information do we 
use to guide our judgmental outputs? This important issue lies at the very heart of 
social cognition research. and it enables us to learn about the underlying cognitive 
dynamics of human judgment. By understanding how people evaluate and construe 
their external social environment, we are able to more accurately predict the way in 
which people will behave (e.g., Fazio, 1986). 
Naturally, when asked to form a judgment we retrieve relevant information from 
memory. Accordingly, it has long been recognised that the contents of consciousness 
are the critical ingredients governing a person's judgments. However. people have 
much "'available" (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) information stored away in memory. 
but this does not mean that it can be assessed when needed. Thus, several researchers 
have stressed that the information which is "accessible" in memory and relevant to 
the question at hand to be the critical factor guiding human judgment (e.g .. Higgins. 
1989, 1996; Higgins & Bargh, 1987: Wyer & Srul!, 1989). However. even though 
there might be a large amount of information that is considered relevant to a 
particular judgment or evaluation. we hardly ever try to recall it all. To do so would 
take time and effort. so instead memory search is selecti\'e. In line with this 
assumption. other research has demonstrated that only a small portion of the most 
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accessible and relevant infonnation retrieved from memory provides the basis for 
people's judgments (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987). Thus, both lines of research 
have emphasised the accessible contents of memory retrieval as the important input 
that enters into judgment. Simply said, what infonnation is brought to mind is the 
detennining factor of people's judgments and evaluations. 
1.1.1 Information Accessibility Explanation 
To illustrate the role of infonnation accessibility in judgment fonnation. imagine you 
were asked to evaluate the quality of your school life. To generate an answer, you 
would automatically think back to your time at school so recollections of it could be 
retrieved from memory. Anned with such knowledge, all the relevant infonnation 
that was brought to mind would be then analysed so you could evaluate whether your 
time at school was truly wonderful or utterly dreadful. Obviously. different people 
retain and recollect very different aspects of their experiences at school, but the 
important point here is that the content of the infonnation retrieved shapes the 
judgment made. In this instance, if one remembered being bullied, strict teachers, 
failing maths and wearing an ugly unifonn, it is more than likely that your time at 
school would be evaluated rather unfavourably. Consequently from such a content-
based perspective, a person who retrieves many negative, and few positive items of 
infonnation from memory should make a more unfavourable judgment than a person 
who retrieves only a few negative items, but many positive ones. In this way, our 
judgments are based on the amount and descriptive meaning of the infonnation that 
is retrieved from long-tenn memory. 
To take another example, suppose you were asked to make a more general 
assessment, namely how satisfied are you with your life as a whole. According to the 
infonnation accessibility hypothesis, such a judgment depends on the aspects of your 
life that are rendered most accessible at the time the question is posed (see 
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987~ Higgins, 1989, 1996; Schwarz, 1995, for reviews). 
Focusing on positive aspects of your life (e.g., a successful job, a lovely husband) 
should result in a more positive evaluation of your overall life-satisfaction. However. 
this is not to say that if the question were asked again at some later time. the same 
judgment would be generated. A large body of research has shown that assessments 
of life-satisfaction c~m be influenced hy a number of situational factors. such as the 
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weather, mood, and even the daily news (e.g .. Schwarz & Strack. 1991). All of these 
influences can have a strong impact on what kind of information is rendered 
accessible in memory. which in tum bears on the subsequent jUdgments that are 
made. 
One such contextual influence that has been frequently investigated is the effect of a 
preceding task on people's evaluative judgments. For example. Strack, Schwarz. and 
Gschneidinger (1985, Expt. 1) asked participants to write a list of either positiye or 
negative events from their life and then they evaluated their overall happiness and 
satisfaction with life. By manipulating what information was brought to mind prior to 
the judgment being made, it was possible to determine whether people base their 
evaluations on the descriptive contents of memory. The results supported this 
prediction. Participants who were induced to focus on positive events evaluated their 
life more positively than participants who had to think about negative ones. Thinking 
about these events rendered them highly accessible in memory and thus subsequent 
evaluations fell in line with the content of these thoughts. 
A more subtle method of increasing the cognitive accessibility of information in 
memory involves the order in which questions are presented in a questionnaire. For 
example, in a survey study carried out by Strack, Martin, and Schwarz (1988) college 
students were asked to report how happy they were with life and how frequently they 
dated. This particular question was chosen as dating was considered an important 
factor contributing to college students' general happiness and satisfaction with life 
(Emmons & Diener, 1985). When the respondents evaluated their general happiness 
prior to reporting their dating frequency, the correlation between these two measures 
was small (r = - .12). However. when the order was reversed so that they first 
reported how frequently they dated before evaluating their life-satisfaction, a larger 
correlation was observed (r = .66). Thus, by first asking college students about their 
dating frequency. this information was rendered highly accessible in memory and. as 
a result, was later used as a judgment-relevant cue for evaluating their overall 
happiness with life. Accordingly, individuals who dated frequently returned higher 
ratings of life-happiness, whereas individuals who dated infrequently provided lower 
ratings of life-happiness. This and other related research (e.g .. Schwarz & Bless. 
1992~ Schwarz. Strack. & Mai, 1991) has also demonstrated these contextual 
.... 
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influences in decision-making. Thus, judgments will change depending on whateyer 
information happens to be most accessible in memory when the question is posed. 
In the research reviewed so far, the judgment pertains to something that is familiar, 
such as our time at school or our own life. Consequently, social cognition research 
postulates that the sole determinant of judgment is the accessible infonnation 
recalled from memory. However, just as often we have to construct a judgment about 
something we are not familiar with. For example, we frequently have to process new 
information about people we have just met. For that reason, a large body of research 
has been developed to explain how such information is processed, stored, and 
retrieved (see Higgins, 1989, 1996; Martin & Clark, 1990; Schwarz, 1995; Wyer & 
Srull, 1989, for reviews). 
According to some of this work, when we encounter a new person, our impressions 
of him or her carry a wide array of informational input. For example, a new work 
colleague has hardly spoken a word to you in the office. As this behaviour, or rather 
lack of it, is ambiguous, it can be interpreted in a number of different ways. Do we 
take it to mean that he is simply shy, boring, conscientious, unhappy, rude, or ill? In 
line with the other research discussed, the role of infonnation accessibility is again 
highlighted, but this time in the domain of impression fonnation. An impression of 
this person is most likely constructed from whichever of these trait concepts springs 
to mind (i.e., the one that is most accessible when the judgment is made). There are a 
variety of techniques that can be used to increase the accessibility of the trait concept 
in memory. For example, if it has been used frequently in the past (Higgins & King, 
1981), by priming the trait in a preceding task (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977), or 
even presenting it subliminally (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). Any of these 
manipulations would be sufficient to increase the probability that the target person 
would be thought of in line with the implications of the trait concept. This research 
demonstrates that we form an impression of another person based on the trait concept 
that springs to mind at the time the judgment is required. 
In summary. a clear take-home message emerges from this line of research. Namely 
that a wide variety of evaluative judgments are based on relevant infonnation that is 
most accessible in memory. As the above examples illustrate, this infonnation 
strongly influences the judgments we fonn about the issue under investigation, 
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whether it is an assessment of our school days, an evaluation of our oyerall happiness 
with life, or our impressions of other people. Thus from this information accessibility 
standpoint, judgment generation is a fairly uncomplicated process. Decision-releyant 
information that comes to mind is analysed, and is then used to guide our judgmental 
outputs. 
1.1.2 Subjective Experience Explanation: The Availability Heuristic 
Although the study of decision-making has primarily focused on retrieval-mediated 
processes, namely the content of thought or what comes to mind, a break from this 
tradition came from Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) work on the availability 
heuristic. This pioneering work was both innovative and exhilarating because it 
offered a new and alternative explanation for how people arrive at a judgmental 
decision. In so doing, these authors delved into a research area that had generally 
been avoided or where other psychologists had feared to tread (Clore, 1992). Rather 
than emphasising the contents of retrieval, they focused instead on phenomenal 
experience itself. What they suggested is that when a question is asked, people 
monitor their cognitive processes as they are thinking of an answer and pay special 
attention to how easy it is to retrieve certain items of information from memory. In 
this way, the focus is on how information comes to mind rather than on what 
information appears in consciousness. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) conducted 
numerous studies based on this idea, but their research focused specifically on 
judgments of a certain kind. 
In more detail, Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) availability heuristic postulates that 
when individuals estimate the frequency of a category or the likelihood of an event, 
they use 'the ease with which relevant instances come to mind' (p. 207) as the 
primary basis for judgment. Reliance on this heuristic is useful for judging frequency 
and probability because when it is easy to bring instances of a certain category to 
mind, or examples of likely events, this presumably indicates that the category must 
be frequent and the event highly probable. 
In a well-known study. Tversky and Kahneman (1973, Expt. 3) asked participants to 
judge whether five consonants (k. /, n, r, \.) were more likely to occur in the first 
- 5 -
position of an English word or in the third position. Choose one of the letters and try 
this task. How did you arrive at an answer? 
The authors assumed that generating an answer to this question involves 'comparing 
the availability of the two categories, i.e., by assessing the ease with which instances 
of the two categories come to mind' (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 211). If you 
had a quick go, you will probably agree that thinking of words beginning with one of 
these letters is without doubt a much easier task than conjuring up examples of words 
containing these letters in the third position. In line with this reasoning, the results 
confinned that words beginning with one of these letters were judged to be more 
frequent in usage than words containing these letters in the third position. This was 
interpreted to mean that the participants considered the ease accompanying the 
retrieval of example words to be a reliable indicator of frequency. After all, it seems 
to make sense that if it is easy to think of many examples from a class of words, then 
the class of words must be a frequent one. However, it is important to note that in 
utilising this simple inferential rule, the wrong judgment was in fact made. All the 
letters selected by the experimenters were actually more frequent in the third position 
of English words than in the first position. Thus, a manipulation of how easy it was 
to bring words to mind prompted participants to incorrectly estimate their frequency 
in the English language. 
There is a large body of research that supports Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) 
proposition that the availability heuristic is used as the primary basis for frequency 
and probability judgments (see Shennan & Corty, 1984, for a review). For example, 
Gabrielcik and Fazio (1984) observed that participants exposed to subliminally 
presented words containing the letter t judged those words to be more frequent in 
usage than participants who were not primed in this way. This priming procedure 
enhanced the availability of those words, thereby making it easier to retrieve 
examples of them from memory. Similarly, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman. 
and Combs (1978) observed that 800/0 of participants judged accidents to cause more 
fatalities than strokes, despite the fact that dying from a stroke is in fact more likely. 
The authors suggested that this misconception occurs because the media attention 
given to fatal accidents causes them to spring to mind easily. Thus, the availability 
hypothesis accounts for these results by emphasising the differential availability of 
these events in memory and accordingly, can explain why death by accident is 
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misjudged as being the more likely everyday occurrence. In combination. this 
research suggests that individuals consider the ease with which relevant examples 
come to mind as a valid and reliable source of information on which to base their 
judgments of frequency and probability. 
1.1.2.1 The Availability Heuristic: Errors and Biases 
Although it appears that people frequently employ the availability heuristic, it has 
already been pointed out that relying on it can lead to judgmental inaccuracy. Thus, a 
strong implication arises from this work. Namely, when this heuristic is utilised in 
forming a judgment, error and biases may follow (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; see 
Sherman & Corty, 1984, for an extended review). In the Lichtenstein et al. (1978) 
study, reading about fatal accidents in the newspaper or hearing about them on the 
news renders these events more available in memory than death by stroke that does 
not receive as much media attention. As a direct result, participants misjudged the 
former cause of death as more likely. This judgment was inaccurate because 
participants failed to take into account that the experienced ease of retrieval could 
have been due to the salience and the vividness of the remembered examples, rather 
than the actual likelihood of death by accident. 
The same errors of judgment are strikingly evident in Tversky and Kahneman' s 
(1973, Expt. 3) research. Words beginning with a certain letter (e.g., k) were judged 
to be more frequent in usage than words containing k in the third position, despite the 
reverse being actually true. The wrong judgment was made because participants did 
not consider the possibility that influences other than the actual frequency of the 
class of words could have caused words beginning with k to spring to mind more 
easily. Some researchers have suggested that one such influence concerns the manner 
in which words are organised and stored in memory (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
Rosch, 1978). These authors demonstrated that words appear to be assessed by their 
first letter, so this could be one explanation for the enhanced availability of words 
beginning with a certain letter. Other factors which are also unrelated to frequency 
can impact on how easily items of information can be brought to mind. For example. 
if a word is recently encountered by using priming manipulations (e.g .. Gabrielcik & 
Fazio. 1984). or if the item is vivid. salient. or memorable in some way (e.g .. Nisbett 
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& Ross, 1980}, the availability of that information will be increased, which in turn 
can affect the inferences made. 
Taken together this research shows that there is a major problem in utilising the 
availability heuristic for frequency and probability judgments. When other 
information is not considered, errors in the attribution process occur. It is for this 
reason that people can draw conclusions that are inaccurate and biased (Tyersky & 
Kahneman, 1973). In line with this assumption, it was Clore and Parrott (1991) who 
pointed out that the experience of ease that serves as input for judgment is prone to 
misattribution. Specifically, the subjective experience of ease of retrieval is 
misattributed to the judgment under investigation, that is, to the frequency of a 
category or the probability of some event, rather than to the influence of other 
factors. 
At this juncture, an important question readily springs to mind. If this judgmental 
heuristic can occasionally lead us astray, why is it used as a source of information to 
guide our judgments? As with all heuristic processing strategies their function is a 
simple one. They are employed as a way of minimising the cognitive effort necessary 
to arrive at an answer. In this way, heuristics can be considered as simplifying rules 
of thumb, or cognitive shortcuts that allow us to make decisions quickly and easily 
(e.g., Sherman & Corty, 1984). When a judgment has to be formed under conditions 
in which information is incomplete or uncertainty prevails, the availability heuristic 
provides a way to simplify the task at hand (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). For 
example, it would be an enormous feat to recall and count all the relevant examples 
of a given class of words in order to estimate its frequency. Instead, it is assumed that 
some examples are brought to mind and the experienced ease accompanying the 
retrieval process provides the basis for frequency estimation. 
1.2 THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES OR FEELING STATES 
It was thirty years ago that Tversky and Kahneman"s (1973) work on the availability 
heuristic suggested that the experience of ease evoked by the process of thinking 
itself provides important information to judgments of frequency and probability. 
However. it is only more recently that psychologists in this field have begun to take 
on board the revolutionary idea that the many types of phenomenal experiences 
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accompanying thought processes may also serve as input to judgment and decision-
making in general (e.g., Clore, 1992; Clore & Parrott, 1991: Schwarz & Clore. 1996. 
Strack, 1992). One of the main reasons for the late foray of this type of research was 
highlighted by Clore (1992) who noted, 'we are better prepared to study the content 
of thought than the experience of thinking' (p. 133). As a result, the role of conscious 
experience in judgment formation was neglected for many years. However. breaking 
away from this more traditional content-based analysis of decision-making, a large 
body of recent research now suggests that subjective experiences may also playa 
causal role in the construction of everyday judgments. Although the role of cognitive 
experiences, namely, the subjective experience of ease accompanying memory 
processing operations is the primary concern in this chapter, the majority of research 
in this domain has focused on experiences that involve affect and emotion (see 
Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988, 1996, for more detailed discussions). It is 
important to draw attention to this line of research as it was primarily responsible for 
the renewed and growing interest in determining what kinds of subjective 
experiences or feeling states may provide information that is used to guide people's 
judgmental outputs. 
1.2.1 Affective Feelings and Evaluative Judgments 
Perhaps this major emphasis on affective states including happiness, sadness, anger, 
and fear, to name only a few, results from the fact that 'one of the most distinctive 
aspects of emotions is that they are felt' (Clore, 1992, p. 133). Thus, it follows 
logically that such feelings may deliver important information to the experiencer that 
can be used in judgment and decision-making. Specifically, a substantial body of 
research has shown that individuals use their momentary affective state as a 
judgment-relevant cue when making a positive or a negative evaluative judgment 
(see Schwarz & Clore, 1988, 1996, for reviews). When individuals think about the 
object of judgment they may simply ask themselves, "How-do-I-feel-about-it?" 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988). 
To investigate the impact of affective states on evaluative judgment. the basic 
experimental procedure involves inducing a happy or a sad mood (e.g., asking 
pm1icipants to write a detailed description of a happy or a sad event from their recent 
past) and then asking participants to report their overall happiness and satisfaction 
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with life. The typical finding is that under elated moods. assessments of overall 
satisfaction and happiness with life are more positive than under depressed moods 
(e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner. 1987). 
According to this line of reasoning, these mood effects occur because when a happy 
mood is induced prior to the judgment task, this momentary affective state is 
attributed to the object of judgment, and thus evaluations of life-satisfaction are more 
positive as a direct result. In the same way, a sad mood elicited by the previous task 
is considered to be an affective reaction to the question under investigation, which 
results in more negative assessments of life-satisfaction being made. Note that even 
though the perceiver's momentary mood is actually due to the previous task, these 
feelings are still used as a basis for the judgment at hand. Congruent with the 
availability heuristic research, this of course means that assessments of life-
satisfaction will be biased in predictable ways. 
Although this "feelings-as-information hypothesis" (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, Wyer 
& Carlston, 1979) can account for these results, so too can an explanation based on 
information accessibility. From this perspective, a person's momentary mood can 
impact on what information is rendered accessible in memory. For example, 
retrieving positive information about a happy life event prior to the judgment task 
renders that information highly accessible in memory and thus subsequent 
evaluations would be more positive in nature (e.g., Bower, 1981). Consequently, 
more direct evidence was needed to show that people rely on their own feelings and 
not on the contents of their thoughts when evaluative judgments are constructed. If 
decision-makers were really using the information provided by their momentary 
affective state as the primary basis for judgment, then if their feelings were 
considered uninformative for some reason they might not be used. This issue has 
been extensively investigated using misattribution paradigms (see Schwarz & Clore, 
1988, for a review). In a typical experiment in this area of research, some participants 
are led to believe that there is an external, yet plausible cause for the way they are 
feeling and others are given no such information. 
To illustrate, imagine that the experimenter told you that the soundproof room where 
you were being tested might make you feel tense and depressed (e.g., Schwarz & 
Clore. 1983). Accordingly. you might realise that it is the strange room that is 
causing your unhappy mood and, as a result. your feelings would not be used as a 
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source of information to guide the evaluative judgment. There is no point because 
they carry no informative value. That is, your feelings tell you nothing about your 
reaction to the object of judgment, for example how satisfied you are with life as a 
whole. On the other hand, when your reaction to the object of judgment contradicts 
the impact of this external factor (i.e., you feel happy with life, despite the fact that 
the room should be making you feel a little depressed), your feelings transmit 
informative cues about how you feel about the issue under investigation and thus are 
used as a basis for judgment. Such discounting and augmentation effects (Kelley, 
1972) have been demonstrated with much consistency in this affective domain (e.g .. 
Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983: Schwarz, Servay, & 
Kumpf, 1985; Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998). 
Collectively this research provides convincing evidence that affective states convey 
valuable information which is used to guide a wide range of evaluative jUdgments. 
Furthermore, by using misattribution paradigms, it has been revealed that the 
informational cues from affective experiences are only used as a basis for judgment 
when they can be attributed to the object under investigation. When there is another 
explanation that can account for these feelings (e.g., an external factor), they are not 
used as input to judgment. Thus, it is the informational value of these affective 
feelings that is considered by the experiencer when evaluative judgments are made 
(see Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988, 1996, for reviews). However, it is 
important to point out that even though individuals may understand that it is 
inappropriate to use their momentary affective state when it is does not reflect how 
they truly feel about the object of judgment, this does not imply that relying upon 
affective experiences involves conscious attribution about their source (see Schwarz, 
1990, for a more detailed discussion). Generally, we just assume that our experiences 
or feelings are a reaction to whatever we are thinking about at that moment in time. 
1.2.2 Bodily Feelings and Physical Judgments 
The role of subjective expenences In decision-making does not end here: other 
phenomenal experiences have also been investigated. As Clore (1992) pointed out 
"many of the most common feelings are not affective. For example. when we say we 
feel hungry. tired. or dizzy. we are not referring to emotions but to bodily feelings' 
(p. 141). In much the same way as atTectin~ states can be used as a source of 
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information when positive or negative evaluative judgments are generated. these 
kinds of bodily feelings may also serve as relevant input when asked about one ~ s 
physical state (see Schwarz & Clore, 1996, for a review). For example, when asked if 
you are hungry, tired, or dizzy, the bodily feeling relevant to the question at hand 
may be used to guide your answer. Research in this area indicates that individuals 
draw upon their perceived momentary arousal state as a judgment-relevant cue. 
unless its informational value is questioned for some reason (see Zanna & Cooper, 
1976; Zillman, 1978, for reviews). Thus, this line of inquiry also provides strong 
evidence that subjective states play a central role in the construction of human 
judgment. 
1.2.3 Cognitive Feelings and Cognitive Judgments 
Thus far, it has been noted that affective and bodily feelings may provide us with 
useful information for particular judgments. However, Clore (1992) and Clore and 
Parrott (1991) brought attention to a third class of feelings, namely "cognitive 
feelings" that may also communicate an informative message to the experiencer 
when certain cognitive judgments have to be made. In the same way that we 
experience happiness and sadness, or hunger and tiredness, we can have feelings of 
knowing, familiarity, effort, surprise, confusion, uncertainty, boredom, or 
amazement, to name only a few. It is these types of cognitive experiences that 
provide us with information about "our state of knowledge" (Clore, 1992). Even 
though these self-produced "feelings associated with knowing" (Schwarz & Clore, 
1996) are not affective in nature, they are still experienced everyday of our lives. 
Hence, they may also impact on our decisions and judgments. An understanding of 
their influence on decision-making is made possible by the fact that it is easy to elicit 
such cognitive feelings in the laboratory. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) were the first researchers to investigate the role of 
one of these cognitive experiences elicited by thinking in their work on the 
availability heuristic. As already discussed in detail, it was postulated that the ease 
experienced in bringing items of information to mind serves as useful information for 
estimating the frequency and probability of certain events. Although the subjective 
experience of ease accompanying processing operations is the primary focus of this 
chapter and related research will be reviewed shortly. it is an appropriate time to 
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briefly point out some other momentary cognitive experiences that have been studied 
(see Clore, 1992, for a review). For example. feelings of uncertainty have been found 
to playa role in judgments of understanding a poem (Clore & Parrott 1994). In a 
similar vein, the feeling of distraction may be used for judging if a lecture is boring 
(Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989), and the feeling of expectation can serve as a basis for 
deciding if a cartoon is funny (Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, & Wetzel. 1989). In each 
instance, some type of feeling that arises from the phenomenal experience of 
thinking is used as relevant information for making the particular kind of judgment 
under investigation. 
In summary, this research highlights that subjective states. specifically affective, 
bodily and cognitive feelings all appear to provide the experiencer with useful and 
valid information on which to base their evaluations and judgments. Of course, the 
type of subjective state has to be considered relevant to the specific judgment under 
investigation if it is to be utilised as a source of information (Schwarz & Clore, 
1996). Affective states seem to provide input for evaluative judgments, bodily 
feelings may convey information for physical judgments, and cognitive feelings 
appear to serve as cues for cognitive judgments. With this notion firmly in mind that 
individuals seem to rely on the information provided by their feelings to guide a wide 
variety of judgments, it is important to consider when and why such feelings or 
subjective experiences may be used in judgment formation. 
1.2.4 When and Why Do We Use Them? 
The most logical place to begin this discussion is with a point that has already been 
made, but it will be emphasised again here. At any given moment, an individual has 
access to a multitude of different kinds of feelings (Hardin & Rothman, 1997). 
However, the information provided by a specific feeling will only be used as a basis 
for judgment if it is perceived as relevant to the type of judgment that has to be made 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1996). For example, positive or negative affect can serve as a 
useful source of information for making positive or negative evaluative judgments 
(e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). On the other hand, this kind of elicited experience 
would not be very helpful if asked to estimate the frequency of a specific event. For 
this particular kind of judgment. the cognitive feeling of ease accompanying the 
retrieval of relevant eVl!nts from memory seems to convey an informative message 
- 13 -
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). That is. finding it easy to think of examples can be 
taken as evidence that the event must be a frequent one, otherwise it would have 
been more difficult to think of relevant examples. Thus, the important lesson to take 
away is that the subjective feeling state has to be directly related to the judgment in 
question. 
In the majority of studies investigating which informational cues enter into judgment, 
participants are asked to make inferences about objects that have no associated 
opinions already in mind (Sherman & Corty, 1984). As a result. little information 
may be available to participants (Schwarz & Clore, 1996), hence they may utilise the 
information provided by their immediate experiences. In direct contrast, when faced 
with a judgmental task that is so complex that decision-makers are overloaded with 
relevant and available information (Schwarz & Clore, 1996), they may turn to what 
their feelings are telling them instead of expending considerable time and cognitive 
effort arriving at a decision. Furthermore. situational factors can increase the 
complexity level of the judgment task. For example, when a person is under time 
pressure or is distracted in some way, subjective experiences provide a way to 
simplify the task at hand (Strack, 1992). Finally, another condition in which feelings 
may be consulted is when decision-makers are unmotivated (Strack, 1992). For 
example, decision-makers might not even care about the object of judgment under 
investigation (Branscombe & Cohen, 1991), so they are unwilling to expend large 
amounts of cognitive effort generating an appropriate answer. 
Any of these conditions may induce individuals to rely on a heuristic strategy for 
judgment based on their sUbjective experiences (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Taking 
into consideration the three classes of subjective states discussed earlier, affective, 
bodily and cognitive feelings, I next discuss why such feelings may be used, and in 
so doing show how reliance on them can simplify judgmental tasks. ludgment-
relevant cues for these three types of feelings maybe, "I'm really happy", "I'm 
hungry" and "It was really easy to bring those words to mind". These examples are 
given to show that we commonly have such feelings everyday of our lives and once 
they are evoked, 'they are immediately accessible to the indiyidual. That is, we have 
direct introspective access to them~ they can be "read" like an internal meter, and no 
inferences are necessary to determine their nature' (Strack. 1992, p. 257). \\'e 
automatically know if we are happy or sad. hungry or full, or if we are finding a task 
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relatively straightforward or mentally demanding, so it makes sense that \\e pay 
attention to the informational cues they convey to us. 
Furthermore, rarely do we analyse our feelings or give much thought to where they 
come from. Instead we simply take on board their meaning which is indicatiye of 
their informative function (Clore, 1992). Thus, as our feelings are meaningful to us. 
it follows logically that they may be used as a reliable and valid source of input to 
guide our judgmental outputs. What is more, we generally believe our feelings 
wholeheartedly. Hence, when they are used as a basis for judgment we are likely to 
be confident in our assessments, whether they are correct or not. A final reason for 
using subjective experiences is that they can be connected to the judgment under 
investigation in a simple manner (Strack, 1992). For example, if asked to evaluate 
your general satisfaction with life, then your affective state at that moment can 
provide the basis for your judgment. After all, our subjective experiences are 
automatically assumed to be caused by whatever occupies our thoughts at that time. 
Collectively these reasons show that using subjective experiences or feelings as a 
basis of judgment reflects a heuristic strategy as it minimises the cognitive effort 
required to arrive at a decision. No time or effort is wasted as judgments are 
constructed in a rapid and efficient manner. Basically. when this strategy is 
employed simpler judgments are guaranteed. However, this raises the question of 
whether decision-makers are aware that they use this route to judgment. Do they 
consciously draw conclusions based on their experiences? It would seem not to be 
the case. If people did have internal access to how such judgments were formed, then 
this judgmental heuristic would have been discovered many years ago via the method 
of introspection (Strack. 1992). Therefore. it seems that the immediacy of these 
experiences can cause decision-makers to use them as input for judgment without 
conscious awareness that they have actually done so. 
1.3 SUMMARY - TWO ROUTES TO JUDGMENT 
At this point. it is important to draw attention back to the question raised at the very 
beginning of this chapter. Namely, what type of information do we use to guide our 
judgmental outputs? The reyiewed research demonstrates that two separate lines of 
inquiry have emerged in an attempt to answer this important question in social 
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cognition. This work indicates that two different types of infonnation are available to 
us. Firstly, a very large body of research has highlighted that the important basis for 
people's judgments is the accessible contents of memory retrieval. Simply stated. 
what information comes to mind at the time the judgment has to be made is analysed, 
and is then used to shape our judgments and evaluations. However, more recenth', 
alternative lines of research have suggested that subjective expenences 
accompanying the process of thinking may also play a significant role in the 
formation of everyday judgments. Of special interest here is the proposition that 
experiential aspects of the retrieval process itself, namely the experience that 
something comes to mind easily is another type of input that enters into judgment 
and decision-making. In this way. how infonnation comes to mind is considered to 
be the vital factor. 
This latter explanation was first suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1973). and as 
a revolutionary idea that broke away from the traditional emphasis on accessible 
content, it can be regarded as a milestone in the study of judgment and decision-
making. As previously discussed, these researchers explored the role of ease of 
retrieval in the class of judgments relating to frequency and probability. Later in this 
chapter, more recent research that has investigated this idea will be discussed in 
detail. However, at this juncture, it is important to draw attention to a large body of 
research which has shown that the fluency of processing operations, that is. the ease 
with which information is processed can also serve as input to a wide range of 
metacognitive judgments (see Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; 
Kelley & Jacoby, 1996a, for reviews). 
Prior to this review, it is important to point out that although we instinctively believe 
our feelings, it has already been shown that sometimes relying upon them can 
mislead us. For example, participants using the subjective ease with which 
information can be brought to mind as a cue to guide judgments of frequency and 
probability were often inaccurate in their evaluations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
The problem was that participants failed to realise that factors other than frequency 
and probability (e.g., how vivid or salient the remembered examples were: Nisbett & 
Ross. 1980) could ha\'e caused certain items of infonnation to be retrie\'ed more 
easily from memory. Under such conditions. reliance on the availability heuristic 
(i.e.. the subjective experience of ease of retrieval) rests on a process of 
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misattribution (Clore & Parrott, 1991). Judgments can easily be led astray when the 
impact of other information is not considered. In fact, as you \\111 observe there are 
many situations in which individuals fail to recognise the true source of their 
momentary cognitive experiences, but nevertheless still use them as a valid basis for 
the judgment at hand. 
1.4 FLUENCY OF PROCESSING OPERATIONS 
1.4.1 Processing Fluency and Metacognitive Judgments 
One such cognitive experience that appears to act as information for judgment is the 
feeling of familiarity that an item elicits. The subjective experience of familiarity 
may arise from the experienced ease of processing and thus these two kinds of 
experiences are very closely linked (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). A prime example of 
reliance on this type of experiential information comes from the research carried out 
by Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989). These authors demonstrated that the 
feeling of familiarity that is elicited by a name is used to judge whether the named 
person is famous or not. Participants were asked to read aloud a list of names and 
were informed that they all related to nonfamous individuals. At this point, some 
participants were asked to return 24-hours later for further testing, whereas others 
immediately completed the second part of the experiment. This involved the list of 
nonfamous names being presented again, in addition to some new nonfamous and 
famous names. The task was simply to decide whether each name in the list was that 
of a famous person. It is important to note that the famous names pertained to only 
moderately well known individuals, so that they could be recognised as famous 
without being able to specify exactly why this was the case. By selecting names in 
this way, it made it more likely that fame judgments would be based on the 
subjective familiarity of each name presented. 
The results showed that the nonfamous names from the initial list were more often 
mistakenly judged as famous than the nonfamous names that were only presented in 
the second list. The prior presentation of the nonfamous names enhanced the fluency 
with which these names were processed. This in turn. elicited a feeling that these 
non famous names were familiar causing them to be incorrectly judged as famous. 
Moreover. after a 24-hour delay this effect of false fame was even more prominent. 
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Presumably, participants tested promptly after reading the initial list were more 
confident that the nonfamous names were not famous as they remembered being told 
explicitly that this was the case when they were first presented. As such, they could 
attribute their feelings of familiarity to the correct source, namely to seeing the 
nonfamous names previously. However, after a 24-hour delay, participants 
misattributed their feelings of familiarity to the target person actually being famous. 
This suggests that, over time, participants were unable to consciously identify the 
real cause of why a name seemed familiar (e.g., a prior presentation) and as a result 
relied upon a misleading source of information to guide their judgments of fame. 
This research was described at length because the implications of this work at a more 
general level need to be highlighted before other relevant research can be discussed. 
As Jacoby and Kelley (1987) suggested, 'people are often unconsciously influenced 
by memory' (p. 314), namely by memory of their past experiences. In the fame-
judgment experiment discussed above, simply by rereading a nonfamous name, the 
familiarity of it is unconsciously influenced and this experience makes it more likely 
that it will be later incorrectly judged as famous. This example nicely illustrates how 
the effects of a prior presentation can influence subjective experience. When 
individuals do not recollect that the subjective experience of familiarity or processing 
fluency comes from a previous presentation, they very often end up attributing it 
incorrectly to some other salient factor of the present task, in this instance, perceived 
fame. Consequently, when subjective experience is used as a basis for judgment, we 
can easily be misguided in the inferences we make. 
To take a more relevant example as you are reading through my thesis, you will no 
doubt be judging the quality of my writing. One way to form such a judgment would 
be to rely on the information provided by your experienced ease of processing 
(Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). Finding it easy to follow the progression of ideas 
throughout my thesis would probably result in a positive evaluation being made. 
However, imagine (but only for a moment) that you are finding it quite difficult to 
follow the ideas presented. In this case. you might evaluate my work rather more 
negatively. However. my advice would be to reread it. In doing so. you should find 
that paragraphs that seemed unclear at first suddenly seem to make sense. This 
clarity occurs because by simply reading the thesis for a second time. the ideas 
within it are processed more fluently. This in turn makes it more likely that you will 
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judge it in a positive light. Thus, this illustration shows that rereading my thesis 
would unconsciously influence the subjective experience of ease of processing. Once 
this experience of ease is elicited, it is very difficult to ignore. The consequence 
being that the evaluation of the quality of my writing may be altered for the better. 
A large number of demonstrations across a wide range of judgment domains 
confirms that the unconscious influence of past experience is widespread (Jacoby & 
Kelley, 1987). Feelings of familiarity or the processing fluency gained from seeing 
an item previously not only causes a nonfamous name to be judged as famous, but it 
can also instigate the belief that a statement is true. A number of researchers (e.g., 
Bacon, 1979; Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977) 
have shown that when plausible statements about unknown topics are repeatedly 
presented, judgments of their truth increased relative to statements that had not been 
seen before. These illusions occur because people misattribute the familiarity of the 
information resulting from the statements being previously presented to the 
information actually being true (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992). This research 
suggests that when we decide if something is true, we rely upon how familiar it 
seems. As Clore (1992) interestingly pointed out, 'it is often observed that if one tells 
a lie often enough, people begin to believe it' (p. 146). Together this work shows that 
the subjective experience of ease of processing plays an important role in shaping 
people's cognitive judgments such as knowing and believing. 
The following examples also illustrate that relying upon subjective experience as a 
source of information for judgment can be misleading. When individuals fail to take 
into account that fluent processing stems from a prior experience, they may instead 
misattribute this experienced ease to other salient factors of the current task. 
Witherspoon and Allan (1985) presented words on a computer at very fast rates (30-
or 50-msecs) and participants were asked to judge how long each word stayed on the 
screen. This judgment was made by pressing one of four buttons (very short, short, 
long, or very long). Some of the words had been read earlier and others had not. The 
results showed that longer duration judgments were reported for the words that had 
been previously presented than for the words that had not been seen earlier. Thus. the 
prior experience of seeing thl.? words increased the ease with which they were 
processed. but this experience of ease was not attributed to its real cause. Instead the 
effect of a prior presentation was misattributed to a longer presentation duration. 
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Evidence of similar misattribution effects can be observed in an experiment carried 
out by Jacoby, Allan. Collins, and Larwill (1988). Participants listened to sentences 
played against a background of white noise and were asked to judge the loudness of 
the background noise for each sentence presented. As in the experiment above, some 
of the sentences had been presented in an earlier part of the experiment. whereas 
others were completely new when the noise judgments were made. In line with the 
duration-judgment results, participants reported the background noise to be less loud 
when they heard sentences that had been previously presented compared to when 
they listened to new sentences. Once again, the fluency accompanying information 
processing was misattributed to a lower background noise level instead of to the 
impact of the prior presentation. 
In both of these examples, the enhanced ease of processing caused by the previous 
presentation of a word or a sentence could not be ignored, and hence, it was used as 
input for the judgment in question. However, even though the information provided 
by this experience was taken on board, failure to identify its actual source resulted in 
misinterpreting the fluency to a change in the physical nature of the stimulus, namely 
to a longer duration or to a lower noise level. Such demonstrations clearly reveal that 
the past has a strong influence on our 'perception and interpretation of later events' 
(J acoby & Kelley, 1987, p. 314), even though the relevant past experience is not 
recognised. In fact, the above authors pointed out that there seems to be little we can 
do to avoid memory of a previous presentation influencing subjective experience. 
Thus, it follows that when this experience is used as a basis for judgment, a resultant 
negative consequence is that judgments are left open to error because not all the 
information is considered. Unfortunately, the downside of this is that people's 
judgments are not always accurate. 
Taking this one step further, Jacoby and Kelley (1987) explored whether people use 
their experience of processing fluency when judgments about others are made. To 
demonstrate, participants were asked to rate how difficult other people would find it 
to solve anagrams. Some had read the solution words for the anagrams from a list 
presented earlier in the experiment, yet for others the anagrams were new when the 
judgments had to be made. For those participants who had previously seen the 
answers, the anagram-solving task was experienced as easy - after all. they had just 
seen the answers. The results revealed that those participants rated the anagram task 
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as easIer for other people compared to the group of participants who had not 
previously seen the solution words. In fact this was the case even though the 
participants were actually informed that the people they were making the judgment 
for would not see the solutions to the anagrams. This was taken as evidence that 
participants used their own experienced ease of processing as a basis for judging the 
difficulty of the anagrams for others. As in the other examples discussed. having 
recently seen the answers to the anagram problems increased how fluently the 
anagrams themselves were processed and this experience was then misattributed to 
the task being easy. As Kelley and Jacoby (1996a) note 'the ability to make accurate 
predictions of judgments for others is central for clear communication and smooth 
social interactions' (p. 291). Thus, it is a little worrying to find out that reliance on 
SUbjective experience still prevails even though it can lead to unreliable social 
predictions. 
It is worthwhile drawing attention to a later study conducted by Kelley and Jacoby 
(1996b, Expt. 2). Under certain circumstances, it was found that subjective 
experience could be discounted as a relevant source of information for predicting the 
difficulty of anagram solving for other people. For this to happen, participants had to 
be explicitly informed that some of the anagrams would seem easy because they had 
previously seen the solution words and they had to be warned that this experience of 
processing ease should not mislead them when formulating their judgments. In 
addition, after solving the anagrams, recognition judgments had to be made as to 
whether the solution word had been presented earlier (old) or not (new). Both factors 
were found to be necessary to avoid a prior presentation impacting upon their 
judgments of how difficult other people would find the anagrams. 
From this array of research, it is very clear that when processing fluency is used to 
guide people' s judgmental outputs, inferential errors can arise. This occurs because 
individuals very often are unaware and lack understanding that a prior presentation 
of an item enhances how fluently it is processed (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987). As a 
result. when the item is shown again, the accompanying processing ease is 
misattributed to other relevant factors of the task. Naturally, the most obvious source 
to draw upon is whatever kind of judgment is required in the experiment. As the 
reviewed work demonstrates. individuals use their subjective experience of ease of 
processing to guide their judgments of a person's fame or the truth of a statement. It 
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has also been shown to influence the physical nature of events, such as judgments 
about duration and noise. Finally, the fluency of processing operations is even used 
as a relevant cue when people make judgments for other people, such as predicting 
the difficulty of problem solving. 
Many researchers in this domain consider reliance on subjective experience to be a 
"nonanalytic" route to judgment formation (e.g., Jacoby 1988: Jacoby & Brooks, 
1984). This is because people's judgments can be unconsciously influenced by a 
number of factors, some relevant for the judgment at hand, but others completely 
irrelevant. It has been observed throughout this discussion on processing fluency that 
the irrelevant influence of a prior presentation cannot be ignored when nonanalytical 
judgments are constructed. However, in some of the examples reviewed, individuals 
discounted the information provided by their subjective experience as they realised 
that it could be misleading (e.g., Jacoby et aL 1989: Kelley & Jacoby, 1996b). Under 
such circumstances, it has been suggested that people adopt a more '"analytic" 
judgmental strategy. In this case, the real cause of fluent processing is understood 
and thus, memory of a previous experience does not influence subsequent judgments 
(e.g., Jacoby, 1988; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989). However, as this approach 
requires considerable effort, most individuals seem to opt for a judgmental strategy 
based on subjective experience (e.g., Jacoby, 1988). In summary, this body of 
research has demonstrated that processing fluency has a pervasive influence on a 
wide range of metacognitive judgments. 
1.4.2 Retrieval Fluency and Metacognitive Judgments 
In the same way that some things are more easily processed than others, we often 
find that some types of information can be brought to mind effortlessly, whereas 
recalling other information is considerably more difficult. For example, our e-mail 
address can be retrieved from memory very easily, but could we say the same of our 
friends' addresses, probably not. As such, this experienced ease of retrieval seems to 
tell us something about our degree of knowledge, in this instance, how well we know 
e-mail addresses. Although Tversky and Kahneman (1973) first explored this idea of 
using ease of item retrieval to guide judgments of frequency and probability, 
subsequent lines of research have also demonstrated that how easily something 
comes to mind can influence metacogniti\'~ judgments. 
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One such judgment that has been investigated is confidence in question answering. 
That is, when a question is asked and an answer comes to mind, how do we know it 
is correct? One possibility is that we have more confidence in our answer when we 
can generate much supporting evidence for it (e.g., Graesser & Hemphill. 1991; 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff. 1980). However, it has recently been suggested 
that this analysis of confidence is incomplete. In line with the general theme of this 
chapter, an alternative explanation highlights the role of subjective experiences that 
accompany the retrieval process itself. Specifically, the ease with which an answer is 
brought to mind may also be used as a reliable basis for confidence (e.g., 
Costermans, Lories, & Ansay, 1992; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Nelson & Narens, 
1990). 
In a number of experiments, Kelley and Lindsay (1993) provided convmcmg 
evidence for an experience-based explanation. Participants were asked to answer a 
number of general knowledge questions. such as, "What was Buffalo Bill's last 
name?" As in the other research discussed, fluency or ease of retrieval was 
manipulated by having participants read a list of words before attempting to answer 
the questions. Some of these words were the correct answers to the questions, 
whereas others were plausible, but actually incorrect answers. It was assumed that 
this prior reading of an answer (whether it is correct or not) causes it to quickly and 
easily spring to mind when relevant questions are later asked. Accordingly, it was 
hypothesised that this ease of item retrieval may contribute to the feeling of greater 
confidence in the accuracy of the answer. 
This is exactly what Kelley and Lindsay (1993) observed, thereby demonstrating the 
causal role of retrieval ease in confidence. Participants gave their answers to the 
general knowledge questions more quickly and reported more confidence in them 
when they came to mind easily. Of course, for some questions this meant that the 
right answer was actually given as that word had been presented earlier. However, 
for others an incorrect answer had been primed so illusions of knowing occurred. In 
another experiment, Kelley and Lindsay (1993, Expt. 2) found that even when 
participants were explicitly informed that some of the studied answers were correct 
and some were incorrect. the same pattern of results emerged. 
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This research clearly shows that the ease with which infonnation comes to mind 
serves as an infonnative cue for metacognitive judgments. Benjamin and Bjork 
(1996) have noted that, 'clearly, it makes sense to use retrieval fluency as an 
indicator of what we know' (p. 321). However, it has been observed that relying 
upon this judgmental heuristic still prevails even though individuals are likely to 
suffer from illusions about their own level of knowledge - we think we know more 
than we actually do! By using retrieval fluency as a basis for confidence, perceivers 
were confident in their answers to general knowledge questions even when they were 
wrong. These judgmental biases occurred because individuals failed to understand 
that certain items of information came to mind more easily because they were 
presented previously in an earlier part of the experiment. A prior presentation 
impacts on subjective experience unconsciously, so its effects were not recognised. 
Thus, instead of attributing the momentary cognitive experience to its correct source. 
the facilitating effects of ease were misattributed to feeling confident in the answer 
given. After all, in an experiment nothing is more striking than the object of 
judgment under investigation. 
1.4.3 Summary 
It therefore appears that people taking part in experiments are generally motivated to 
simply answer the question posed or make the judgment required, rather than 
identifying where the answer or evaluation comes from (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 
1989). A judgmental heuristic based on the fluency of processing or retrieval 
operations fulfils this need. Judgments can be constructed quickly and with minimal 
effort. Although this discussion has focused on the errors that arise from utilising this 
judgmental strategy, it is important to bear in mind that these biases are a 
consequence of experimental design. With careful planning and specific 
manipulations in place. it becomes very easy to mislead the participants taking part. 
As noted by Kelley & Jacoby (1996a), such errors "are useful for revealing the basis 
for judgments' (p. 305). 
In combination, this body of research has demonstrated that people use subjective 
experiences that accompany information processing to guide their metacognitive 
judgments. Such cognitive experiences provide the decision-maker with valuable 
infonnation. and accordingly, seem to be used frequently in judgment fonnation. An 
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understanding of their role in shaping people's jUdgmental outputs is made possible 
by the fact that these kinds of cognitive experiences are easy to elicit in experimental 
situations. A common factor of all the studies described so far rests on how this was 
done. Some kind of priming procedure (e.g., a prior presentation) is employed as a 
way of directly manipulating the ease or the fluency with which an item is processed 
or retrieved. Priming some target item by presenting it earlier in the experiment has 
been found to temporarily increase its cognitive accessibility in memory (e.g .. 
Higgins et aI., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979). This occurs even when the item is 
presented in a task that seems unrelated to the later judgmental task. When this is 
followed by a task that cues this item in some way, it is processed or retrieved with 
marked facility. 
It is important however, to draw attention to the fact that Tversky and Kahneman' s 
(1973) seminal work on the availability heuristic (i.e .. the subjective experience of 
ease of retrieval) did not employ this kind of procedure. In contrast, the subjective 
demands of retrieval were manipulated by selecting items for study that were 
presumed to be already differentially available in memory. To reiterate on one of 
their studies previously discussed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, Expt. 3), 
participants were asked to judge whether a certain letter (e.g., k) is more likely to 
occur in the first position of an English word or in the third position. Thus, by 
choosing two classes of words that were assumed to be more (words beginning with 
k) or less (words containing k in the third position) available in memory, retrieval 
ease was indirectly manipulated. In line with this assumption, participants 
overestimated the frequency of the fonner class of words relative to the latter class, 
even though this was in fact the wrong answer. This error in judgment occurred 
because it was presumably easier to think of words beginning with the letter k than 
words containing k in the third position. Thus, the subjective experience of ease of 
retrieval was emphasised as the important basis for frequency judgments. 
1.5 PROBLEMS WITH THE AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC 
Although Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) research has been very influential in 
highlighting the role of retrieval ease in judgments of frequency. likelihood. and 
typicality. it is important to point out a major shortcomi ng of this work \\"hich was 
emphasised by Schwarz. Bless. Strack. Klumpp. Rittenauer-Schatka, and Simons 
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(1991). By manipulating the differential availability of two classes of words in 
memory. the process of memory retrieval can be affected in two different ways. Not 
only can availability cause a difference in how easily examples from each class of 
words can be brought to mind, but also the numerical amount of infonnation 
retrieved may vary as a function of this as well. When retrieving example words is 
experienced as easy, it could be argued that a greater number of exemplars are 
generated. Unfortunately, this means that an alternative explanation can also account 
for Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) findings. Instead of using the experienced ease 
evoked by memory retrieval operations as a cue to judgment. frequency estimates 
may have been based on the number of words actually retrieved. A judgmental 
strategy that relies on either type of infonnation, that is. the subjective experience of 
ease of retrieval, or the content of memory retrieval would result in the same 
inference being made. Specifically, higher frequency estimates for words beginning 
with a certain letter. As this was indeed the finding observed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973, Expt. 3), Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) noted that it remains unclear 
which is the underlying process of frequency estimation. 
In another of Tversky and Kahneman's studies (1973, Expt. 8). the same problem 
exists. Participants listened to two lists of people's names. One contained the names 
of 19 famous men and 20 less famous women, and the other included 19 famous 
women and 20 less famous men. Following this listening task, some participants 
were asked to judge whether the names of men or women occurred more frequently 
in the lists, whereas others were asked to recall as many of the names as possible. 
The results revealed that participants judged the gender which related to the more 
famous names as more frequent. As such, they believed that more men's names were 
presented in the first list, yet more women's names in the second. Once again, this 
was in error as the reverse was actually true. The authors proposed an experience-
based explanation for these biased assessments. Finding it easier to bring the famous 
names to mind than the less famous ones led participants to infer that the gender 
associated with more famous names was more frequent. In the other study discussed 
previously (Tversky & Kahneman. 1973, Expt. 3) no retrieval task was perfonned, 
but it can be presumed that when retrieval of example words is experienced as easy. 
this would be accompanied by a greater number of examples being generated. 
However. the results of this experiment showed that indeed more famous names were 
actually retrieved from memory than less famous ones. in fact. nearly twice the 
- 26-
amount. Thus, judgments of frequency may have been based on the ease with which 
the names could be brought to mind, or on the number of names actually recalled. As 
in the previous study, using either judgmental strategy would lead to the same 
assessment being made. Unfortunately, this makes it all the more difficult to 
determine which one is used. 
In fact, most of the studies supporting the availability heuristic suffer from the same 
complications (see Sherman & Corty, 1984; Taylor, 1982: Taylor & Thompson, 
1982, for reviews). For example, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) found that death by 
accident was judged as more likely than death by stroke. The availability heuristic 
predicts that as memory is scanned for relevant cases of each cause of death, 
examples of fatal accidents pop to mind more easily than examples of fatal strokes. 
Perhaps this occurs as a result of these types of events receiving more media 
attention (e.g., newspapers, television). As such, the experience of ease 
accompanying the retrieval of such events can explain why death by accident is 
misjudged as more likely. However. in line with the other examples discussed, the 
observed results can also be explained by a judgmental strategy based on the actual 
products of the retrieval process. Finding it easy to recall examples of fatal accidents 
would presumably cause an increase in the amount of examples retrieved. 
Together, these examples clearly illustrate that a major problem surrounds this 
research. Most of the studies bearing on the availability heuristic are left open to the 
alternative interpretation that the products of memory retrieval serve as the basis for 
judgment. Naturally, this leaves us wondering which type of information enters into 
judgment. Do we rely upon the subjective experience of ease of retrieval as a cue to 
guide our judgmental outputs, or on the descriptive contents of what we retrieve? 
Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) note that the lack of clarity on this issue stems from the 
fact that experimental manipulations designed to increase how easily information 
comes to mind can also have the effect of increasing the amount of information that 
comes to mind. Of course, the direct consequence of this is that it is very difficult to 
be certain which process is responsible for guiding people's judgments of frequency, 
likelihood. and typicality. 
However. as the content-based explanation is the more traditional and widely 
accepted hypothesis. the assumed role of retrieval ease \vas called into question by 
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these ambiguities. What was needed was more conclusive research showing that the 
sUbjective experience of ease of retrieval serves as informati\'e input to social 
judgment on its own - that is, completely separate from the actual information 
retrieved. Taylor (1982) noted that if this was not the case, the availability heuristic 
would be rather redundant as a theory because ·one's judgments are always based on 
what comes to mind' (p.1 99). 
1.6 TWO BASES FOR JUDGMENT: CONTENT VS. SUBJECTIVE 
EXPERIENCE 
This knotty issue was left unresolved for a while, in large part because these two 
bases for judgment had been explored separately in the decision-making literature. 
Moreover, an experimental paradigm had to be devised in which the content of 
retrieval and the experienced ease of retrieval would lead to opposite judgmental 
decisions. It was the impressive work carried out by Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) 
that managed to successfully unravel these two competing explanations of judgment 
formation. 
To demonstrate how this was done, let us consider the scenario again where a person 
is asked to evaluate the quality of their time at school. Suppose that some people are 
asked to recall 6 positive pieces of information about their schooling and others have 
to recall 12 positive pieces of information. Note however, that as individuals try to 
remember a large number of examples, it is more than likely that they will 
experience some difficulty in doing so. In stark contrast, recalling a smaller number 
is considered to be a much easier task. After the required amount of information is 
brought to mind, imagine that they are all asked to evaluate the quality of their time 
at school. This type of retrieval task provides the decision-maker with two possible 
bases for judgment. That is, the actual contents of retrieval and the experienced ease 
or difficulty of retrieval. As you will see below, evaluations of school life would be 
very different depending on which type of information is utilised to guide such 
judgments. 
A content-based explanation would predict that indi\'iduals should evaluate their 
time at school as more enjoyable after 12 positive pieces of information are recalled 
than after 6 positi\'c examples arc brought to mind. According to this hypothesis, 
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recalling these examples makes them highly accessible in memory, so when they are 
asked to make an evaluation it is the content of retrieval that serves as input to the 
judgment. As such, school ratings are based on the descriptive meaning of what 
comes to mind; the more positive examples retrieved, the better the evaluation. 
Contrast this however with an experience-based prediction. Individuals who were 
given the demanding task of recalling 12 positive thoughts should judge their time at 
school as less enjoyable than those individuals who only had to recall 6 examples. 
Note that reliance on this judgment strategy causes the exact opposite evaluation to 
be made. According to this hypothesis, individuals who experience difficulty 
bringing positive examples to mind interpret it to mean that their time at school could 
not have been that enjoyable, otherwise it would not have been so hard to think of 
relevant examples. Thus, even though these individuals recalled twice as many 
positive thoughts about their schooling, the difficulty or effort experienced in doing 
so may have the interesting, but counterintuitive effect of decreasing their 
evaluations of how enjoyable school life actually was. In this way, school ratings are 
based on the informational implications of how easy or difficult it was to bring 
examples to mind; the more demanding and effortful, the worse the evaluation. In 
line with the other subjective states discussed earlier, relying on subjective 
experiences that accompany the retrieval process can bias the evaluations made. The 
difficulty encountered in generating many positive examples is attributed to school 
life being rather negative when in fact this experience is a direct consequence of task 
demands. However, if this is not understood, judgments can be influenced 
unconsciously. 
As noted earlier, the way in which the subjective experience of ease of retrieval was 
manipulated by past research was also likely to increase the amount of information 
that came to mind (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). For this reason, strong 
conclusions could not be drawn about the underlying process mediating judgment as 
both strategies would lead to the same outcomes (Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991). 
However, the above example clearly illustrates that when the subjective demands of 
retrieval (ease or difficulty) are manipulated by varying the amount of information 
that has to be generated in a retrieval task (few or many examples). these problems 
are overcome. This method of manipulation is successful in increasing how easily 
infomlation is brought to mind. but at the same time decreasing how much 
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information is retrieved. Consequently, reliance on each type of information leads to 
completely opposite judgmental decisions making it possible to determine which is 
driving the judgment made. It is important to bear in mind that this school example is 
purely hypothetical, yet considered in detail as a way of highlighting how the distinct 
influences of the content of retrieval and the experienced ease of retrieval can be 
unravelled in judgment formation. This is important to understand because seyeral 
studies have tested this idea. Furthermore, this is the paradigm that inspired the 
current research. 
1.6.1 Retrieval Experiences as Information: Self-Related Judgment 
It was Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) who devised and first used this methodology 
(easy versus difficult retrieval operations) in a series of experiments. By placing the 
two competing explanations for judgment in opposition, it was possible to determine 
whether people rely on the content of retrieval or on the phenomenal experience of 
retrieval itself when specific judgments are furnished. In this research, people's 
assessment of their own assertiveness was the judgment under investigation. 
Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991, Expt. 1) asked participants to provide instances of their 
own assertive or unassertive behaviour. In each of these conditions, half the 
participants recalled and wrote down 6 behavioural episodes and the other half had to 
do the same for 12 behavioural episodes. Pre-testing had established that it was 
relatively easy to come up with 6 examples, whereas it was much more difficult to 
bring 12 examples to mind. It is important to note that even though this latter task 
was experienced as more effortful and difficult, all participants could complete it. 
After the required number of behavioural episodes had been generated, participants 
were asked to evaluate their own assertiveness on a 10-point scale (the higher the 
value, the higher the assertiveness). Following this judgment task, participants rated 
how much difficulty they had experienced generating the examples. This was done 
using a scale "ranging from not at all difficult (1) to very difficult (10)' and provided 
"a direct measure of experienced ease of recall' (Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991, p. 196). 
There was no surprise in terms of the difficulty ratings. In line with pre-testing, 
participants reported that it was easier to recall 6 rather than 12 instances that 
typified their assertive or unassertive behaviour. However. the judgments of self-
assertiveness reyealed an interesting pattern. As expected, self-reports of 
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assertiveness were higher after 6 assertive behaviours were brought to mind rather 
than 6 unassertive behaviours. Thus. when retrieving examples was experienced as 
easy, self-judgments were in line with the descriptive meaning of the accessible 
information retrieved from memory. A judgment strategy based on the contents of 
retrieval would also predict that ratings of assertiveness should be higher following 
the retrieval of 12 rather than 6 assertive behaviours and lower following the retrieval 
of 12 rather than 6 unassertive behaviours. After all, more examples that typify that 
kind of behaviour are recalled from memory. However, this pattern of results did not 
emerge. Interestingly, the exact opposite was found. 
Participants who had recalled 12 examples of assertive behaviour rated themselyes as 
less assertive than those who had recalled 6 assertive behaviours. In a similar vein, 
participants inferred that they were more assertive after recalling 12 rather than 6 
examples of unassertive behaviour. This was the case even though participants in the 
12-example condition had recalled twice as many self-behaviours that typified high 
or low assertiveness. Furthermore, it was found that participants returned higher 
ratings of assertiveness following the retrieval of 12 unassertive behaviours rather 
than 12 assertive ones. Thus, when retrieving examples was experienced as difficult 
the trait inferences were the exact opposite to what would be expected if a content-
based strategy had been utilised. 
This pattern of results strongly implied that participants were not simply paying 
attention to the number of examples they actually generated, but instead Schwarz, 
Bless, et a1. (1991) suggested that they reflected on the ease or difficulty with which 
the examples came to mind. The rationale was that participants who had to report 12 
assertive (or unassertive) behaviours experienced difficulty in bringing this 
information to mind. Participants then translated this experience of retrieval 
difficulty to mean that the examples generated could not be very frequent and typical 
examples of their normal behaviour, otherwise it would not have been so difficult to 
think of behaviours that exemplified that particular trait. As a result. this prompted 
them to infer that they must not be very assertive (or unassertive) in eyeryday life. 
However, it is worthwhile pointing out that Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) considered 
an alternatin? explanation for these findings. EYen though participants were able to 
successfully recollect 12 instances of their own assertiYe or unassertive behayiour, it 
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was possible that they gave less persuasive examples towards the end of the task in 
order to complete it. As such, the items generated last may have been more 
accessible in memory when they judged their own assertiveness. Unfortunately. if 
this occurred, a content-based judgmental strategy could also account for the pattern 
of results found. However, a content analysis of the last two examples reported by 
participants revealed that they did not become less persuasive over the course of the 
retrieval task (Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991, Expt. 2). In fact, to the contrary they 
found that the final two behavioural episodes in the 12-example condition typified 
the requested behaviour better than the last two examples reported in the 6-example 
condition. Consequently, the possibility that participants' judgments of assertiveness 
were based on the differential contents of retrieval was ruled out as an explanation 
for the results. 
This analysis gave greater strength to the authors' conclusions that participants relied 
on their subjective experience of retrieval ease or difficulty when assessing their own 
assertiveness. Although this idea has to be credited to Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973), their work on the availability heuristic was inconclusive as the findings could 
also be explained by the content-based hypothesis. However, by using ingenious 
manipulations to disentangle these two competing explanations, Schwarz, Bless, et 
al. (1991) provided convincing evidence that how information is retrieved from 
memory acts as a separate judgmental process from what information is retrieved. 
Thus, in line with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) original proposition, individuals 
estimate the frequency, likelihood, or typicality of an event by 'the ease with which 
relevant instances come to mind' (p. 207). Furthermore, this new research extended 
the availability heuristic by showing that not only may judgments of frequency, 
likelihood, and typicality increase when retrieving examples is experienced as easy. 
but also these judgments may decrease when it is difficult to bring examples to mind. 
In this way, the phenomenal experiences of ease and difficulty elicited by memory 
retrieval operations lie at opposite ends of a continuum and have differential effects 
on judgmental outcomes (Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991). 
I t is important to note that even though this experimental paradigm was successful in 
revealing the existence and importance of retrieval experiences in decision-making. 
another way to provide more direct evidence is to show that sometimes it is used as a 
basis for judgment and at other times it is not. Schwarz. Bless. et al. (1991) did 
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acknowledge that this is not the only judgmental strategy that decision-makers 
employ. Rather, in some situations how easily infonnation comes to mind may serve 
as a more revealing judgment-cue than the actual content of the infonnation itself, 
yet in other situations the reverse may be true. 
In related research already discussed, the infonnative role of affective experiences in 
judgment fonnation has been extensively investigated (see Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz 
& Clore, 1988, 1996, for reviews). The results from this experimental work reveal 
that people consider the infonnational value of their momentary affective state when 
asked to make evaluative judgments (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). It was found that 
people only rely on their affective experience (e.g., momentary mood) when they can 
attribute it (rightly or wrongly) to the judgment under investigation. However, when 
people are induced to misattribute the affective experience to the impact of an 
external factor, then it is not used as a basis for judgment. These augmentation and 
discounting effects (Kelley, 1972) provide a strong case that affective experiences 
are used to guide people's evaluative judgments. Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) 
recognised that the 'perceived diagnosticity of ease of retrieval' (p. 198) could also 
be varied using misattribution manipulations to detennine if these cognitive 
experiences follow the same logic. 
1.6.1.1 Questioning the Informational Value of One's Experiences 
To test this idea, Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991, Expt. 3) used the same procedure as 
before. Participants were asked to recall either 6 or 12 examples of their own 
assertive or unassertive behaviour. However, this time as participants perfonned the 
retrieval task they listened to a piece of meditation music via some headphones. Half 
of the participants were infonned that this music would facilitate the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories involving assertive behavioural episodes and the other 
half were told that it would facilitate the retrieval of unassertive behavioural 
episodes. 
In the conditions where participants believe that their expenences of ease or 
difficulty of retrieval are caused by the music. it was presumed that they would 
consider their accessibility experiences to be uninfonnatin~ when later asked to judge 
their own assertiveness. For example. when retrieving 6 assertive behaviours is 
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experienced as easy, this manipulation would make participants think that the 
experience of ease tells them nothing about their true assertiveness because it simply 
reflects the music's influence. In the same way, finding it subjectively difficult to 
recall 12 assertive behaviours would not be considered very informative when 
participants believe that the music facilitates the retrieval of the opposite kind of 
behavioural episodes to those they are required to recall. After all, participants can 
blame their experienced difficulty on the music. In contrast, in the conditions where 
participants' experiences of ease or difficulty of retrieval actually contradict the 
effects of the music, it was presumed that their retrieval experiences would be 
considered very informative. For example, experiencing difficulty retrieving 12 
assertive behaviours even when the music is meant to facilitate this kind of retrieval 
should make participants think about its informative value. That is. the experienced 
difficulty must tell them something about their own level of assertiveness. 
Consistent with the findings observed for affective expenences, participants 
considered the apparent informational value of their retrieval experiences when 
evaluations of self-assertiveness were made. That is, they only relied on the 
subjective experience of ease or difficulty of bringing examples to mind when it was 
considered informative. As such, the results found in Experiment 1 were replicated 
again here. Lower ratings of assertiveness were reported after 12 assertive 
behaviours were recalled from memory rather than after 6 assertive behaviours. In 
contrast, higher ratings of assertiveness followed recall of 12 unassertive behaviours 
rather than after 6 unassertive behaviours. However, when participants' experiences 
of ease or difficulty could be explained by the influence of the music, their retrieval 
experiences were discounted as a basis for evaluating self-assertiveness. Participants 
must have realised that relying on them would be pointless because they were 
uninformative. As a result of this, participants turned to a content-based strategy 
paying attention to the number and descriptive meaning of the examples they 
retrieved to guide their assessments. Accordingly, trait inferences were the exact 
opposite to those based on subjective experience. Higher ratings of assertiveness 
were reported after 12 assertive behaviours were brought to mind rather than after 6 
assertive behaviours. and lower ratings of assertiveness were given after 12 
unassertive behaviours were recalled from memory than after 6 unassertive 
behaviours. 
In summary, this pattern of augmentation and discounting effects (Kelley. 191'2) 
convincingly demonstrates that the subjective experience of ease or difficulty 
accompanying memory retrieval can serve as a source of information for self-related 
judgment separately from the content of memory retrieval. Sometimes the experience 
of ease or difficulty is used as a basis for judgment and at other times it is not. It 
seems that when individuals are asked to form a judgment about their own 
assertiveness they pay special attention to the informational value of their retrieval 
experiences. Importantly, when they offer useful and informative input about their 
true assertiveness, an experience-based judgmental strategy is employed. However, 
when the experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval is uninformative because it is 
caused by some other factor, a content-based judgmental strategy is utilised for 
assessing assertiveness. Thus, the apparent diagnosticity of one's retrieval 
experiences seems to be an important factor governing which type of information is 
used for judgments of frequency, likelihood. and typicality (Schwarz. Bless, et aL 
1991). 
Taken together, this inspiring research by Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) shows that 
only focusing on what comes to mind is insufficient to explain how our judgments 
are constructed. The information provided by our experiences of ease or difficulty of 
retrieval also seems to play an important role. This was shown in two different ways. 
Firstly, it was demonstrated that reliance on each type of information can lead to 
different judgmental decisions. When self-relevant behaviours could be brought to 
mind easily. judgments reflected the content of that information. However, when 
self-behaviours were brought to mind with much more difficulty, judgments actually 
contradicted the content of the information retrieved. Secondly, it was shown that 
reliance on subjective experience varies as a function of its perceived informational 
value. Consequently, this research can be considered as a milestone in the study of 
decision processes. As with any new and interesting finding, especially one that 
enhances our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying human judgment, 
the natural progression was one of replication to other task domains. As the present 
chapter will reveal, the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of retrieval plays 
an influential role in shaping people' s judgmental outputs across a range of domains. 
Although the research by Schwarz. Bless. et al. (1991) showed these subjective ease 
of retrieval effects in the domain of self-related judgment. the initial demonstrations 
of the availability heuristic were concerned with estimating the frequency of events 
that were not self-related. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973. Expt. 3) 
asked participants to estimate whether certain letters were more frequent in the first 
position of English words or in the third position. The results fell in line with an 
experience-based prediction, that is, the former class of words was judged as more 
frequent than the latter class. However, participants may not only have experienced 
greater ease in bringing words beginning with a certain letter to mind, but they may 
have also retrieved a larger number of these words at the time of judgment. Thus, a 
judgment strategy based on ease or content could explain the observed findings 
leaving it unclear which process served as the basis for frequency estimation 
(Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991). As it was experimental work of this kind that inspired 
the availability heuristic in the first place, this was the most obvious domain to test 
whether the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of retrieval is used as a basis 
for judgment over and above the actual content that is retrieved. 
1.6.2 Retrieval Experiences and Frequency Judgments 
To explore this issue, Wanke, Schwarz, and Bless (1995) carried out a replication of 
Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, Expt. 3) letter-frequency experiment with some 
added modifications to overcome the aforementioned problems. These included 
keeping the number of words brought to mind constant across conditions and using 
misattribution manipulations to vary the perceived informational value of the 
experienced ease of retrieval. 
The first task of this experiment involved all participants writing down ten words 
where the letter t appeared in the third position on a blank piece of paper. 
Participants were then asked to rate how much difficulty they had experienced 
completing this task. Following this, all participants were asked to write down ten 
words where the letter t appeared in the first position. Three conditions were created 
for recording the words generated. In the control condition a blank piece of paper 
was used. whereas in the two experimental conditions the sheet of paper was 
imprinted with rows of the letter I that were visible. but rather pale. In one of these 
experimental conditions. participants were informed that the imprinted worksheet 
would facilitate the retrieval of I-words ("facilitation condition"). In contrast. 
participants in the other condition were told that the imprinted worksheet would 
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inhibit the retrieval of t-words ("inhibition condition"). Both sets of instructions were 
expected to affect the perceived informational value of participants' experienced ease 
of retrieval. After listing ten t-words, participants then rated the difficulty of the task. 
Finally, all participants were asked to estimate whether the letter t is more frequent in 
the first or in the third position of a word. 
In line with expectation, subjective ratings of task difficulty revealed that participants 
found it easier to recall ten words that contained the letter t in the first position than 
in the third position. Participants' frequency estimates followed a more complicated 
pattern. In the control condition, words with t in the first position were judged as 
more frequent than words with t in the third position; the same finding observed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973, Expt. 3). However, in the two experimental 
conditions, participants' frequency estimates differed as a function of the 
misattribution manipulations, that is, the extent to which their retrieval experiences 
were considered informative. 
Participants in the facilitation condition who believed that the imprinted worksheet 
would make it easier for them to recall ten t-words estimated these words as less 
frequent in usage than those participants in the control condition who expected no 
such influence from their worksheet. This reflects the notion that participants realised 
that the experience of ease accompanying the retrieval of t-words was caused by the 
worksheet and therefore understood that using it to estimate the frequency of t-words 
would be uninformative. In this way, they attributed their experienced ease of 
retrieval to the worksheet's influence and as a result discounted subjective 
experience as a valid basis for judgment. In contrast, participants in the inhibition 
condition who were led to believe that the imprinted worksheet would make it 
difficult for them to bring ten t-words to mind estimated these words as more 
frequent in usage than those participants in the control condition. In this case, finding 
that t-words came to mind very easily, despite being told that the imprinted 
worksheet would inhibit recall drew participants' attention to the informative value 
of their experienced ease of retrieval and so used it to guide their frequency 
judgments. 
This pattern of findings provides strong evidence that participants based their letter-
frequency judgments on the subjecti\'e ease with which example words could be 
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brought to mind rather than on the number of words they retrie\'ed. just as T\'ersky 
and Kahneman (1973) had suggested more than twenty years earlier. Manipulations 
were set in place to ensure that the amount of words recalled was always the same. 
Nevertheless, there were still differences in the frequency estimates made by 
participants in the three conditions. The only factor that was varied was the 
information given to participants about how the imprinted worksheet would impact 
on their retrieval of t-words. It was this manipulation that drew their attention to 
whether the subjective experience of ease of retrieval was informative or not, and 
consequently to the decision as to whether it should be used as input for judgment. 
1.6.3 Retrieval Experiences and Judgments of Childhood Memory 
More evidence for the informative role of retrieval experiences in decision-making 
comes from the work carried out by Winkielman, Schwarz. and Belli (1998). This 
time the judgment under investigation was the quality of one's own memory for 
childhood. Participants were asked to remember childhood events from the age of 5-
10 years of age. To reveal experiential effects on memory judgments, some 
participants were asked to recall 4 childhood events (an easy task) and others had to 
recall 12 such events (a difficult task). Following the generation of these events, all 
participants were asked, "Regarding childhood memory, are there large parts of your 
childhood after age 5 which you can't remember?" (Winkielman et aI., 1998. p. 125). 
The participants were given the choice of three answers: - "yes", "no", and "unsure". 
The results showed that participants who had recalled 12 childhood events judged 
their memory as less complete than participants who had described 4 events from 
their childhood. In fact, it was found that 46% of participants from the 12-events 
condition judged that they could not remember large parts of their childhood, 
compared to only 19% of participants from the 4-events condition. This was the case 
even though the former group had recalled triple the number of events to those in the 
latter group. It seems that the participants who had to recall 12 events did not 
understand that the task was so difficult because of the high number of events they 
were required to recall. Consequently, when participants used their experienced 
difficulty of retrieval as a source of information for judgment. it had the paradoxical 
effect of making them infer that memory of their childhood was rather patchy. Once 
again. these findings suggest that judgments of childhood memory were not based on 
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the actual number of events brought to mind, but on the ease or difficulty that was 
experienced generating the childhood events. It is worth pointing out that Belli. 
Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, and Lynn (1998) found the same pattern of findings in 
this judgment domain. 
Further support for the experience-based hypothesis was found in another condition 
of the Winkielman et al. (1998) experiment. Before participants recalled 12 
childhood memories (a difficult task), they were informed that most people find this 
task to be a difficult one. In line with the other research discussed earlier, it was 
predicted that this manipulation would cause the informational value of their 
subjective experience of difficulty to be questioned. After all, if it is common for all 
people to find it difficult to bring 12 childhood events to mind, then there is nothing 
special if they also experience the same difficulty. With this knowledge in mind, a 
judgment strategy based on experienced retrieval difficulty may be discounted as a 
valid basis for deciding how well childhood is remembered. 
Before the results are discussed, the previous findings obtained when participants 
were not informed about how other people would find the task need to be reiterated 
again here. When participants found it easy to recall 4 childhood events from 
memory, only 19% judged that they could not remember large parts of their 
childhood. This figure increased to 460/0 when participants experienced difficulty 
recalling 12 such events. However, in the additional condition where participants 
found it difficult to bring 12 childhood events to mind but were informed that most 
people suffer from the same problem, only 27% of these participants made the same 
memory judgment. As there was no significant difference between this condition and 
the 4-events condition, participants must have correctly attributed the difficulty they 
experienced to the high demands of the task instead of to memory being rather 
patchy about their childhood. 
In combination, the research reviewed thus far demonstrates that judgments of self-
assertiveness (Schwarz, Bless, et a1.. 1991). letter-frequency (Wanke et ai., 1995), 
and childhood memory (Belli et ai., 1998~ Winkielman et a1.. 1998) are all based on 
the ease or difficulty with which relevant examples from these domains can be 
brought to mind. It was findings such as these that led Schwarz (1998) to conclude 
that "the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman. 1973) does indeed describe a 
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metacognitive judgment strategy that is based on a monitoring of one' s own recall 
experiences' (p. 91). Furthermore, from using misattribution manipulations it is now 
understood that individuals do not always rely on their subjective retrieval 
experiences. It appears that they are only used as a basis for judgment when 
considered to be informative, that is, when the experience of ease or difficulty of 
retrieval can be attributed to the judgment under investigation. Note however. that 
this attribution process is sometimes in error, so the judgments based upon it can be 
biased and inaccurate (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). However. under conditions 
where one's retrieval experiences are found to be uninformative for some reason 
(e.g., a situational influence), then they are discounted as a relevant source of input 
for judgment. As a result, the same types of judgments avoid such biasing effects 
(Wanke et aI., 1995). Thus, an important factor governing whether the subjective 
experience of ease or difficulty of retrieval is used as a basis for judgment is the 
informational value it conveys to the experiencer; the same finding observed for 
affective states and bodily experiences discussed earlier (see Clore, 1992: Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996, for reviews). As Kelley and Jacoby (l996a) have noted, 'the importance 
of subjective experience is revealed by its absence as well as its presence' (p. 304). 
1.6.4 Experience or Content: Perceived Self-Knowledge 
In the previous studies discussed, participants were made aware that their subjective 
experiences accompanying the retrieval process were differentially informative by 
drawing their attention to some external factor that could account for their 
experiences of ease or difficulty. Related experimental research has shown that there 
are other circumstances that can also cause the experiencer to question the 
informational value of their retrieval experiences. Imagine for a moment that you 
were asked to write down the names of 12 exotic foods and that you experienced 
considerable difficulty in doing so. When this retrieval task is followed by a question 
asking you to judge the frequency of exotic foods, you are unlikely to infer that only 
a small number of these food types exist. That is, despite finding it difficult to think 
of relevant examples. you realise that this does not mean that exotic foods are rare. 
but rather that your own knowledge on this topic is rather limited. After all. if you 
are reading this. you are no doubt a Psychologist and not a Cordon Bleu Chef. In this 
example. the experienced difficulty of bringing exotic foods to mind is discounted as 
a basis for judgment because it carries no informative value. Thus. it seems that 
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decision-makers must believe they possess a reasonable amount of knowledge in the 
field in question if they are to use the infonnation provided by their retrieval 
experiences (Schwarz, 1998). The research discussed below clearly demonstrates that 
reliance on an experience-based judgment strategy varies as a function of one's 
perceived knowledge in the content domain under investigation. 
For example, Biller, Bless, and Schwarz (1992) asked some participants to generate 3 
examples of chronic diseases and others had to recall 9 such examples. After this 
retrieval task was completed, participants were asked to estimate the prevalence of 
chronic disease in the general population. Subjective ratings of task difficulty 
showed that participants found it relatively easy to come up with 3 examples, 
whereas it was much more difficult to bring 9 such examples to mind. As for their 
judgments, participants believed that less people suffer from chronic diseases after 
they recalled 9 rather than 3 examples from memory. Thus, in line with the previous 
findings from other judgment domains, even though recalling 9 chronic diseases 
provides a broader base for the estimate, participants seemed to rely on the ease or 
difficulty of their retrieval experiences to guide their estimates. 
To investigate whether individuals still rely on an experience-based judgment 
strategy when their perceived knowledge is called into question, a group of other 
participants were asked about their own level of knowledge on chronic diseases. This 
was done prior to perfonning the retrieval task as a way of making them consciously 
aware that they did not know much about the topic. This time, the exact opposite 
pattern of findings emerged. Participants believed that more people suffer from 
chronic diseases after they recalled 9 rather than 3 examples. This suggests that 
drawing attention to their sparse knowledge about chronic diseases caused the 
infonnational value of their retrieval experiences to be discredited. As a result, 
participants considered the number of examples they retrieved to be the most reliable 
source of infonnation for their judgments. Similar findings have also been observed 
in the domain of political knowledge (Schwarz & Schuman. 1997). Together this 
research indicates that percei\'ed knowledgeability is a dri\'ing factor behind whether 
an experience-based or content-based judgment strategy is employed. \\'hen 
individuals think that they know about the topic under investigation. the former type 
of strategy is utilised. In contrast. if very little is known about the topic. the latter 
type is relied upon instead. 
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1.6.5 Experience or Content: Level of Prejudice 
In the same way that individual differences in one's level of knowledge can impact 
on whether retrieval experiences are used for judgment, it has been reasoned that so 
too can differences in a person's level of prejudice. It was the research by 
Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock (1999) that investigated this issue in the domain of 
social stereotyping. These authors predicted that when people are asked to recall 
gender stereotypic information from memory, its accessibility would depend on their 
level of prejudice towards women. That is, low-prejudiced individuals would find 
this task to be a difficult one, whereas high-prejudiced individuals would be unlikely 
to suffer from the same difficulty. Of special interest in their experiment was the 
much-studied question in social psychology of how people form an impression of 
another person, in this instance one from a stereotyped group. A large body of 
research has assumed that making such an evaluation is rather uncomplicated. People 
simply rely on the most accessible and relevant information that comes to mind at the 
time an impression is formed (see Higgins, 1989, 1996; Martin & Clark, 1990; Wyer 
& Srull, 1989, for reviews). 
To determine if people may also rely on the experienced ease or difficulty of 
bringing that information to mind, Dijksterhuis et al. (1999) instructed low-
prejudiced individuals to recall and write down stereotypic traits that differentially 
describe men and women. Half of these participants were asked to list 3 of these 
traits (an easy task) and the other half had to list 8 such traits (a difficult task). 
Following the generation of these items, participants were asked to form an 
impression of a female secretary. This occupation was chosen because it is 
stereotypically linked with women. 
According to the content-based hypothesis, thinking of these gender stereotypic traits 
would render them highly accessible in memory, so the evaluation should fall in line 
with their stereotypic implications. In this instance, the more stereotypic traits 
generated. the more stereotypical the evaluation. However, this pattern of results did 
not emerge. Rather, participants who had recalled 8 traits from memory formed a less 
stereotypical impression of the female secretary than those participants who had only 
generated 3 traits. Presumably, finding it considerably difficult to bring 8 gender 
stereotypic traits to mind was considered a reliable indication that the stereotype 
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could not be that relevant or important for evaluating the female secretary. In 
contrast, experiencing ease in generating 3 traits had the reverse effect. Participants' 
evaluations reflected the stereotypic implications of what they retrieved. Thus. just as 
Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) demonstrated that self-assessments of assertiveness are 
based on the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of retrieval, it appears that so 
too are our evaluations of other people. Well, at least this is the case for low-
prejudiced individuals who have nothing against women (Dijksterhuis et aL 1999). 
When high-prejudiced individuals were tested in the same way, subjective ease of 
retrieval effects were not found. That is, regardless of the number of stereotypic traits 
generated, participants always formed a stereotypical impression of the female 
secretary, even more so when 8 traits were brought to mind. However. this came as 
no surprise when their subjective ratings of task difficulty were taken into account. 
Participants had reported that they found the task of recalling 8 stereotypic traits 
from memory to be no more difficult than recalling 3 of these traits. Although this 
difference in retrieval amount was enough for low-prejudiced individuals to 
experience ease in one condition and difficulty in the other, the same was not true for 
their high-prejudiced counterparts. Thus, as the subjective experience of retrieval 
difficulty was completely absent for these high-prejudiced individuals, they had no 
alterative but to base their evaluations on the contents of memory retrieval. This 
research interestingly highlights that reliance on an experience-based judgment 
strategy varies as a function of a person's level of prejudice. 
1.6.6 Experiential Information: Present or Absent 
In the above research by Dijksterhuis et al. (1999), it was an individual difference 
variable, namely a high level of prejudice that caused certain experiential 
information to be absent. However, another way to deprive people of this 
information is to make sure that they do not have access to it in the first place. It was 
an experiment by Wanke, Bless, and Biller (1996) that created conditions so one 
group of participants would experience either ease or difficulty in information 
retrieval. but another group would not. This first group of participants were asked to 
generate either supporting or opposing arguments for the use of public transportation. 
In each of these conditions. half the participants listed 3 arguments (an easy task) and 
the other half listed 7 arguments (a difficult task). Following this task, participants 
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were asked to rate their attitude towards public transportation. Consistent \\ith a 
judgment strategy based on retrieval experiences, participants who had generated 7 
supporting arguments were less in favour of public transportation than those who had 
generated 3 such arguments. Conversely, participants who had recalled 7 opposing 
arguments rated that they were more in favour of public transportation than those 
who had recalled 3 such arguments (other attitude-based judgments also show these 
ease of retrieval effects; e.g., Haddock, Rothman & Schwarz, 1996). Thus, even 
though this retrieval task provides decision-makers with two independent types of 
information, they chose to base their attitude judgments on how easily arguments 
came to mind rather than on what arguments were actually retrieved. 
The second group of participants did not perform this retrieval task, but instead were 
simply asked to read the arguments provided by the first group of participants. This 
was followed by them rating their attitude towards public transportation, just as the 
first group had done. As this group of participants were only reading the arguments 
and not generating them, this would deprive them of any experiential information. In 
this condition, the exact opposite pattern of findings emerged. More positive attitudes 
towards public transportation were reported after participants had read 7 rather than 3 
supporting arguments, and more negative attitudes were reported after they had read 
7 rather than 3 opposing arguments. Given the absence of subjective experience 
accompanying argument retrieval, these participants had no choice but to rely on the 
amount and descriptive content of the arguments they read. Thus, each group of 
judges - the "writers" and the "readers" reported completely opposite attitudes on 
public transportation as they adopted different judgmental strategies (Wanke et aI., 
1996). 
In combination, this research shows that across a wide range of task domains 
participants relied on the experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval to guide their 
judgmental outputs. This was the case unless its informational value was questioned 
for some reason. When participants' attention was drawn to an external factor (e.g .. 
Schwarz. Bless, et aI., 1991), to the demands of the task (e.g., Winkielman et aL 
1998), or to their lack of knowledge on the topic under investigation (e.g .. Biller et 
al.. 1992). they came to realise that there was an alternative explanation that could 
account for their experiences of ease or difficulty. Under all of these conditions. 
participants discounted their retrieval experiences as a source of information and 
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instead relied on the content of retrieval as it provided a more reliable basis for 
judgment. Similarly, when no difficulty was experienced due to individual 
differences (Dijksterhuis et aI., 1999), or experiential information was completely 
absent (Wanke et aI., 1996), participants based their judgments on what information 
they brought to mind as this was the only option available to them. 
Consequently, it becomes clear that the actual contents of memory retrieval and the 
subjective experiences accompanying the retrieval of that information both play an 
important role in judgment formation. In many of these experiments, researchers 
were in a good position to be able to predict how the decision-maker would respond 
to a particular question posed. After all, manipulations were set in place so that one 
type of information would be considered more informative than the other. However, 
if there was no reason to doubt either type of input and both seemed equally 
informative, how do decision-makers decide which judgmental strategy to utilise? 
1.6.7 Experience or Content: Personal Relevance 
When people are faced with a particular judgmental task, a person's level of 
motivation to arrive at an answer can impact on how they choose to process relevant 
and accessible information. A considerable amount of research in social cognition 
has demonstrated that people tend to rely on heuristic processing strategies when the 
judgment task is of low personal relevance and involvement and on more effortful 
systematic processing strategies when the task is of high personal relevance and 
involvement (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In line with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) 
proposition, reliance on the ease with which information comes to mind reflects a 
heuristic judgmental strategy and reliance on the actual contents of the retrieval 
process reflects a systematic judgmental strategy. Thus, if decision-makers are 
differentially motivated to arrive at a particular judgment we should see differences 
in which source of information they draw upon. 
To explore this issue. Rothman and Schwarz (1998) selected a judgment task that 
would be personally relevant for some participants, but not for others. In their 
experiment. male participants were asked to recall and write down either 3 or 8 
factors (including self-hehaviours and personal characteristics) that could either 
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Increase or decrease their own risk of developing heart disease. Pre-testing had 
established that it was relatively easy to come up with 3 risk factors, whereas it was 
much more difficult to think of 8 such factors. After this retrieval task was 
completed, participants were asked to estimate their own risk of suffering from heart 
disease. As participants were recalling self-relevant information about this health 
issue, personal relevance was manipulated by selecting one group of male 
participants who had a family history of heart disease and another group who did not. 
It was predicted that the former group for whom the judgment task is personally 
relevant would be more motivated to engage in systematic processing and reflect on 
what information they brought to mind when constructing their risk judgments. 
Conversely, the authors assumed that the latter group for whom the judgment task is 
less personally relevant would be more likely to adopt a heuristic processing strategy 
and rely on their subjective retrieval experiences. 
In line with these predictions, male participants with a family history of heart disease 
believed that they were more at risk after they had generated 8 rather than 3 risk-
increasing factors and at lower risk when they had recalled 8 rather than 3 risk-
decreasing factors. Thus, these participants based their judgments on the numerical 
amount of self-relevant information they had retrieved from memory. The exact 
opposite pattern of results was found for the male participants with no family history 
of heart disease. These participants believed that they were less at risk after they had 
generated 8 rather than 3 risk-increasing factors and at higher risk when they had 
recalled 8 rather than 3 risk-decreasing factors. In this case, judgments were based on 
the experienced ease or difficulty with which the self-relevant information was 
brought to mind. It is worthwhile pointing out that Grayson and Schwarz (1999) 
found the same pattern of findings when female participants were asked to assess 
their own risk of being sexually assaulted. 
This research again shows that retrieving information from memory provides the 
decision-maker with two possible bases for judgment - the actual contents of 
memory retrieval and the subjectively experienced ease or difficulty of bringing that 
information to mind. An important factor governing which judgmental strategy is 
utilised is the individual's processing motivation at the time a judgment is required~ a 
finding compatible with the dual-process models of judgment (e.g .. Chaiken et at.. 
1989: Petty & Cacioppo. 1986). When the task at hand calls for a judgment that is 
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personally relevant to the decision-maker. a systematic processmg strategy is 
employed and attention is paid to what information comes to mind. Howeyer. an 
unmotivated decision-maker for whom the judgment task is less personally releyant 
may wish to expend as little time and effort as possible. As a result. a heuristic 
processing strategy is adopted and the decision-maker reflects on how easy or 
difficult is was to bring the information to mind. As reliance on each of these 
judgment strategies can lead to completely opposite decisions being made. it is 
important to identify the conditions that make it more likely that decision-makers 
will use one source of information over the other. This research has taken us another 
step closer to understanding this issue. It appears that it is not only necessary to pay 
close attention to the situational context in which the judgment is formed, but also 
features of the individual need to be considered as well (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). 
1.6.8 Experience and Attitude Judgments: Level of Involvement 
The above research has shown that the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of 
retrieval only exerts an impact on people's attitudinal judgments when the task at 
hand is of low personal relevance. Other recent research has also demonstrated that 
reliance on this type of experiential information only occurs when the individual's 
• 
level of involvement with the topic of judgment is low. However, in this case, it is 
the extremity of a person's attitude that makes the task more or less involving. Some 
research already discussed bears on this issue. To reiterate, Dijksterhuis et a1. (1999) 
found that only people who were low in prejudice towards women used their 
subjective experiences accompanying the retrieval of gender stereotypic information 
to evaluate a member of a stereotyped group, namely a female secretary. For these 
low-prejudiced individuals, the judgment task would have been far less involving 
than for individuals who were high in prejudice, and thus they were content to rely 
on this heuristic strategy. 
Haddock, Rothman. Reber, and Schwarz (1999) also found that the extremity of a 
person's attitude can determine whether retrieval experiences are used as input for 
judgment. Individuals who were asked to assess the strength of their attitude towards 
doctor-assisted suicide (i.e .. by making judgments of certainty. intensity. and 
importance) only relied on the relative ease or difficulty with which attitudinal 
infom1ation could be brought to mind when their pre-existing yiews on this issue 
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were not very strong. This led Dijksterhuis et aI. (1999) to conclude that an 
experience-based judgment strategy is only used 'when people do not hold strong 
attitudes or beliefs about a group, a person, or an object' (p. 766). Thus, in the same 
way that people only rely on the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of 
retrieval when it is informative (e.g., Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991), it also appears 
that this heuristic strategy is used when the judgmental task is not very self-relevant 
or involving. 
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that this is always the case. Some 
research has shown that even when the judgment task is personally involving. for 
example evaluating a close friend, individuals still relied on their retrieval 
experiences (Rothman & Hardin, 1997, Expt. 3). These authors suggested that this 
occurs because in everyday life we very often form judgments of our friends based 
on how we feel about them, so the subjective feeling of ease or difficulty may have 
been considered a highly applicable source of information for this particular kind of 
judgment. In fact, it was findings like this that led Rothman and Hardin (1997) to 
propose that people may develop chronic habits of relying on information for 
judgment that they have previously used in the past. 
1.7 WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? A MORE COMPLETE VIEW OF 
DECISION-MAKING 
From reading this chapter, it should have come as no surprise to learn that there is an 
enormous amount of research in social cognition dedicated to enhancing our 
knowledge of the cognitive processes underlying human judgment. After all, 
decision-making is an integral and vital part of our everyday lives. The majority of 
research in this domain has focused on the role of the accessible contents of memory 
retrieval in the construction of social judgment (e.g., Higgins, 1989, 1996: Wyer & 
Srull, 1989). From this standpoint, people rely on the amount and descriptive 
meaning of the accessible information retrieved from long-term memory to guide 
their judgments. However. alternative lines of research have now shown that this 
content-based analysis of decision-making is incomplete. It seems that people also 
use the subjective ease or difficulty of information processing as another source of 
input for their judgments. evaluations, and appraisals (e.g .. Clore. 1992~ Jacoby & 
Kelley. 1987~ Kelley & Jacoby. 1996a: Schwarz. 1998~ Strack. 1992: Witherspoon & 
- 48 -
Allan, 1985). Thus, it appears that social perceivers are far more sophisticated than it 
was originally thOUght when it comes to the information they use to guide their 
judgmental outputs. 
Particular interest was paid to the recent body of research by Schwarz and his 
colleagues which focused specifically on subjective experiences accompanying the 
process of memory retrieval (e.g., Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991). From this 
experience-based perspective, finding it relatively easy or considerably difficult to 
bring information to mind elicits a distinctive mental state which conveys useful and 
relevant information to the decision-maker. When one considers that this intriguing 
concept has only recently been embraced by social psychologists, the amount of 
supporting research is rather impressive. Since Schwarz, Bless, et ai. (1991) first 
demonstrated that these subjective accessibility experiences playa prominent role in 
shaping judgments of self-perception, the same experiential effects have been shown 
across a wide range of judgment domains. For example. people seem to use their 
retrieval experiences to assess the quality of their own memory (Winkielman et aI., 
1998), their own risk of developing heart disease (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), and 
to decide if their attitudes towards public transportation are favourable or not (Wanke 
et al., 1996). 
This research undoubtedly provides a compelling case for the influential role of 
subjective experiences in the formation of everyday social judgments. However, the 
dependent variables employed in these studies pertain to subjective domains, namely 
to judgments that are self-related. The downside of studying such subjective 
judgments is that it is impossible to verify if people's judgmental outputs are 
accurate or inaccurate. After all, there is no correct answer or objective standard 
against which level of accuracy can be assessed. Thus, it is interesting to speculate 
whether the subjective ease or difficulty of processing operations also serves as an 
informative judgmental cue in more objective domains where there is a correct 
answer to the question posed. Clearly, such experiential effects would be even more 
important if they extend to judgments in objective domains. The research reported in 
the present thesis seeks to explore this issue. 
In the literature so far. the only available evidence that subjective ease of retrieval 
effects are not restricted to self-related judgnlent concerned itself with letter-
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frequency judgments (Wanke et aI., 1995). However, there are a number of other 
domains in which subjective judgments map onto an objective reality, for example, 
judgments of temperature, sound, and brightness. In the same way. judgments of 
temporal duration (i.e., how long an event seemed to last) lend themselves to an 
assessment of accuracy as there is an objective standard against which these 
judgments can be compared (i.e., how long the event lasted in real time). Thus, as 
temporal duration is an interesting and readily verifiable daily human experience, it 
was chosen as the judgment under investigation in the present research. 
1.8 TEMPORAL ESTIMATION 
Two additional reasons motivate this emphasis on temporal duration. First, I wanted 
to select a type of judgment that plays an important role in our everyday lives. In 
fact, few judgments are as consequential as people's estimates of temporal duration. 
It is subjective estimates of this kind that enable us to interact successfully with our 
ever-changing external environment (Boltz, 1998; Michon, 1985). For example, 
without the ability to judge the passage of time, people would be unable to cross a 
busy road without incident, estimate the length of time a pot of tea has been brewing 
before pouring a cup, or gauge how long was spent studying for an examination prior 
to advising a friend on how best to prepare for the test. Given therefore the pivotal 
status of duration timing in daily life, it is surprising to learn that there has been little 
interest in experimental social psychology in identifying the type of information that 
people utilise to make estimates of time. The lack of research on this very important 
issue gave rise to my second reason for focusing on temporal duration judgments. 
Might it be the case that these objective judgments are computed in the same way 
that has recently been suggested for subjective judgments? That is, do people use 
their experienced ease or difficulty of information processing as a judgmental cue to 
estimate time? 
Before elaborating on this assumption, it must be noted that the question of how 
people estimate the passage of time has long intrigued the minds of many cognitive 
psychologists (e.g., Block. 1979~ Fraisse, 1963~ Frankenhaeuser. 1959: James. 1890~ 
Michon. 1972; Ornstein. 1969). Therefore, it is necessary to consider the way in 
which this topic has been investigated prior to considering the present approach to 
the topic. In so doing. it will become clear that the role of subjective experiences in 
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duration estimation has not been explored in any real systematic manner. In fact. 
inspection of the literature reveals that fundamental aspects of temporal cognition 
remain open to debate and empirical scrutiny (Block, 1990; Block & Zakay. 1997: 
Brown, 1997; Fraisse, 1984; Ornstein, 1969; Zakay & Block, 1997). This at least in 
part can be explained by the inherently elusive nature of time as a psychological 
construct (Michon & Jackson, 1985). As Fraisse (1984) observed, 'duration has no 
existence in and of itself but is the intrinsic characteristic of that which endures' (p. 
2). The investigative predicament is compounded still further by the fact that no 
single sensory organ or processing system appears to be dedicated to the task of 
tracking temporal duration. Regardless of these problems confronting time 
researchers, there is now abundant evidence that cognitive processes mediate 
people's judgments of short durations in the second and minute range (e.g., Block, 
1989a; Block & Zakay, 1997; Brown, 1985: Poynter, 1989; Predebon, 1996: Zakay. 
1990; Zakay & Block, 1997). As Jackson (1990) so aptly put it, 'time is cognition' 
(p. 153). 
In laboratory investigations of temporal estimation, participants are asked to process 
information (e.g., studying words for a subsequent memory test) or perform a task 
(e.g., sorting playing cards into stacks) for a given period of time usually ranging 
from seconds to minutes. After the experimental interval has elapsed, participants are 
required to estimate the duration of that interval relying solely on their subjective 
impressions. An important methodological distinction in this type of research is 
whether the duration judgment is made prospectively or retrospectively (e.g., Block, 
1989a; Brown, 1985; Hicks, Miller, & Kinsboume, 1976; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 
1994; Nichelli, 1996; Zakay, 1990; Zakay & Block, 1997). 
In prospective tasks, participants are informed before the interval begins that its 
duration is to-be-estimated. As such, prospective temporal paradigms enable 
researchers to study people's awareness of passing time (Fraisse, 1984) or 
experienced duration (Block, 1974). In contrast, in retrospective tasks, participants 
only become aware that time is to-be-estimated after the critical duration has elapsed. 
In this way, retrospective temporal paradigms allow people's awareness of past time 
(Fraisse. 1984) or remembered duration (Block, 1974) to be investigated. To 
understand this distinction better, consider examples of prospective and retrospective 
timing in everyday life. When a person is waiting for an important phone call or for a 
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delayed train, his or her attention is drawn to the passage of time and prospective 
timing occurs. However, when a person is deeply engrossed in a good book. or 
enjoying a film, he or she pays no attention to time~s passage. As such, a duration 
judgment can only be made retrospectively. 
It is commonly accepted that different cognitive processes are responsible for 
prospective and retrospective duration estimation (e.g .. Block, 1992; Block, George. 
& Reed, 1980; Grondin & Macar, 1992; Hicks, 1992; Hicks et al.. 1976; McClain, 
1983; Miller, Hicks, & Willette, 1978; Zakay, 1989. 1993; Zakay, Block, & Tsal. 
1999; Zakay, Meran, & Ben-Shalom, 1989). In prospective tasks, as participants are 
fully aware that a duration judgment will be required, they presumably pay close 
attention to the passage of time during the experimental interval. As such. temporal 
information may be encoded intentionally which can then serve as the basis for their 
prospective duration judgments (e.g., Curton & Lordahl. 1974; Smith, 1969; Zakay. 
1990, 1992). It is for this reason that models proposed to explain experienced 
duration emphasise attentional processes (e.g., Block & Zakay. 1996; 
Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Hicks, Miller, Gaes, & Bierman. 1977; Priestly, 1968; 
Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Zakay, 1989; Zakay & Block, 1996, 1998). 
In retrospective tasks however, the problem confronting participants is that the 
duration to-be-estimated has already elapsed before a "temporal motive" is awakened 
(Doob, 1971). This of course means that participants do not pay attention to the 
passage of time during the critical interval. So what information do they use to form 
an impression of elapsed time? It is generally assumed that as participants focus their 
attention on the information-processing task. duration estimates of this type must be 
based on aspects of what is remembered of the critical interval (Block & Zakay. 
1997; Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Michon, 1972). In other words, the contents of long-
term memory provide information from which elapsed time can be estimated (Block. 
1974; Fraisse. 1984; Zakay, 1990). Endorsing this general viewpoint, models 
proposed to explain the dynamics of remembered duration emphasise memory 
processes (e.g., Block, 1978, 1989a, 1990; Block & Reed. 1978; Fraisse, 1963: 
Ornstein, 1969; Poynter. 1983). These memory-based models all share the primary 
assumption that retrospective duration judgments are directly related to the amount 
of information that is processed and stored in memory during the critical interval. 
- 52 -
Noting the distinction between these two types of duration experiences, in the present 
thesis I focus only on people's retrospective duration judgments. My reasoning for 
this emphasis on remembered duration is three-fold. First, retrospective judgments 
capture the manner in which the passage of time is commonly estimated in everyday 
life. We rarely monitor time from the onset of a specific activity or an event, yet we 
often estimate time after an event has elapsed (e.g., "how long did you stay at the 
party?", "did the film last for more than 2 hours?"). It is for this reason that Bro\\ n 
and Stubbs (1988) have noted that 'retrospective procedures may thus possess greater 
ecological validity' (p. 298). Second, this line of inquiry has received considerably 
less empirical attention than prospective duration estimation. As a consequence of 
this, the cognitive processes that may guide judgments of remembered duration 
remain largely unspecified. Third, the same issues addressed in the social cognition 
literature of how people arrive at a particular judgmental decision appear to be 
relevant to retrospective timing. Just as the majority of research in social cognition 
has emphasised the contents of memory or what comes to mind as the important 
input to a wide range of social judgments (e.g., Higgins, 1989; Wyer & Srull, 1989), 
the same has been suggested for judgments of remembered duration. Despite this 
similarity, one difference needs to be highlighted. Whereas the memory-based 
models in social cognition stress the importance of both the amount of information 
retrieved and the descriptive implications of that information in judgment formation, 
the memory-based models of retrospective timing only consider the amount of 
information retrieved from memory to be important. However, with new lines of 
research in social cognition, it has become increasingly clear that subjective 
expenences of ease or difficulty evoked by information processmg also hold 
informational value for the judgmental process (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby, 1996a; 
Schwarz, 1998). Thus, I suspected that this kind of experiential information may also 
function as a useful cue when people make retrospective duration judgments. 
I.S.1 Memory-Based Models of Retrospective Duration Estimation 
As already noted, memory-based models are in agreement that retrospective duration 
judgments are constructed from the amount of information stored in memory during 
the critical interval. From such a content-based perspective, the more information 
that springs to mind at the time a duration judgment is requested, the longer duration 
estimates should be. Although the memory-based models overlap in terms of this 
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assumption, they have opposing views on the actual nature of the information that is 
assumed to mediate remembered duration. Inspection of the literature ren:als two 
dominant cognitive models of retrospectiYe duration estimation. One approach 
emphasises the amount of stimulus information stored in memory as the sole 
determinant of remembered duration (Ornstein, 1969), whereas the other approach 
emphasises the amount of contextual information stored in memory as the critical 
factor driving retrospective duration judgments (Block, 1989a; Block & Reed, 1978). 
These two competing models will be reviewed in tum along with some of their 
supporting research. Some problems and weaknesses associated with each model will 
also be discussed. 
1.8.1.1 The Storage-Size Model 
In more detail, Ornstein (1969) proposed a "storage-size" model which has turned 
out to be the most frequently cited explanation of how people estimate elapsed time 
in the second and minute range. According to this model, remembered duration is 
based on an assessment of the size of storage space filled with memories of the 
stimulus information from the critical interval. When more information is encoded 
during the interval or when the information is encoded in a more complex way, 
memory storage increases in size and as a result the remembered duration of that 
time period lengthens. Thus, according to this hypothesis, a person relies on the 
amount of stimulus information stored in memory during the target interval to 
compute elapsed time. The more stimulus information stored and available to be 
retrieved at the time of judgment, the longer the duration estimate produced. 
To demonstrate that the critical determinant of retrospective time estimation is the 
size of memory storage of the judged intervaL Ornstein (1969) conducted a number 
of cleverly designed experiments that measured both judgments of duration and 
memory of the interval's contents. In one of these experiments (Expt. VII), 
participants performed one of two paired-associate learning tasks. In each learning 
task, participants listened to the same ten words paired with either 'harsh' or 
'neutral' sounds. The task was simply to learn this sound-word pairing by saying the 
word aloud after the relevant sound was heard. This learning task was comprised of 
seven trials and lasted for a period of 6 minutes. On compktion of this task, all 
participants could correctly remember the ten words from the interval. 
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At this point in the experiment, some participants were dismissed. whereas others 
were asked to estimate the duration of the learning task. As predicted. no differences 
in judged duration were found between the harsh and neutral conditions as the 
amount of information in storage was equivalent in both conditions (that is. all 
participants had perfect responses on the learning task by the last trial). Importantly. 
pre-testing had established that words paired with harsh sounds are forgotten more 
quickly than the same words paired with neutral sounds. For this reason. it was 
expected that if the dismissed participants were unexpectedly asked to return 2 weeks 
later, differences in the number of words remembered from the learning task would 
emerge between the harsh and neutral conditions. This difference in the contents of 
storage should then affect the remembered duration of the learning task. In line with 
these predictions, participants in the harsh condition judged the duration of the 
learning task to be shorter than participants in the neutral condition and they 
remembered fewer words when retested on the paired-associate task. Thus, in both 
conditions and after no delay or a 2-week delay the storage-size model was supported 
as participants' retrospective duration judgments co-varied with the amount of 
information in memory storage. 
In another of Ornstein's (1969) experiments (Expt. VIII), participants were asked to 
inspect a complex figure (an ambiguous line drawing) for I-minute. To manipulate 
the way in which this information was encoded and stored in memory. one group of 
participants was first presented with a simplifying code that would enable them to 
interpret the drawing more easily, whereas a second group of participants was not 
given the code. Instead, these participants were shown another meaningless and 
complex line drawing prior to inspecting the complex test figure. It was presumed 
that the amount of information in memory (Le., storage size) would be smaller for the 
first group of participants than for the second group because the simplifying code 
would allow them to store the complex figure in a more organised and efficient 
manner. Participants' retrospective duration judgments of the I-minute interval filled 
with the complex figure and a memory measure of the amount of information in 
storage fell in line with the predictions of the storage-size model. That is. participants 
provided with a simplifying code for the complex figure judged the duration of that 
interval to be shorter and used fewer words to describe the figure than participants 
who viewed the same figure without the aid of the code. 
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Further support for the proposition that remembered duration is based on an 
assessment of the size of memory storage was obtained from testing a third group of 
participants. The same procedure was used as for the second group of participants 
but with one important difference. Immediately after viewing the complex figure. 
participants in this third group were provided with the simplifying code. These 
participants also judged the interval filled with the complex figure to be shorter and 
used fewer words to describe the figure than participants who were not provided with 
the code. This was interpreted to mean that these participants must have recoded the 
stored infonnation about the complex figure into a simpler fonn and in doing so 
reduced the storage size of the judged interval. It is worth pointing out that Mulligan 
and Schiffman (1979) replicated these findings not only with ambiguous line 
drawings but also with verbal passages. 
Thus, as the storage-size model proposes that retrospective duration judgments are 
based on the amount of stimulus infonnation stored in memory from the to-be-
estimated interval, a positive relationship between remembered duration and memory 
of the interval's contents is taken as evidence for Ornstein's (1969) hypothesis. In his 
experiments discussed above, the more words remembered from a paired-associate 
task (Expt. VII) and the more words used to describe a complex figure (Expt. VIII), 
the longer the duration judgment produced. Other investigators have also found 
evidence of this relationship using memory measures such as free-recall (e.g., Block, 
1974; Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Hanley & Morris, 1982; Zakay & Feldman, 1993) and 
recognition (e.g., Block, 1974, 1978). However, many other investigators have failed 
to find that remembered duration is directly related to the amount of infonnation 
recalled or recognised from the interval. Rather, duration judgments have been found 
to be inversely related (e.g .. Underwood, 1975; Underwood & Swain, 1973) or 
unrelated (e.g., Block, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1992; Block & Reed, 1978; Hanley & 
Morris, 1982; Hicks et aI., 1976; McClain, 1983; Poynter. 1983: Predebon. 1984, 
1988) to these memory measures. 
Taken together these findings show that the storage-size explanation of remembered 
duration is sometimes supported and at other times disputed. The main problem with 
this model is that it rests on a concept that is rather vague (e.g., Block. 1990; 
Predebon, 1988). Ornstein (1969) offered no precise operational definition of storage 
size and he even noted that 'the amount in storage can never really he measured' (p. 
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113). This failure to incorporate an independent way of quantifying storage size has 
lead researchers to test this model by measuring the amount of infonnation that is 
recalled or recognised from the judged interval. It is presumed that these memory 
measures are positively correlated with the size of memory storage. Another problem 
this model encounters is that it is difficult to establish the exact nature of the 
cognitive processes involved when a person actually assesses the size of storage (i.e., 
the space filled with memories of stimulus events from the critical interval) at the 
time the duration judgment is made (Predebon, 1988). 
1.8.1.2 The Contextual-Change Model 
An alternative explanation of how people fonn an impression of elapsed time is 
offered by Block's (1978, I989a, 1990; Block & Reed, 1978) "contextual-change" 
model. This model was primarily developed because Ornstein's (1969) storage-size 
model could not account for results that found no consistent relationship between 
judgments of duration in retrospect and memory for stimulus events from the judged 
interval. According to the contextual-change model, remembered duration is based 
on an assessment of the overall amount of change in cognitive context that occurred 
during the critical interval. These contextual changes are assumed to involve those 
taking place in the environmental situation (e.g., number of events, task demands) 
and in the person (e.g .. processing strategies, emotional states). When more of these 
external and internal contextual changes are encoded in memory in association with 
the stimulus infonnation presented in the target interval, the remembered duration of 
that time period lengthens. Thus, according to this view, a person relies on the 
amount of contextual infonnation stored in memory during the critical interval to 
compute elapsed time. The more contextual changes retrieved at the time of 
judgment, the longer the duration estimate produced. Thus, in stark contrast to 
Ornstein's (1969) storage-size model, this model does not consider memory for the 
stimulus information that occurred during the interval to be important. Rather, 
memory for contextual change is emphasised. 
Some research supports a contextual-change explanation of remembered duration. 
An experimental procedure frequently used to manipulate the amount of change 
experienced during the judged interyal involves varying the type of leyels-of-
processing tasks that participants arc required to perfonn (e.g .. Block. 1992. Expt. 2: 
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Block & Reed, 1978, Expt. 2). These experiments have demonstrated that intervals 
(80-160 s) during which participants alternated between deep and shallow processing 
tasks were remembered as longer than those during which only one of these 
processing tasks was perfonned. This occurred even though the amount of 
infonnation presented and processed was equivalent in the two conditions. The 
contextual-change hypothesis explains these findings by assuming that alternating 
between different types of levels-of-processing tasks engages the use of different 
cognitive processes and this causes an increase in the amount of experienced change 
stored in memory during the experimental duration. In this case, a difference in what 
they called "process context" between the mixed and unmixed processing conditions 
was assumed to be the particular aspect of experienced change that affected 
participants' retrospective duration judgments. This explanation was bolstered by the 
finding that no consistent relationship was found between recognition memory for 
the words processed during the interval and its remembered duration. 
Further support for Block's (1990; Block & Reed, 1978) contextual-change model 
comes from a number of studies that have manipulated the amount of perceived 
changes by varying the degree to which the judged interval is segmented (e.g., 
Poynter, 1983, Expts. 1 and 2; Zakay & Feldman, 1993, Expt. 1; Zakay, Tsal, Moses, 
& Shahar, 1994, Expt. 1). This was done by strategically placing a specific number 
of high-priority events (e.g., American presidents' last names) among a list of 
unrelated common nouns and asking participants to memorise the list paying close 
attention to these high priority events. Empirical findings showed that a segmented 
time period (155-225 s) in which high-priority events were evenly distributed 
throughout the word list was judged as subjectively longer than an equivalent 
unsegmented time period in which the same number of high-priority events were 
clustered at the beginning of the word list. It was presumed that the more an interval 
is segmented by high-priority events, the more contextual changes are encoded and 
stored in memory and as a result the remembered duration of that interval lengthens 
(Zakay et al.. 1994). This interpretation was further supported by the absence of 
memory perfonnance differences between the segmented and unsegmented 
conditions in tenns of the number of words correctly recalled or recognised. 
Although the results of many studies have been interpreted as support for the 
hypotht:sis that contextual infonnation is the prominent factor guiding people's 
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retrospective duration judgments (see Block, 1985, 1989b, for a comprehensi\'e 
review), the contextual-change model is open to criticism. In fact it is my opinion 
that this model faces even more problems than Ornstein's (1969) storage-size model. 
First, the concept of contextual change is vague and cognitively unspecified. In one 
of Block's many papers, he proposes that 'changes in process context, environmental 
context, emotional context, and other contextual elements, some of which may 
change as a function of time' (1992, p. 151) are all types of contextual change that 
may influence people's duration judgments. This operational definition of contextual 
change is far from precise; in fact to the contrary it is rather unconstrained. A second 
and related problem is that it is unclear which of these contextual changes are 
important for the duration judgment. One is not explicitly emphasised over another. 
Third, the contextual-change model fails to incorporate any independent way of 
quantifying the amount of change in cognitive context that occurred during the 
critical time period (Predebon, 2002). At least, measuring memory for the stimulus 
events from the interval may provide a direct test of the storage-size hypothesis, but 
no direct test has been used to support the contextual-change hypothesis. In fact, the 
existence of such a test is doubtful, hence the amount of change experienced during 
the to-be-judged interval can only be inferred from the experimental manipulations. 
Fourth, this lack of specificity with regard to concept and measurement means that 
this model is not easily refuted because it can provide post-hoc explanatory accounts 
for any set of results. Finally, a fifth problem with the contextual-change model is 
that the specific cognitive processes involved when a person assesses the overall 
amount of contextual change from the critical interval are unclear (Block, 1990; 
Predebon, 1988). 
1.8.1.3 Summary 
In summary, although the storage-size model and the contextual-change model vary 
in critical respects, they both agree that people's judgments of elapsed time are 
constructed from the amount of information stored in memory during the interval and 
retrieved at the time of judgment. If a person can remember a greater number of 
stimulus events (Ornstein, 1969) or contextual changes (Block, 1989a; Block & 
Reed. 1978) from the interval, the inference is made that more time has elapsed. Both 
of these models have generated a considerable amount of research and each approach 
has made an important contribution to the goal of understanding how people 
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compute elapsed time without using a clock. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the 
contents of memory (i.e., products of memory retrieval) provide the only route 
through which people can estimate remembered duration. 
1.9 AN EXPERIENCE-BASED ACCOUNT OF RETROSPECTIVE 
DURATION ESTIMATION 
One other possibility is that people may use their subjective experiences of ease or 
difficulty elicited by information processing as a cue to judge elapsed time. This 
assumption is based on previous research in social cognition which has shown that 
subjective experiences accompanying the process of memory retrieval can serve as a 
basis for people's judgments in a wide range of domains (e.g., Schwarz, 1998: 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). However, the retrieval process is but one stage in the 
information-processing sequence in which experiences of mental ease or effort can 
be elicited. Just as people can find it relatively easy or considerably difficult to 
retrieve items of information from memory (e.g., words beginning with k vs. words 
containing k in the third position), people can also find it easy or difficult to commit 
items to memory. 
Imagine for example that two people are studying for the Highway Code theory test. 
One has a good aptitude for memorising road signs, whereas the other does not 
possess the same aptitUde. When it comes to the test, both people pass and answer 
the same number of questions correctly. As such, they share a common retrieval 
experience as the same amount of information is remembered. However, if these 
people were asked how difficult they found the task of memorising the signs, each 
person would undoubtedly report a different encoding experience (i.e., easy and 
difficult respectively). This example is given as a way of illustrating how experiences 
associated with memory encoding can also vary in ease or difficulty independently 
from experiences associated with memory retrieval. 
In the research carried out by Schwarz and his colleagues, participants were asked to 
retrieve a specified number of items of information that already resided in long-term 
memory (e.g., few or many self-assertive behaviours: Schwarz, Bless. et al.. 1991). 
This experimental paradigm therefore manipulated participants' retrieval experiences 
(easy or difficult), but they did not have any encoding experiences. Studies of this 
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kind have been very informative into how information is retrieved from memory and 
its effects on people's judgmental outputs. However. no interest has been paid to 
whether people's judgments can also be affected by how easy or difficult it was for 
them to place information into memory in the first place. Finding it easy or difficult 
to commit information to memory should also elicit a distinctive experiential mental 
state which holds informational value for the decision-maker. Extending previous 
work on the role of subjective experiences in judgment formation, it is anticipated 
that not only may the subjective ease or difficulty of retrieval serve as a cue that 
guides people's retrospective duration judgments, but also the subjective ease or 
difficulty of encoding may function as a useful cue in this judgmental context as 
well. In this way, I am suggesting that it is not the memory processing operation per 
se that is important to the judgment, but the experience of ease or difficulty that was 
associated with the cognitive process. 
In the research reported in this thesis, the assumption IS that the experiential 
concomitants of prior processing operations (i.e., memory encoding and memory 
retrieval) may have direct implications for people's estimates of remembered 
duration. When remembering the temporal extent of episodes from the past, one 
common observation is that some events appear to pass with unusual rapidity, that is, 
the duration of an event is remembered as shorter than it actually was. Put another 
way, remembered time is underestimated relative to clock time. This frequently 
occurs in absorbing task contexts, such as when one is studying for an important 
exam the following day (encoding tasks), or when one is trying to remember the 
studied information in the actual exam (retrieval tasks). In settings such as these, I 
suspect that people may use their inferences about the subjective ease or difficulty of 
prior processing operations as a cue to judge elapsed time. 
Specifically, when encoding or retrieving information is experienced as effortful or 
difficult. perceivers may feel that there was insufficient time to complete the task in a 
satisfactory manner (e.g., performance may feel pressurised or rushed). As a result. 
they will underestimate how much time was spent performing the task relative to 
those people who find the task of encoding or retrieving information to be much 
easier. Thus I am suggesting that individuals may perceive their experienced 
processing difficulty as relevant information for their retrospective duration 
judgments. at least in certain task contexts. The benetits of such an experience-based 
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judgmental strategy are obvious. Rather than basing duration estimates on the result 
of an exhaustive search of memory, people can use their experienced ease or 
difficulty of prior processing operations to furnish these judgments in a rapid and 
efficient manner. Relying on subjective experience as a basis for judgment reflects a 
heuristic strategy as it minimises the cognitive effort required to arrive at a decision. 
1.9.1 Processing Difficulty and Retrospective Duration Judgments 
To clarify the previous point, the experience-based hypothesis predicts an inverse 
relationship between processing difficulty and retrospective duration judgments, such 
that judgments of remembered duration should decrease as processing operations 
increase in subjective difficulty. However, it is important to point out that there are 
huge inconsistencies in the retrospective timing literature as to whether or not 
processing difficulty influences people's judgments of elapsed time (Block & Zakay, 
1997). In this research, any existing relationship between these two variables is 
investigated by manipulating the level of information processing load during the 
target interval and observing its effects on the magnitude of people's duration 
judgments. 
Although it has been found that increasing the number of stimulus events presented 
during the interval lengthens judgments of remembered duration (Block, 1974, E 1; 
McClain, 1983; Predebon, 1988, 1996, El and 2), other manipulations of processing 
load have produced rather mixed results. Only a handful of manipulations have been 
used which include varying the complexity of a visual stimulus (more vs. less 
interior angles), varying the arrangement of a sequence of stimulus events 
(randomised vs. blocked ordering), varying the level of processing required (deep vs. 
shallow), or varying the level of attention required to perform the task (more vs. less 
concentration). Research of this kind has found that as the difficulty of the task 
increases, retrospective duration judgments increase (Block, 1974, E2, 1978, E2: 
Hanley & Morris, 1982, E 1; McClain, 1983; Ornstein, 1969; Underwood, 1975; 
Underwood & Swain, 1973; Vroon, 1970, El; Zakay, 1993), decrease (Brown 1985: 
Brown & Stubbs. 1992; Bueno Martinez. 1992: Hanley & Morris, 1982. E2; Vroon. 
1970, E2; Zakay & Fallach. 1984. E3: Zakay. 1989. E 1) or are unaffected by the 
particular manipulation (Block. 1992, E 1; Block & Reed, 1978. E 1: Gray. 1982; 
Hicks et al.. 1976; McClain. 1983; Predebon. 1984. Eland 2). 
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This failure to find any consistent relationship between processing difficulty and 
judgments of duration in retrospect has led researchers to believe that there is another 
more important mediating factor that guides people's judgments. Namely. the 
amount of stimulus information (Ornstein, 1969) or contextual information (e.g .. 
Block, 1989a; Block & Reed, 1978) that is remembered from the critical time period. 
However, in deriving this conclusion, researchers seemed to have overlooked the 
possibility that this failure to find a consistent relationship between processing 
difficulty and retrospective duration judgments might be an artifact of experimental 
design. In all the experiments above, the difficulty of the information processing task 
was artificially manipulated by the experimenter. It is likely, however. that some 
conditions set up actually fail to induce the proposed difficulty differences for the 
participants performing the tasks. What the experimenter believes to be an easy or a 
difficult task may not be perceived as so by the participant. 
Take for example one manipulation of processing difficulty commonly used in 
retrospective temporal tasks (e.g., Block, 1992, Expt. 1; Block & Reed, 1978, Expt. 
1; McClain, 1983). The interval to be judged is filled with a levels-of-processing 
task. In such tasks referred to as 'easy' in the literature, participants are required to 
process the words presented at a shallow. structural level (e.g., simply reading the 
words or counting the number of words typed in a particular style, such as 
uppercase). In contrast, so called "difficult' tasks require the presented words to be 
processed at a deep, semantic level (e.g., generating an action associated with the 
presented word, such as drink for beer, or counting the number of words from a 
particular category, such as animals). Experiments of this type have shown that time 
periods spent performing one of these easy tasks were judged to be equal in duration 
to those spent performing one of these more difficult tasks. Although, this is taken as 
evidence that information processing difficulty does not influence assessments of 
remembered duration, is it really the case that participants perceive these tasks as 
easy and difficult respectively? In fact, perfect scores were obtained in counting the 
number of words presented and generating an action associated with the presented 
word. Perhaps then, no perceived difficulty on the part of the participants can explain 
the lack of differences in judged duration between the two experimental conditions. 
To overcome this problem, participants should simply be asked to provide a 
subjective rating of the task's difficulty. However. to my knowledge. this has only 
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been done in one experiment (Zakay & Fallach, 1984, Expt. 3). In this study. one of 
two versions of the Stroop colour-word test was perfonned during the to-be-
estimated interval. One task involved reading the name of the colour-word presented 
(W task), whereas as the other involved naming the colour of the ink in which the 
colour-word was written (CW task). Although the objective difficulty of Stroop tasks 
is well-established, ratings of subjective difficulty also established that the CW task 
was perceived as more difficult than the W task. Interestingly, participants judged the 
duration of the difficult CW task to be shorter than that of the easy W task. Thus, 
retrospective duration judgments decreased as the perceived difficulty of the task 
increased. This suggests that when the difficulty of a task is validated by subjectiye 
difficulty ratings, more meaningful and consistent results may emerge. The ease or 
difficulty experienced whilst perfonning an infonnation processing task may well 
turn out to be an important judgmental cue for inferring how much time has elapsed 
during the task. 
1.10 THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
1.10.1 Objectives 
The primary objective of the present research is to investigate the extent to which the 
subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing operations (i.e .. memory encoding 
and memory retrieval) influences people's retrospective duration judgments. That is, 
will people use their experiences of how easy or difficult it was for them to place 
items of information into memory as a cue to judge how much time has elapsed 
during a task? Similarly, will people consider the ease or difficulty they experienced 
bringing information to mind as a relevant and reliable basis for their duration 
judgments? By undertaking work of this kind, the current research is designed to 
confirm and extend earlier work on subjective experiences to a type of judgment not 
previously studied (e.g., Schwarz, 1998). These notions will be empirically tested in 
the following nine experiments by comparing people's retrospective duration 
judgments after they have perfonned an easy or difficult encoding task (Expts. 1-5 
and 9) or an easy or difficult retrieval task (Expts. 6-8). The assumption is that if 
people draw on their prior processing experiences as a basis for judgment, then 
duration judgments should decrease as processing operations are perceived to 
increase in difficulty. Supporting evidence for these experiential effects would add 
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uniquely to the previous literature on subjective experiences and demonstrate the 
usefulness of this experience-based approach in a new domain, namely In 
retrospective duration estimation. 
The second objective of the present research is to compare the predictions of the 
experience-based hypothesis against those derived from the traditional memory-
based models of remembered duration. Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis 
predicts that retrospective duration judgments increase as a function of the amount of 
stimulus information stored in memory during the task interval. In contrast. Block's 
(1989a~ Block & Reed, 1978) contextual-change hypothesis predicts that 
retrospective duration judgments increase with the amount of contextual change that 
is stored in memory during the critical time period. To test the predictive utility of 
these two hypotheses, the relationship between remembered duration and memory 
for events from the task interval will be examined (Expts. 1-9), as will the 
relationship between remembered duration and the number of contextual changes 
that took place during the critical time period (Expts. 7-8). The third and final 
objective of the current research is to investigate whether experiential effects on 
judgments of elapsed time can be elicited in more naturalistic task contexts (Expt. 9). 
1.10.2 Overview of Experimental Procedure 
In all nine experiments reported in this thesis, participants were required to perform 
either an easy or a difficult information-processing task for a fixed period of time. In 
this way, the demands placed on the process of memory encoding (Expts. 1-5 and 
Expt. 9) or memory retrieval (Expts. 6-8) were varied. Following the information-
processing task, participants performed a distractor activity for 5 minutes and then 
were asked to answer two questions. One question required participants to estimate 
how much time they believed had elapsed during the task. The other required 
participants to rate how much difficulty they had experienced performing the task. 
This question provided a direct measure of participants' experienced ease or 
difficulty of encoding or retrieval and thus served as a manipulation check for the 
assumed differences in task difficulty between the two experimental conditions. On 
completion of these questions. participants were finally given either a free recall test 
(Expts. 1-3 and 6-8) or a recognition test (Expts. 4-5 and 9) to assess their memory 
for the items they had previously encoded or retrie\'ed during the critical interval. 
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1.10.3 Methodological Issues 
In previous retrospective temporal estimation research, the duration of the interval to 
be judged has ranged from about 45 s to several minutes. Thus, for the present 
research to be comparable, the same range was used. The shortest duration studied 
was 46 s and the longest was 4 min 47 s. By using a wide range of objective clock 
time durations, there is more scope for testing the experience-based hypothesis of 
remembered duration and the other two competing hypotheses. In addition. the 
generality of the findings across different durations can be examined. Retrospective 
duration judgments were made along a horizontal interval scale either via a circled 
response (Expts. 1-5) or by making a mark on the line (Expts. 6-9). 
Of critical importance to the rationale of the present research is that participants 
acquire the "temporal motive" (Doob, 1971) only when they are unexpectedly given 
the duration judgment instructions after the task interval has elapsed. After all, this 
research is solely interested in how people estimate the duration of a task in 
retrospect. If participants were aware that time is being studied, then they would 
undoubtedly pay attention to the passage of time during the critical interval (i.e .. 
concentrate on time-keeping in some way) and their subsequent duration judgment 
would be prospective rather than retrospective in nature. Thus, as far as the 
participants were concerned their only task was to perform some kind of information 
processing activity. 
However, regardless of explicit instructions, the inquisitive mind of a person taking 
part in an experiment makes it likely that he or she will still speculate about the 
experimenter's hypotheses. In some retrospective timing studies, experimenters find 
a convenient way to get participants to remove their watches without arousing 
suspicion as to the prime purpose of the experiment. For example, McClain (1983) 
asked participants 'to remove their watches and jewelry because these metal objects 
sometimes interfere with our electronic recording equipment' (p. 186). However. 
instructions of this kind may actually cause participants to suspect that the 
experiment is related to time measurement in some way (Block & Zakay. 1997; 
Zakay. 1990). Therefore. to be overly cautious, no such instructions were given. 
Also. to be certain that duration judgments were actually formed in retrospect. 
participants were probed for suspicion at the end of the experiment. They were asked 
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what they thought the experiment was about and whether they had suspected that a 
duration judgment would be required. Participants were also asked not to discuss the 
time aspect of the experiment with any of their colleagues. Furthermore, rigorous 
checks were carried out to ensure that an individual who signed up for one of the 





Previous research in social cognition has shown that the subjectiye experience of 
ease or difficulty evoked by memory retrieval operations can play an influential role 
in shaping people's judgments (e.g., Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991: Wanke et aI., 1996; 
Winkielman et aI., 1998). In these studies the judgments under investigation 
pertained to subjective domains, namely to judgments that were self-related. With 
judgments of this kind, the inference made is neither right nor wrong as there is no 
objective standard against which level of accuracy can be assessed. The question 
remains, therefore, of whether these experiential effects would emerge for a 
judgment more objective in nature where there is a correct answer to the question 
posed; specifically, people's retrospective duration estimates of a given task. In 
addition to studying a new type of judgment, the research in this chapter also extends 
earlier work in this domain by considering whether experiences of ease or difficulty 
evoked by memory encoding operations may also affect people's judgments of 
remembered duration. 
The following three experiments will investigate the extent to which the experiential 
concomitants of the encoding process may influence people's retrospective duration 
judgments. That is, will people use their inferences about how easy or difficult it was 
for them to commit items of information to memory as a cue to compute how much 
time has elapsed during a task? This experience-based hypothesis will be 
competitively compared against Ornstein' s (1969) storage-size hypothesis of 
remembered duration. According to this hypothesis, people base their retrospectiYe 
duration judgments on the amount of stimulus information stored in memory (i.e., 
storage size) during the critical task interval. This hypothesis therefore predicts a 
positive relationship between remembered duration and memory for stimulus eYents 
that occurred during the task interval. Any pattern of differences or equivalences in 
memory measures (such as recall or recognition) should be paralleled by a similar 
pattern in people's retrospective duration judgments. Thus, to test Ornstein's (1969) 
- 68-
storage-size hypothesis, a free recall test will be administered in the three 
experiments to assess people's memory for the events occurring during the interval. 
2.2 EXPERIMENT 1: HIGH- vs. LOW-FREQUENCY WORDS 
To investigate the moderating role of prior encoding experiences on judgments of 
remembered duration, it is essential that participants perform a task during the to-be-
judged interval that places differential demands on the memory encoding process 
(Le., easy or difficult). Unlike the research carried out by Schwarz and his colleagues 
(e.g., Schwarz, 1998), the amount of material in mind will not be manipulated. In the 
present context, as the storage-size model emphasises the contents of memory as the 
sole determinant of retrospective timing, it is imperative that the amount of 
information to-be-encoded during the critical interval is held constant across the two 
experimental conditions. Thus, the current experiment will manipulate the difficulty 
of encoding operations that are undertaken on a fixed number of items. This will be 
achieved by requesting participants to memorise a list of either high- or low-
frequency words (e.g., Gregg, 1976). It was anticipated that the lexical status of the 
words (high- vs. low-frequency) would moderate the encoding experience (easy vs. 
difficult respectively). 
As long as this word frequency manipulation is successful in eliciting different 
encoding experiences for participants in the two experimental conditions, the 
experience-based experimental hypothesis predicts the following. If people use their 
prior encoding experiences to compute elapsed time. then judgments of remembered 
duration should decrease as the perceived difficulty of encoding operations increase. 
That is, when the encoding task is perceived to be difficult or demanding (i.e., low-
frequency words), people will report that less time was available to commit the 
words to memory compared to when the encoding task is perceived to be relatively 
easy (i.e., high-frequency words). The content-based hypothesis (i.e .. Ornstein's 
(1969) storage-size model) predicts that if people draw on the numerical amount of 
stimulus information stored in memory to compute elapsed time, then retrospective 
duration judgments should closely parallel the amount of information remembered 
from the task. That is. if the encoding task leads to increased. decreased. or 
equivalent memory for the presented words compared with the other task, people will 
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report that more, less, or the same amount of time was available to commit these 
items to memory. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty female undergraduates from the University of Bristol participated in the 
experiment in partial fulfilment of a course requirement. The study had a single 
factor (word frequency: high or low) between-subjects design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. 
Stimulus Materials 
Two word lists were prepared. One list contained 20 high-frequency words (e.g., 
number, second, doctor; see Appendix 1) and the other list contained 20 low-
frequency words (e.g., accost, dispel, forego; see Appendix 1). The words were 
selected from Francis and Kucera's (1982) word pool with occurrences over 300 per 
million for high-frequency words and between 0-12 occurrences per million for low-
frequency words. The words were presented in a single vertical column on a sheet of 
paper and were typed in lowercase letters (Times New Roman font, 12 point). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and informed that the purpose of the experiment 
was to investigate human memory. One of the two 20-item word lists was placed 
face down on the table in front of the participants. They were instructed to carefully 
study and memorise the words on the sheet of paper as their memory for these items 
would later be tested. When the experimenter said "start", participants turned over 
the sheet of paper and began the memorisation task. No information was given 
regarding the length of the study phase, but after a 90 s interval had elapsed (which 
was surreptitiously timed using a stopwatch), the experimenter said .... stop·· and the 
list was removed. By using these signals. the task interval (i.e .. to-be-assessed 
duration) was delimited for the participants. Following the encoding task, 
participants performed a 5 min distractor activity in which they were required to 
describe their most recent holiday. The interval was precisely timed using a 
concealed stopwatch. The experimenter encouraged the participants to talk for the 
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full 5 min period by asking appropriate questions to prompt their recollections. This 
filler task was carried out to clear short-term memory and again. participants were 
unaware of how much time had elapsed. 
The next task involved completing a questionnaire consisting of two questions that 
related to the memory task. The order of presentation of the questions was 
counterbalanced across the two experimental conditions. One question required the 
participants to estimate how much time they believed had elapsed during the memory 
task. All participants were reminded that the task interval (i.e., to-be-assessed 
duration) was delimited by the words 'start' and • stop' . Below this question was a 9-
point scale ranging from 70-110 s with 5 s intervals between each point. Participants 
were asked to circle the point that most accurately captured the duration of the word-
memory task. The other question asked participants to rate how much difficulty they 
had experienced memorising the words. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale 
ranging from 1 ('very easy') to 9 ('very difficult'). Finally, participants were given a 
free recall task in which they were asked to bring to mind and write down as many 
words as possible from the initial study list in the space provided on the 
questionnaire. Participants were told that they could take as much time as they 
required, but no participant took any longer than five minutes. All participants were 
then debriefed as to the real purpose of the experiment, thanked for their assistance. 
and dismissed. None of the participants had guessed that a retrospective duration 
judgment would be required as they all believed that the main purpose of the 
experiment was to investigate their memory for the presented words. 
2.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To ensure that the memory task was accompanied by different encoding experiences, 
participants' difficulty ratings were submitted to a single factor (word frequency: 
high or low) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOV A). In line with 
expectation. this revealed an effect of word frequency on participants' perceptions of 
task difficulty, F( 1.28) = 4.32, P < .05. Participants considered the memory task to be 
less demanding when the to-be-remembered items were high- rather than low-
frequency words (see Table 1 for treatment means). 
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Duration Estimates 
A single factor (word frequency: high or low) between-subjects ANOV A was 
undertaken on the data. As expected, this revealed an effect of word frequency on 
participants' duration jUdgments, such that more time was believed to have been 
available to memorise the high- rather than the low-frequency words, F(1,28) = 5.77, 
P < .05 (see Table 1 for treatment means). As participants' estimates of elapsed time 
varied as a function of their experienced ease or difficulty of encoding. this result 
provides initial support for the experimental prediction. 
Free Recall Performance 
Free recall performance (total number of words correctly recalled) was computed for 
each participant as a proportion. The resultant proportional recall scores were 
submitted to a single factor (word frequency: high or low) between-subjects 
ANOV A. This analysis revealed no effect of word frequency on recall performance, 
F(1,28) < 1, ns (see Table 1 for treatment means). This suggests that participants who 
memorised the low-frequency (i.e., difficult to encode) words must have expended 
greater effort on the task for memory to be equivalent to those participants who 
memorised the high-frequency (i.e., easy to encode) words. 
Table 1. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Free Recall Performance as a 
Function of Word Frequency (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Word Frequency Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Free Recall 
High-frequency 86.3 (7.90) 6.33 (1.59) .373(.11) 
Low-frequency 76.6 (8.99) 7.27 (0.70) .357 (.08) 
Interestingly, Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis cannot explain the effect of 
word frequency on participants' retrospective duration judgments. Both the high- and 
low-frequency word memory tasks produced equivalent recall performance, but were 
not judged as equal in remembered duration. Rather, the memory task with low-
frequency words was judged as shorter in retrospect than the same task v.ith high-
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frequency words. Therefore in line with the experimental predictions, the lexical 
status of the words was sufficient to elicit different encoding experiences and this 
experience of ease or difficulty then influenced the subsequent judgment. When the 
encoding task was deemed to be subjectively difficult or demanding (i.e., low-
frequency words), participants believed that less time had been available to commit 
the items to memory compared to when the encoding task was deemed to be less 
demanding (i.e., high-frequency words). 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
Corroborating the relationship between these variables, participants' duration 
estimates and ratings of encoding difficulty were correlated. such that duration 
estimates decreased as encoding operations were perceived to increase in difficulty, 
r(28) = -.471, p < .005. To investigate whether the subjective difficulty of encoding 
operations mediated the effect of word frequency on participants' duration estimates, 
a mediational analysis was conducted using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). 
Three relationships between the target variables must be demonstrated in order to 
establish a basis for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The independent 
variable must influence both the dependent and the mediator variable and the 
mediator and dependent variable must be associated. Mediation is established if the 
effect of the independent variable (i.e., word frequency) is reduced or eliminated 
when the effect of the hypothesised mediating variable is taken into account. As the 
reported effects satisfied the conditions for testing for mediation, an ANCOVA was 
performed on the data. This revealed that when the subjective difficulty of the 
memory task was partialled out of the analysis, the effect of word frequency on 
duration estimates was eliminated, F(1,27) < 1, ns. This finding confirms that the 
subjective ease or difficulty of prior encoding operations mediated participants' 
judgments of remembered duration. 
The results of Experiment 1 lend preliminary support to the experimental predictions. 
As expected, duration estimates diminished as participants perceived the task to 
increase in difficulty. This confirms that retrospective duration judgments were 
driven by the experiential concomitants (i.e., experiences of ease or difficulty) of a 
standard memory task. Corroborating the work of Schwarz and his colleagues 
(Schwarz, 1998), this finding substantiates the notion that subjective processmg 
experiences can function as a highly informative judgmental cue - in the present 
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context, a cue to judge elapsed time. In demonstrating this, the present study extends 
previous research of this kind in two important ways. Firstly, it reveals that these 
experiential influences emerge not only for judgments in subjective domains (e.g., 
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), but also for a judgment that is more objective in nature. 
Secondly, unlike other research in this domain, participants' temporal outputs were 
not moderated by the apparent ease or difficulty of the retrieval process (e.g., 
Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991). In each of the experimental conditions, recall 
performance was equivalent. Participants must therefore have shared a common 
retrieval experience as the same amount of information was remembered from the 
memory task. Hence, the current results are amenable to an interpretation based on 
experiences of ease of difficulty associated with the encoding of to-be-remembered 
information. The results of the mediational analysis lend further support to this 
viewpoint. 
Theoretically, these initial findings present problems for a content-based explanation 
of remembered duration (Ornstein, 1969). The expected positive relationship 
between retrospective duration judgments and memory for the encoded words was 
not found. There were large differences in remembered duration between the high-
and low-frequency word memory tasks, whilst recall performance for these items 
was equivalent. Thus, the inference can be made that duration judgments were not 
based on the amount of information stored in memory. As these judgments were 
influenced by the nature of to-be-encoded words in the absence of memory 
differences, the experience-based account of remembered duration is needed to 
explain the current results. Duration judgments were based on an assessment of how 
easy or difficult it was to encode the presented words. 
2.3 EXPERIMENT 2: TYPED vs. HANDWRITTEN WORDS 
The results of Experiment 1 furnished initial support for the experimental hypothesis 
that people's prior encoding experiences affect their assessments of elapsed time. 
The obtained findings also called into question the traditional content-based 
explanation of retrospective duration estimation (cf. Ornstein, 1969). Of potential 
relevance, however, is that the present experiential effects were obtained in a task 
context in which participants were required to commit different sets of items to 
memory during the critical interval (i.e .. high- vs. low-frequency words). Although 
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participants' ratings of task difficulty revealed that the ease of encoding manipulation 
was successful, it is possible that subtle differences in the lexical status of the items 
may have contributed to the observed effects. 
Perhaps then a better test of the experimental prediction would be to hold the 
informational content (i.e., words to be encoded) constant across the two 
experimental conditions and manipulate the difficulty of encoding operations in an 
alternative way. In the current experiment, this will be achieved by varying the 
typeface in which a standard set of items are presented to participants (i.e., typed vs. 
handwritten). It was anticipated that participants would experience more difficulty 
memorising poorly handwritten rather than typed words. The predictions were as in 
Experiment 1. That is, if people rely on an experience-based judgmental strategy, 
then retrospective duration estimates should decrease as the encoding task is 
perceived to increase in difficulty. In contrast if people rely on a content-based 
judgmental strategy, then retrospective duration estimates should closely parallel 
memory for the amount of information remembered from the encoding task. 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-two female undergraduates from the University of Bristol participated in the 
experiment in partial fulfilment of a course requirement. The study had a single 
factor (typeface: typed or handwritten) between-subjects design. A random 
assignment of participants to one of the experimental conditions was undertaken. 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and informed that the study was an investigation 
into human memory. The experiment was basically a replication of the previous 
study. but with one important modification. In the study phase (again lasting for 90 
s). participants were presented with the 20 high-frequency words used in Experiment 
1. For half of the participants, the words were typed in lowercase letters (Times New 
Roman font. 12 point); for the others, the words were handwritten in a generally poor 
style which also appeared in lowercase (see Appendix 2). The presentation fonnat of 
the to-be-remembered items was expected to int1uence the difficulty of the encoding 
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experience. The procedure and dependent measures were as in Experiment 1. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. In the 
debriefing session, participants once again did not suspect that the experiment was 
primarily interested in their time estimation abilities and therefore were completely 
unaware that a retrospective duration judgment would be required. 
2.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To assess the encoding experiences associated with the memory task, a single factor 
(typeface: typed or handwritten) between-subjects ANOV A was perfonned on 
participants' difficulty ratings. This analysis confinned that participants found the 
memory task to be less demanding when the to-be-remembered words were typed 
rather than handwritten, F(l,30) = 3.83, p < .06 (see Table 2 for treatment means). 
Although this analysis revealed only a marginal effect of typeface on participants' 
encoding experiences, the results fell in the predicted direction. 
Duration Estimates 
A single factor (typeface: typed or handwritten) between-subjects ANOVA was 
perfonned on the data. As expected, this revealed an effect of typeface on 
participants' duration judgments, such that more time was believed to have been 
available to memorise the typed rather than the handwritten words, F(l,30) = 5.00, p 
< .04 (see Table 2 for treatment means). This pattern of findings is consistent with 
what would be expected if participants used their prior encoding experiences as a 
source of infonnation for judgment. 
Free Recall Performance 
Total correct proportional recall scores were submitted to a single factor (typeface: 
typed or handwritten) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed no effect of 
typeface on recall perfonnance, F{1,30) < 1, ns (see Table 2 for treatment means). 
This suggests that participants must have expended greater effort memorising the 
handwritten words (see difficulty ratings below). 
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Table 2. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Free Recall Performance as a 
Function of Typeface (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Typeface Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Free Recall 
Typed 87.5 (12.25) 6.06 (1.65) .334 (.10) 
Handwritten 79.1 (8.80) 7.12 (1.41) .350 (.08) 
The observed pattern of time estimation results again presents difficulties for a 
content-based hypothesis of retrospective timing (Ornstein, 1969). The two memory 
tasks lasted for the same clock duration, contained identical stimulus items that were 
processed and remembered to the same degree, but they were not judged as equal in 
perceived duration. Thus, as no relationship was found between duration estimates 
and memory for the interval items, participants could not have used a judgmental 
strategy based on memory content. As the only physical difference between the 
memory tasks was the presentation format of the to-be-remembered items, the 
experience-based hypothesis provides the best explanation of the current findings. 
Specifically, participants appeared to rely on a judgmental strategy based on their 
experienced ease or difficulty of encoding to infer the time elapsed during the task. 
When the word-encoding task was perceived as difficult (i.e., handwritten) rather 
than easy (i.e., typed), participants judged that less time had been available to 
commit the items to memory. 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
Further evidence for this conclusion was obtained by a correlational analysis. 
Participants' duration estimates decreased as their reported difficulty of encoding the 
words increased, r(30) = -.448, p < .01. As the results satisfied the conditions for 
testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), an ANCOVA was performed to establish 
if the subjective difficulty of encoding operations mediated the effect of typeface on 
participants' duration estimates. This revealed that when task difficulty ratings were 
partialled out of the analysis, the effect of typeface on duration estimates was 
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eliminated, F(1,29) < 1, ns. This confirms that the experienced ease or difficulty of 
encoding mediated participants' judgments of remembered duration. 
Thus replicating Experiment 1, the present findings again show that people pay 
attention to their prior encoding experiences and use the information they pro\'ide to 
guide their judgments of elapsed time. Extending the previous results. on this 
occasion the contents of the to-be-remembered words were constant across 
conditions whilst encoding difficulty was manipulated by varying the typeface in 
which these items were presented. 
2.4 EXPERIMENT 3: TYPED vs. HANDWRITTEN PERSONALITY 
TRAITS 
The results thus far demonstrate a relationship between the subjective difficulty of 
prior encoding operations and people's retrospective duration judgments. 
Interestingly, in both Experiments 1 and 2, participants were given explicit 
instructions by the experimenter to study and memorise the presented stimulus items. 
Perhaps, these instructions cause participants to pay more attention to their encoding 
experiences than would otherwise be the case. The question remains, therefore. 
whether similar effects would emerge in task contexts in which participants are not 
required (at least explicitly) to commit items to memory. This issue will be addressed 
in the present experiment. Imagine a situation in which a tall dark attractive stranger 
approaches you whilst sitting in a bar. As he or she is making polite chit chat, no 
doubt you will be listening carefully and hanging on each and every word so that you 
can form some kind of impression of that person. Some recent work discussed 
previously has shown that the experience of ease or difficulty evoked by processing 
operations is used as a relevant source of information to guide our impressions of 
another person (Dijksterhuis et aL 1999). Suppose then that you were asked in 
retrospect how long it took you to form an impression of that person. Would the 
same type of experiential information be used to come up with an answer? 
Based on such a task context, participants will be given a series of personality traits 
that are said to describe a particular target. Their task will be to fonn an impression 
of this person. Previous research has shown that an impression-set functions as an 
implicit memory instruction (Hamilton, Katz. & Leirer, 1980). That is, although no 
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mention is made of the need to remember the presented items. an impression-set 
prompts participants to memorise the personality descriptors. As in Experiment 2~ the 
exact same items will be used in the two experimental conditions and the difficulty 
of encoding operations will be manipulated by varying the typeface in which these 
items are presented to participants (i.e., typed vs. handwritten traits). Deyeloping the 
procedures used in the initial experiments, a couple of modifications will be made to 
the methodology. First, the temporal interval of interest will be reduced to 46 s. This 
will assess the extent to which the reported effects extend to shorter time periods. 
Second, a judgment of the confidence with which an impression is held will be used 
as a proxy for the difficulty of the impression-formation task. In the present context. 
a question about confidence seemed more appropriate and provides another way to 
measure participants~ experienced ease or difficulty of encoding. This assumption is 
based on previous research which has found that ratings of confidence and task 
difficulty are correlated (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Wanke et aI., 1996). 
Specifically~ people feel less confident in their judgments when they find a task to be 
difficult rather than easy. The experimental predictions (the experience-based 
hypothesis) and Omstein~s predictions (the content-based hypothesis) were as in the 
previous experiments. 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Twenty-eight female undergraduates from the University of Bristol were paid £3 for 
their participation in the experiment. The study had a single factor (typeface: typed 
or handwritten) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the experimental conditions. 
Stimulus Materials 
Two word lists were prepared. Both lists comprised 20 personality traits that 
described a girl called "Mary" (e.g., compassionate. unusual, impatient). These 
items were selected from Anderson~s (1968) word pool of personality traits and were 
presented in a vertical column on a sheet of paper. In one list. the trait words were 
typed in lowercase letters (Times New Roman font. 12 point); in the other, the same 
- 79-
trait words were handwritten in a generally poor style using lowercase letters (see 
Appendix 3 for a full listing of the stimulus trait words and typeface used). 
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were told that they would be 
taking part in a study on person perception. Participants' attention was then drawn to 
the sheet of paper placed face down on the table in front of them. It was explained 
that the sheet contained 20 personality traits that described a girl called "Merry" and 
their task was to form an impression of her using the words available to them. No 
information was given as to the time allowed to complete this task. Half of the 
participants studied the typed trait words and the other half studied the handwritten 
trait words. Participants turned over the list when the experimenter said "start" and a 
46 s interval was timed using a concealed stopwatch. At that point, the experimenter 
said "stop" and the list was removed. In this way, the task interval (i.e., to-be-
assessed duration) was clearly defined. Following the impression-formation task, 
participants were instructed to write down as many countries of the world as they 
could remember. This distractor task lasted for 5 min and was secretly timed using a 
stopwatch. However, participants were unaware of the amount of time that had 
elapsed during the task. 
Next, participants completed two questions that related to the impression-formation 
task. The order of presentation of the questions was counterbalanced across the two 
experimental conditions. Participants were asked to estimate how much time they 
had been given to form an impression of Mary. They were reminded that the duration 
to-be-estimated began when the experimenter said "start" and finished when they 
heard the word "stop". A 7-point scale was provided for the retrospective duration 
judgment ranging from 37-55 s with 3 s intervals between each point. Participants 
were asked to circle one of the points and were encouraged to be as accurate as 
possible. Participants were also required to rate how confident they were that their 
impression of Mary was accurate. Ratings were made along a 7-point scale ranging 
from 'not at all confident' (1) to 'extremely confident' (7). Finally, participants were 
instructed to write down all the personality trait words they could remember from the 
presented list in the space provided on the question sheet. Participants were told that 
they could take as much time as they needed to complete this task. In the debriefing 
session that followed. participants were probed for suspicion as to the real purpose of 
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the study. No participant guessed that time estimation was the main area of interest 
and none had suspected that a retrospective duration judgment would be required. 
Participants were then thanked, paid, and dismissed. 
2.4.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Confidence 
To ensure that the impression-formation task was accompanied by different encoding 
experiences, participants' confidence ratings were submitted to a single factor 
(typeface: typed or handwritten) between-subjects ANOV A. As expected, this 
revealed an effect of typeface on participants' perceptions of impression confidence, 
F(1,26) = 7.67, p < .01. Participants felt more confident that their impression of 
Mary was accurate when the presented trait words were typed rather than 
handwritten (see Table 3 for treatment means). 
Duration Estimates 
A single factor (typeface: typed or handwritten) between-subjects ANOY A was 
undertaken on the data. As expected, this revealed an effect of typeface on 
participants' judgments of elapsed time, F(1,26) = 5.50, p < .03. Participants 
believed that they were given more time to form an impression of Mary when the 
presented trait words were typed rather than handwritten (see Table 3 for treatment 
means). Once again, this pattern of findings is consistent with what would be 
expected if participants used their experienced ease or difficulty of encoding as a 
source of information for judgment. 
Free Recall Performance 
Total correct proportional recall scores were submitted to a single factor (typeface: 
typed or handwritten) between-subjects ANOY A. This analysis revealed a marginal 
effect of typeface on recall performance, F(1.26) = 3.37. p < .08. Participants 
remembered slightly more trait words when they were presented in a typed rather 
than a handwritten format (see Table 3 for treatment means). 
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Table 3. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Confidence, and Free Recall Performance as a 
Function of Typeface (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Typeface Duration Estimates Task Confidence Free Recall 
Typed 47.5 (5.85) 4.92 (1.14) .468 (.11) 
Handwritten 42.6 (5.24) 3.50 (1.56) .396 (.10) 
Unlike the previous studies, the encoding task that was judged to have lasted for a 
longer time period also produced slightly better free recall scores (i.e., typed trait 
words). To be overly cautious in interpreting the present data, this relationship (albeit 
weak) between participants' duration estimates and their memory for the interval 
items could lend some support to Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis. 
However, if judgments of remembered duration are based solely on the amount of 
information stored in memory as this hypothesis suggests, then one would expect to 
find evidence of a stronger relationship between these two variables. As this was not 
the case, the pattern of time estimation results is best explained by the experience-
based hypothesis. Participants' retrospective duration judgments of the impression-
formation task were influenced by the ease or difficulty they experienced encoding 
the presented trait words. Less time was reported to be available to form a target-
based impression when the encoding task was considered to be difficult (i.e., 
handwritten traits) and more time was reported to be available when the encoding 
task was considered to be easy (i.e., typed traits). 
Duration Estimates and Confidence Ratings 
Further support for this interpretation can be garnered from the results of a 
correlational analysis. Participants' duration estimates and their ratings of impression 
confidence (proxy for difficulty) were correlated, such that duration estimates 
decreased as perceived confidence in the impression decreased. r(26) = .534. P < 
.005. As the results met with the criteria required for testing mediation (Baron & 
Kenny. 1986). an ANCOVA was performed to establish if the experienced ease or 
difficulty of encoding mediated the effect of trait typeface on participants' duration 
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estimates. On this occasion, however, perceived task confidence was used as the 
covariate. This analysis revealed that when confidence ratings were partialled out of 
the analysis, the effect of typeface on duration estimates was eliminated, F( 1.25) < 1. 
ns. Thus, the experienced ease or difficulty evoked by encoding operations mediated 
participants' judgments of remembered duration. 
The results of this experiment replicate and extend the prevIOUS findings. Even 
without explicit instruction to commit the presented trait words to memory, people 
seem to take on board the information provided by their prior encoding experiences 
to infer how much time has elapsed. When the task of placing the information into 
mind is experienced as effortful and demanding, perceivers believe they had less 
time to form an impression of the target person. Presumably, by reporting the 
duration of the task to be shorter, perceivers can justify to themselves why they are 
not very confident in their impression. Conversely, when the task of placing 
information into the mind is considered to be a relatively effortless activity, 
perceivers believe they had more time to form an impression of the target person. 
This can potentially explain why perceivers reported greater confidence in their 
impression in this situation. Furthermore, the observed results extend those from the 
previous studies as the same ease of encoding effects emerged despite using a shorter 
duration interval (46 s) than in the other experiments (90 s). This therefore suggests 
that an experience-based strategy is employed for retrospective duration judgments 
across varying intervals, at least in the range investigated so far. 
2.5 CHAPTER DISCUSSION 
Although past research has emphasised the contents of memory as the principal 
determinant of remembered duration (Ornstein, 1969), the previous studies suggest 
that this may not provide a complete view of how a person estimates elapsed time. In 
all three studies, the amount of information presented during the to-be-judged 
interval was held constant and with the exception of Experiment 3 the amount of 
information remembered did not differ as a function of its nature (word frequency) or 
its appearance (typeface). Even the third study only found a marginal difference in 
recall scores as a function of trait typeface. A content-based model would have 
problems explaining why large differences in estimated duration were found between 
the two experimental conditions when the same amount of information was 
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apparently represented in mind. These results are consistent with preVIOUS 
retrospective temporal estimation research that has found no relationship between 
judgments of remembered duration and the amount of information recalled from the 
judged interval (e.g., Block, 1974; McClain, 1983; Poynter, 1983; Predebon, 1984). 
The experience-based hypothesis can however provide a potential explanation for the 
reported findings. The characteristics of the to-be-encoded verbal material in 
Experiments 1-3 were sufficient for participants to have different encoding 
experiences (in terms of subjective ease or difficulty). When they were later 
unexpectedly asked to make a retrospective duration judgment, it seems that the 
experiential state that was associated with the encoding experience was used as a cue 
to compute elapsed time. When participants found it mentally demanding and 
difficult to encode the presented words, they interpreted this to mean that they must 
not have been given much time to perform the task. Thus, short retrospective 
duration judgments were provided by these participants. In contrast, when encoding 
information was deemed to be a relatively effortless affair, participants interpreted 
this to mean that they were given sufficient time to perform the task in a satisfactory 
manner. This was reflected in their longer retrospective duration judgments. The 
results of the mediational analyses in all three studies confirm this experience-based 
viewpoint. Specifically, people's subjective mental states are used to guide their 
judgments of remembered duration. As such, the present findings are compatible 
with related research in social cognition that highlights the role of subjective 
experiences in other domains of judgment (e.g., Clore, 1992; Kelley & Jacoby, 
1996a; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Strack, 1992). The question remains, 
of course, whether these ease of encoding effects on judgments of duration in 
retrospect would extend to other stimulus modalities, measures of memory, and 





In the initial three experiments, participants were required to visually encode the 
information presented during the critical task interval and differential demands were 
placed on the encoding process by varying the nature (Experiment 1) or the 
appearance of the to-be-remembered information (Experiments 2 and 3). Thus, in 
order to test the experience-based hypothesis further. it is necessary to determine 
whether the observed effects would extend to task contexts in which the information 
is transmitted in a different modality and the difficulty of encoding operations is 
manipulated in an alternative way. Thus, the two experiments in this chapter will 
investigate whether the subjective ease or difficulty of prior encoding operations 
guides people's retrospective duration judgments when the information is presented 
aurally. A successful replication of the results from the previous three experiments 
would show that experiential effects emerge regardless of the modality in which the 
information is perceived during the target interval. As in Chapter 2. the experience-
based hypothesis will be competitively tested against Ornstein' s (1969) storage-size 
hypothesis of remembered duration. 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 4: ENGLISH vs. GERMAN ACCENT 
To explore these issues in the present experiment participants will be required to 
perform an auditory encoding task during the critical interval. Imagine. for example. 
a situation in which you are eavesdropping on a conversation between two people in 
a restaurant (e.g., a couple arguing). Suppose further that you are later unexpectedly 
asked to estimate the duration of that conversation. Might it be the case that you use 
your subjective experience of how difficult it was to encode the conversation as a cue 
to make the retrospective duration estimate? Of course, for such a cue to be relevant 
to the temporal jUdgment, the encoding experience must have been considered 
effortful and mentally demanding in the first place. One situation in which the 
encoding process would be compromised in this way is when the conservation took 
place in a particularly nOlSY restaurant. Presumably then, the experience-based 
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prediction would be that the duration of the conversation should be judged as shorter 
in this situation compared to a quieter restaurant where the same conYersation could 
be encoded much more easily. 
In the present experiment, a functionally equivalent context will be created in the 
laboratory. Participants will be asked to listen carefully to a tape-recorded passage 
spoken by a female narrator. However, the difficulty of the encoding task \\ill not be 
increased by using background noise, but rather by varying the accent in which the 
passage is spoken (i.e., English vs. Foreign). It was anticipated that native English 
speakers would have a harder time trying to encode the passage when it was spoken 
with a foreign accent (i.e., German) compared to an English accent. Of course, as the 
content-based model proposes that remembered duration is based on the amount of 
stimulus information processed and stored in memory during the judged interval 
(e.g., Ornstein, 1969), it is imperative to hold constant the actual contents of the 
passage in the easy (English accent) and difficult (German accent) encoding 
conditions. The passage comprises an anecdotal story of travelling experiences 
around Great Britain and includes the names of forty towns and cities. Participants 
will be asked to memorise these items for a subsequent memory test. 
Developing the procedures used in the experiments discussed in Chapter 2, three 
modifications will be made to the methodology. First, the temporal interval to be 
estimated will be increased to 4 min 47 s. As this is a much longer duration than 
studied previously, this will assess the extent to which the reported effects generalise 
to extended temporal episodes. Second, the horizontal interval scale used for the 
retrospective duration estimates will be adjusted to include minutes and seconds 
rather than just seconds. This is a small but necessary alteration in the present context 
as time periods in this range are undoubtedly estimated in this way. Third, a 
recognition memory test will be administered to assess participants' recollections of 
the towns and cities from the passage. In the previous experiments, only a free recall 
test was used. As there was no necessary relationship between memory for the 
interval items and judgments of remembered duration. this was taken as evidence 
against Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis. Nevertheless, the argument could 
be made that the contents of memory seemed to play no role in shaping people's 
duration judgments because recall performance was an inadequate measure of the 
anl0unt of information stored in memory (i.e., storage-size). The problem with this 
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defence is that Ornstein (1969) failed to specify a way of quantifying storage size. 
However, time estimation researchers assume that memory measures of both recall 
and recognition are positively correlated with the size of memory storage (e.g., 
Block, 1974, 1992; Hanley & Morris, 1984; McClain, 1983; Poynter, 1983: 
Predebon, 1984). Thus, to further test the storage-size hypothesis of remembered 
duration, recognition accuracy will be measured as another way to assess the amount 
of information held in memory. 
As long as the accent manipulation is successful in eliciting different encoding 
experiences for participants in the two experimental conditions, the experience-based 
predictions should hold. Retrospective duration estimates of the passage should be 
shorter when the encoding task is experienced as difficult (i.e., German accent) rather 
than easy (i.e., English accent). In contrast, the content-based prediction is that 
retrospective duration estimates of the passage should closely parallel memory for 
the amount of information remembered from the encoding task. 
3.2.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty undergraduate students (20 men and 20 women) were recruited from a 
psychology subject pool at the University of Bristol and received course credit for 
their participation in the experiment. All participants were native speakers of English 
and had normal hearing. An equal number of male and female participants were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a single factor (accent: English or German) 
between-subj ects experiment. 
Stimulus Materials 
Using a Sony tape recorder, two tape-recorded passages were prepared. On the first 
tape, a German female narrator read aloud a long fictional story written in the first 
person about her travelling adventures around Great Britain. Critically. 40 towns and 
cities (e.g .• Crewe. Luton. Newcastle; see Appendix 4 for the stimulus passage used: 
the to-be-remembered items are written in bold) were mentioned during the course of 
the passage. The tape-recorded passage lasted for 4 min .f 7 s. On the second tape. an 
English 1emale narrator was recorded reading the same story. To ensure that the 
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recording lasted for an equivalent period of time, the narrator shadowed the German 
speaker on the first tape using headphones. With much practice and a lot of patience 
on the narrator's part, the two tapes were identical in length. An additional 40 towns 
and cities were selected to serve as distractors in the recognition test (see end of 
Appendix 4). Each distractor item was chosen to match a target item in approximate 
geographical location, town size, and number of syllables. 
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were infonned that the study 
was an investigation into human memory. Participants were instructed to listen 
carefully to a tape-recorded passage spoken by a female narrator. For half of the 
participants, the narrator was English; for the others, she was Gennan. Participants 
were infonned that a number of towns and cities would be mentioned throughout the 
course of the passage and were instructed to remember these items as afterwards 
their memory for the items would be assessed. No infonnation was given regarding 
the length of the listening task, but it was delimited for the participants by the 
experimenter saying "start" and "stop". Following this, participants performed a 
number searching task for a 5 min period that was accurately timed using a 
concealed stopwatch. This served as a distractor task to clear short-tenn memory and 
again, participants were unaware of how long they had been working on the task. 
Participants were then required to answer two questions concerning the listening task 
with the order counterbalanced across the two experimental conditions. One question 
required the participants to estimate how much time (in min and sec) they had spent 
listening to the passage. All participants were reminded that the interval of time to be 
estimated was delimited by the words . start' and . stop' . A 9-point scale was 
provided, ranging from 3 min 30 s to 5 min 30 s with 15 s intervals between each 
point. Participants were asked to circle the point that most accurately captured the 
duration of the passage. The other question asked participants to rate, on a 9-point 
scale. how difficult they found it to memorise the towns and cities from the passage 
(l = very easy~ 9 = very difficult). Finally, a recognition memory test was 
administered to assess participants' recollections of the passage. Participants were 
presented with a typed list of 80 towns and cities in three vertical columns (40 targets 
& 40 distractors). The sequence of towns and cities was randomised. Participants 
were instructed to indicate whether each item had been heard earlier in the passage 
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(write '"0" for old) or had not been heard earlier in the passage (write .. ~ .. for new). 
On completion of the recognition task, participants were debriefed as to the nature of 
the research, thanked for their assistance, and dismissed. None of the participants 
guessed that they would be asked to make a retrospective duration judgment. 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To investigate the encoding experiences associated with the memory task, a single 
factor (accent: English or German) between-subjects ANOVA was performed on 
participants' difficulty ratings. This analysis confirmed that accent had the intended 
effect on perceived difficulty. Participants found it easier to memorise the towns and 
cities from the passage when these items were delivered in an English rather than a 
German accent, F(l,38) = 46.05,p < .0001 (see Table 4 for treatment means). 
Duration Estimates 
Participants' retrospective duration estimates were converted to seconds and the 
resultant data were submitted to a single factor (accent: English or German) between-
subjects ANOV A. As expected, this revealed an effect of accent on participants' 
duration judgments, such that the passage was believed to be longer when it was 
delivered in an English rather than a German accent, F(L38) = 107.67, P < .0001 
(see Table 4 for treatment means). 
Recognition Accuracy 
For each participant the number of correctly recognised towns and cities was 
corrected for guessing by subtracting the false-alarm rate from the hit rate. That is. 
the number of distractor towns and cities incorrectly recognised was subtracted from 
the total number actually recognised (Baddeley, 1990). The corrected number was 
then converted into a proportional score which served as a measure of recognition 
accuracy. The resultant scores were submitted to a single factor (accent: English or 
German) between-subjects ANOV A. This revealed an effect of accent on recognition 
accuracy, such that participants correctly recognised more towns and cities from the 
passage when these items were delivered in an English rather than a German accent. 
F( 1.38) -:: 9.04. p < .005 (see Table 4 for treatment means). 
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Table 4. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Recognition Accuracy as a 
Function of Accent (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Accent Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Recognition 
English 285 (16.86) 3.95 (1.67) .664 (.12) 
German 234 (14.10) 6.75 (0.79) .533 (.15) 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
To analyse the relationship between participants' duration estimates and ratings of 
encoding difficulty, a correlational analysis was conducted. This revealed that these 
two variables were correlated, such that duration estimates decreased as encoding 
operations were perceived to increase in difficulty, r(38) = -.676. p < .001. As the 
results fulfilled the conditions required for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), 
an ANCOVA was performed to assess whether the subjective difficulty of encoding 
mediated the effect of accent on participants' duration estimates. When difficulty 
scores were partialled out of the analysis, the effect of accent on duration estimates 
was reduced, but not eliminated, F(1,37) = 40.99, p < .0001. Thus, as in the previous 
studies, the experienced ease or difficulty of encoding exerted a mediational 
influence on participants' retrospective duration judgments, although this effect was 
not as pronounced in the current experiment. 
The current results replicate and extend those observed in Experiments 1-3. As 
before, judgments of remembered duration were influenced by the subjective 
difficulty of a prior encoding episode, even when the information was presented 
aurally rather than visually. When the auditory encoding task was considered to be 
subjectively easy (i.e., English accent), participants believed that more time had been 
spent listening to the passage. In contrast, when the encoding task was considered to 
be subjectively difficult (i.e., German accent). participants believed that less time had 
been spent listening to the passage. Thus. the differences found in judged duration 
are consistent with what would be expected if indi\'iduals relied on their prior 
encoding experiences as a source of information to compute how much time had 
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elapsed during the task. This provides supporting evidence that ease of encoding 
effects generalise across different perceptual modalities. In addition, the observed 
findings also extend the previous work as the objective clock time duration of the 
estimated interval was much longer than in any of the earlier studies, nevertheless 
comparable effects emerged. 
The results of the mediational analysis lend further support to this experience-based 
account of retrospective timing. Specifically, this analysis revealed that the 
subjective ease or difficulty of prior encoding operations plays an influential 
mediational role in people's judgments of remembered duration. However. unlike the 
mediational analyses conducted for the experiments in Chapter 2, the effect of the 
independent variable (i.e., accent) on duration estimates was not eliminated 
completely when difficulty scores were partialled out of the analysis. Undoubtedly. 
this failure to completely eliminate the effect of accent on participants' duration 
estimates is due to the magnitude of the original effect. Perhaps one explanation for 
the enormity of this effect is that more information had to-be-encoded in this 
experiment than in the initial three studies (40 vs. 20 words). It is also possible that 
the presentation modality of the information may have been a contributory factor 
(auditory vs. visual). 
The results of this study are therefore consistent with the idea that people use their 
experienced ease or difficulty of encoding as a cue to estimate elapsed time. 
However, there is one obvious problem in interpreting these results as unequivocal 
support for the experience-based hypothesis. Unlike the previous studies, the 
observed pattern of time estimation results also corroborates Ornstein's (1969) 
storage-size hypothesis of remembered duration. The encoding task that was judged 
as longer in duration (Le., the passage narrated in an English accent) also produced 
better recognition memory for the to-be-remembered items (i.e., towns and cities). 
Thus, as retrospective duration judgments were directly related to the amount of 
information recognised from the judged interval, people could also have used the 
amount of information stored in memory as a judgmental cue to infer elapsed time. 
In the earlier experiments, such a content-based explanation was discounted as there 
was no relationship between judgments of remembered duration and memory for the 
interval items. Of potential relevance. however. is that only recall performance was 
assessed. This raises the question of whether a positive relationship between these 
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two variables was not found previously because a recognition test rather than a free 
recall test provides a better index of the amount of infonnation held in memory. 
Obviously, the only way to address this issue is to investigate whether the same 
memory content effects emerge in a conceptual replication of this experiment. That 
is, will duration judgments again closely parallel memory for the amount of 
information recognised from the judged interval? It is important to note that other 
retrospective temporal estimation research has failed to find evidence of this 
relationship (e.g., Block, 1978, 1986, 1992; Block & Reed, 1978: Hanley & Morris, 
1982; Poynter, 1983). 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 5: ENGLISH vs. GREEK ACCENT 
Given that the results of Experiment 4 lend support to both the experience-based and 
content-based hypotheses of remembered duration, a conceptual replication would be 
welcome to determine the basis of the observed effects. That is, will ease of encoding 
effects on judgments of temporal duration emerge, and if so, will they occur in the 
presence of memory performance differences as in Experiment 4, or in the absence 
of memory performance differences as in Experiments 1-3? The present experiment 
will investigate these issues. 
As in the previous study, participants will be asked to listen carefully to a tape-
recorded passage spoken by a narrator and the difficulty of the encoding task will be 
manipulated by varying the accent in which the passage is spoken (i.e., English vs. 
Foreign). However, on this occasion, the narrator will be male and the foreign accent 
will be Greek. Once again, it was anticipated that native English speakers would 
experience more difficulty encoding the passage when it was spoken with a foreign 
accent compared to an English accent. As before, the contents of the passage were 
identical in both the easy (English accent) and difficult (Greek accent) encoding 
conditions. However, a modification will be made to the subject matter of the 
passage. Specifically, the passage comprises a recipe and cooking procedure for an 
unspecified dish and includes the names of 40 different ingredients. Participants will 
be given the task of memorising these items and they will be forewarned that a 
memory test will follow. As in the previous experiment, the test will assess 
recognition memory. A final modification to the earlier methodology involves the 
duration of the temporal interval to be estimated. In the current experiment the 
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passage will last for 3 mm 18 s. By usmg a different clock time duration. the 
generality of the findings can be examined further. 
The experimental predictions (experience-based hypothesis) and Ornstein's 
predictions (content-based hypothesis) were as in the previous experiments. If people 
use their prior encoding experiences to compute elapsed time. then duration 
estimates should be shorter when the encoding task is deemed to be difficult rather 
than easy. In contrast, if people draw on the amount of stimulus information stored in 
memory, then duration estimates should closely parallel memory for the amount of 
information remembered from the encoding task. 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty undergraduate students (20 men and 20 women) were recruited from a 
psychology subject pool at the University of Bristol and received course credit for 
their participation in the experiment. All participants were native speakers of English 
and had normal hearing. The study had a single factor (accent: English or Greek) 
between-subjects design with an equal number of men and women randomly 
assigned to each condition. 
Stimulus Materials 
The stimulus materials comprised of two tape-recorded passages spoken by a male 
narrator. In both passages, the narrator described a recipe and cooking procedure for 
an unspecified dish. Critically, 40 ingredients (e.g., fennel, sugar, lamb; see 
Appendix 5 for the stimulus passage used; the to-be-remembered items are written in 
bold) were mentioned during the course of the passage. The recipe itself was entirely 
fictional so participants with any cooking knowledge would be unable to predict the 
identity of the dish. The only difference between the two tape-recorded passages was 
whether the narrator was English or Greek. As in Experiment 4, a shadowing 
technique was employed to create two recordings that were equal in length. both 
lasting for a total duration of 3 min 18 s. An additional 40 ingredients were selected 
to serve as distractors in the recognition test (see end of Appendix 5). Each distractor 
item was chosen to match a target item based on food-type and number of syllables. 
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Procedure and Dependent Measures 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were informed that the study 
was an investigation into human memory. The same procedure and dependent 
measures were employed as in Experiment 4, with the exception of the horizontal 
interval scale used for participants' duration estimates. This was adjusted to fit the 
shorter listening period of the passage. A 9-point scale was provided ranging from 2 
min to 4 min with 15 s intervals between each point. At the end of the experiment. 
participants were debriefed as to the nature of the research, thanked for their 
assistance, and dismissed. Once again, none of the participants suspected that the 
experiment was concerned with time estimation and therefore were completely 
unaware that a retrospective duration judgment would be required. 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To assess whether the memory task was accompanied by different encoding 
experiences, participants' difficulty ratings were submitted to a single factor (accent: 
English or Greek) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis confirmed that 
subjective experiences of encoding difficulty varied as a function of accent. 
Participants found it easier to memorise the ingredients from the passage when these 
items were delivered in an English rather than a Greek accent, F(l,38) = 15.39, P < 
.0004 (see Table 5 for treatment means). 
Duration Estimates 
Participants' retrospective duration estimates were converted to seconds and the 
resultant data were submitted to a single factor (accent: English or Greek) between-
subjects ANOVA. As expected, this revealed an effect of accent on participants' 
duration judgments, such that the passage was judged as longer when the recipe was 
delivered in an English rather than a Greek accent, F(l,38) = 28.44, p < .0001 (see 
Table 5 for treatment means). As participants' estimates of elapsed time varied as a 
function of their experienced ease or difficulty of encoding, this provides additional 
support for the experienced-based hypothesis. 
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Recognition Accuracy 
Recognition accuracy (hits minus false-alarms) was computed for each participant as 
a proportion. The corrected proportional scores were submitted to a single factor 
(accent: English or Greek) between-subjects ANOV A. This analysis reyealed that 
recognition accuracy was not affected by the accent in which the passage was 
spoken, F(1,38) < 1, ns. Participants correctly recognised the same number of 
ingredients from the passage regardless of whether these items were delivered in an 
English or a Greek accent (see Table 5 for treatment means). This suggests that 
participants must have expended greater effort memorising the ingredients when the 
narrator was Greek (see difficulty ratings below). 
Table 5. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Recognition Accuracy as a 
Function of Accent (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Accent Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Recognition 
English 191 (27.04) 4.40 (1.67) .609 (.17) 
Greek 154 (16.05) 6.20 (1.20) .544 (.14) 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
Further evidence that retrospective duration estimates were influenced by the 
subjective difficulty of prior encoding experiences was obtained by a correlational 
analysis. Specifically, participants' estimates of temporal duration were shorter when 
they found the encoding task to be difficult, r(38) = -.703, p < .001. As the results 
satisfied the conditions for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). an ANCOV A 
was performed on the data. This analysis revealed that when the subjective difficulty 
of the encoding task was partialled out of the analysis. the effect of accent on 
duration estimates was reduced, but not eliminated, F(1.37) = 10.01, p < .003. Thus, 
as in the previous studies. the experienced ease or difficulty of encoding exerted a 
mediational influence on participants' judgments of remembered duration, but again 
this effect was not as pronounced when performance was indexed by recognition 
accuracy rather than free recall. 
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In Experiment 4. the time estimation results could be explained by both the 
experience-based and content-based hypotheses. Thus, the prime objectiye of the 
current study was to replicate that experiment to determine the generality of the 
observed effects. With regard to the experience-based hypothesis, the present 
findings closely replicate those found previously despite using a different foreibTfl 
accent and a different content domain in the passage. Participants' retrospective 
duration judgments were influenced by the ease or difficulty they experienced 
committing the items to memory. When the auditory encoding task was perceived as 
difficult (i.e., Greek accent) rather than easy (i.e., English accent). participants 
judged the duration of the passage to be shorter. This provides support for the notion 
that people pay attention to their prior encoding experiences and use the information 
they provide to guide their judgments of elapsed time. Moreover, as a different clock 
time duration was used, the generality of these findings is extended further. 
However, with regard to the content-based hypothesis, the present findings fail to 
replicate those found in Experiment 4. Previously, retrospective duration judgments 
were directly related to the amount of information recognised from the passage. In 
contrast, in the present study no such relationship was found. There were large 
differences in remembered duration between the two auditory encoding tasks, but 
recognition accuracy for the passage items was equivalent. If people had used the 
amount of information stored in memory as a cue to judge elapsed time, then the two 
tasks should have been judged as equal in duration. These findings are consistent 
with previous research that has observed differences in judged duration that are not 
related to a recognition measure of participants' memory for the interval items (e.g., 
Block, 1992~ Hanley & Morris, 1982; Poynter, 1983). The inference can therefore be 
made that the contents of memory played no role in shaping people's judgments of 
remembered duration. Thus, as ease of encoding effects were obtained in the absence 
of memory performance differences, it can be concluded that people based their 
retrospective duration judgments on the subjective ease or difficulty of prior 
encoding operations. 
3.4 CHAPTER DISCUSSION 
In both experiments, the time estimation results were identical. The passage narrated 
with an English accent was judged as longer in duration than the same passage 
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narrated with a German (Experiment 4) or a Greek (Experiment 5) accent. The 
content-based hypothesis of remembered duration (Ornstein, 1969) encounters 
problems in explaining these results as the expected positive relationship between 
duration judgments and memory for the interval items was not always found. The 
amount of information remembered from the passage differed as a function of accent 
in Experiment 4, but this was not the case in Experiment 5. These inconsistent 
memory content effects emerged despite using a recognition test which provides a 
sensitive measure of the amount of information stored in memory (Higgins & Bargh, 
1987; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Taken together then, these findings fail to 
corroborate a content-based account of retrospective duration estimation. 
The experience-based hypothesis on the other hand can adequately explain the 
observed results. The accent in which the to-be-remembered items from the passage 
were spoken elicited different encoding experiences for participants in the two 
experimental conditions. That is, participants found it easy to encode the items when 
they were delivered in an English accent and they found it difficult to encode the 
items when they were delivered in a foreign accent. When the retrospective duration 
judgment was unexpectedly called for and participants considered the temporal 
interval, they used the experiential mental state that was associated with the encoding 
experience as a cue to judge elapsed time. Participants who had experienced ease 
whilst encoding the items interpreted this to mean that plenty of time must have been 
available to commit these items to memory. Thus, long retrospective duration 
judgments were provided by these participants. In contrast, participants who had 
experienced difficulty encoding the items interpreted this to mean that not much time 
had been available to commit these items to memory. This was reflected in their 
shorter judgments of elapsed time. The results of the mediational analyses in both 
studies confirm this experience-based account of remembered duration, although the 
effects were less pronounced than those observed in the earlier experiments in this 
thesis. 
Thus far, the current research suggests that the content-based account of 
retrospective timing provides an incomplete view of how people estimate elapsed 
time. Another source of information that people seem to use is the subjective 
experience of ease or difficulty associated with prior encoding operations. Ease of 
encoding effects were obtained in task contexts in which the infonnation was 
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presented visually or aurally, and without affecting recall or recognition 
performance. This demonstrates the generality of these findings across different 
stimulus modalities and measures of memory. Moreover, these effects were 
consistent across various objective clock time durations, all within the second and 
minute range, typically studied in retrospective temporal estimation research. In 
combination, this work provides a strong case for the influential role of experiential 
information in the construction of retrospective duration judgments; at least in task 
contexts similar to those used here. In demonstrating this, the present research 
corroborates and adds uniquely to related work in social cognition which has shown 
that subjective experiences can function as a highly informative cue in many 
domains of judgment (e.g., Clore, 1992; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996a; Schwarz, 1998; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Strack, 1992). 
In the following chapter, the experience-based hypothesis will be tested further by 
investigating whether the subjective experience of ease or difficulty evoked by 
retrieval operations also serves as a useful source of information for estimating 
elapsed time. There is no compelling a priori reason why this should not be the case. 
This assumption is based on the notion that it is not the processing operation per se 
that is important to the judgment, but rather the experience of ease or difficulty that 
was associated with it. Before this investigation can take place, one other issue needs 
to be addressed. 
In the temporal estimation literature, there are two dominant explanations of how 
people form an impression of elapsed time. The research to date has shown little 
support for Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis, but the other influential 
account has not been considered. As discussed in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis, Block's (1978, 1989a, 1990; Block & Reed, 1978) contextual-change 
hypothesis predicts that retrospective duration judgments increase with the number 
of salient contextual changes that are experienced and stored in memory during the 
critical interval. The primary reason for not testing the contextual-change hypothesis 
so far is the difficulty encountered in deriving unequivocal predictions from it. The 
model itself fails to incorporate any independent way of measuring the amount of 
change in cognitive context that occurs in a given situation and it is not always clear 
what actually constitutes contextual change. In one of Block's many papers, he 
proposes that 'changes in process context. environmental context. emotional context. 
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and other contextual elements' (1992, p. 151) are all types of contextual change that 
can influence people's judgments of remembered duration. This rather unconstrained 
definition makes it difficult to predict whether a given experimental manipulation 
will have an effect on the amount of change experienced during the to-be-judged 
interval (Predebon, 1988). 
In Experiments 1-5, the subjectively easy encoding task was always remembered as 
longer in duration than the subjectively difficult encoding task. The contextual-
change hypothesis would have to explain this consistent pattern of findings by 
assuming that the easy task caused more contextual changes to be encoded and stored 
in memory than the more difficult version of the task. It is uncertain, however. why 
this should be the case. No attempt was made to deliberately manipulate contextual 
factors. In fact, with the exception of the first experiment, the informational content 
(i.e., words to be encoded) was identical in the two tasks and there were no 
environmental changes in any of the studies. It could also be stated that if a task is 
considered to be difficult or demanding, then performance on that task is usually 
accompanied by a larger number of mental events and more changes in affective 
reactions than a task which is considered less taxing. In this case, the difficult task 
should have produced longer rather than shorter retrospective duration judgments. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that unintentional, but additional contextual 
influences were operating during the easy task which were stored in memory and 
caused it to be judged as longer in duration. 
Obviously then, to test the predictive utility of Block's (1990; Block & Reed, 1978) 
hypothesis, the amount of contextual change that takes place during the critical 
interval has to be manipulated directly to determine whether it plays an influential 
role in shaping people's judgments of remembered duration. This will be attempted 
in Experiments 7 and 8 in the following chapter. These two experiments will 
competitively evaluate the predictions derived from the experience-based, content-
based, and contextual-change hypotheses. Experiment 6 on the other hand will not 
attempt to manipulate contextual change. Rather, this experiment will logically 
follow on from the previous studies discussed by investigating whether people rely 
on their experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval as a basis for estimating elapsed 





The research reported thus far provides strong evidence that experiences associated 
with prior encoding operations serve as useful information in the construction of 
retrospective duration judgments. Extending this work, the three experiments in this 
chapter will investigate the extent to which the subjective ease or difficulty of prior 
retrieval operations influences people's judgments of remembered duration. That is, 
will people use their experiences of how easy or difficult it was for them to bring 
certain items of information to mind as a cue to estimate how much time has elapsed 
during a task? A successful replication of the previous results would provide support 
for the notion that it is not the memory processing operation per se that acts as input 
to the retrospective duration judgment, but rather the experience of ease or difficulty 
that was associated with the cognitive process. To investigate this issue, memory 
tasks will not be used as in the previous experiments. Instead, participants will be 
required to perform an easy or a difficult generation task during the to-be-judged 
interval. As in Chapters 2 and 3, the experience-based hypothesis will be 
competitively compared against Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis of 
remembered duration. 
Typically, studies in social cognition that assess the role of retrieval experiences on 
judgment formation have used generation tasks which require participants to retrieve 
information from memory that is relevant to the subsequent judgment. For example, 
Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991) asked participants to recall examples of their own 
assertive or unassertive behaviour prior to rating their level of assertiveness. In this 
research domain, directly equating the dependent measure with the retrieval task is a 
necessary methodological requirement to determine whether the descriptive contents 
of memory retrieval or the ease or difficulty of memory retrieval is used as a basis 
for judgment. In the current research, however. the information provided in the 
retrieval task does not have to relate in any way to the dependent measure (i.e., 
judgments of duration in retrospect). This is due to the fact that the traditional 
account of retrospective timing only regards the contents of memory (i.e .. products of 
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retrieval) and not the descriptive implications of that information to be the critical 
factor that drives people's judgments of remembered duration (Ornstein, 1969). 
Naturally then, this left me with a decision regarding what kind of information to 
include in the retrieval task. After much deliberation, exemplar generation tasks, 
used frequently, in cognitive neuropsychology to assess frontal functioning, were 
chosen (Shallice, 1988). 
4.2 EXPERIMENT 6: ANIMAL-GENERATION TASK (CUE CARDS 
PRESENT vs. ABSENT) 
In the present experiment, the standard neurological test selected was a semantic 
category naming task. Specifically, participants will be asked to generate animal 
names during the critical interval. As in the previous experiments, the informational 
content (i.e., number of items to be generated) will be held constant across the two 
experimental conditions. All participants will be required to generate the names of 35 
animals. Critically, participants must experience the same objective clock time 
duration during the generation task. To achieve this objective, a metronome will be 
set up to beep at regular intervals throughout the task. Participants will be instructed 
to generate an animal name each time a beep is heard. This simple procedure ensures 
that there are no differences between the two experimental conditions in the amount 
of information that is generated, or in the amount of time that elapses during the task. 
To investigate the moderating role of prior retrieval experiences on judgments of 
remembered duration, it is essential that the animal-generation task places 
differential demands on the memory retrieval process (i.e., easy vs. difficult). 
Imagine for example that you were asked to generate the names of animals whilst at 
the zoo or at home. The specific location of the memory retrieval problem would 
undoubtedly cause you to have different retrieval experiences. Whilst visiting the 
zoo, the presence of a variety of animal species would enable you to generate animal 
names very easily. In stark contrast, generating animal names at home without the 
aid of such retrieval cues would somewhat increase the difficulty of the task. 
In the present experiment. a functionally equivalent context will be created in the 
laboratory. The subjective demands of memory retrieval will be manipulat~d by 
presenting cue cards to half of the participants during the animal-generation task and 
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no cue cards to the other participants. It was anticipated that the presence or absence 
of cue cards would be sufficient for participants to have different retrieval 
experiences (i.e., easy vs. difficult respectively). To develop the procedures used in 
Experiments 1-5, three modifications will be made to the methodology. First, the 
duration of the task interval to be estimated will be different from any used 
previously (l min lOs). This will assess the extent to which the reported effects 
generalise to other temporal durations in the second and minute range. Second. the 
horizontal interval scale used for the retrospective duration judgments will be 
adjusted slightly. Previously, duration estimates were made via a circled response at 
a set point along the scale. However, in this experiment (and in those that follow), 
retrospective duration estimates will be made by making a mark along a fixed line 
length scale. As such, participants will be able to estimate the duration of the task to 
the nearest second. This alteration makes it possible to determine whether the 
reported effects extend to other duration judgment scales. Third, a surprise memory 
test will be administered. Due to the task context (i.e., animal names are self-
generated during the task), a free recall test will be used to assess participants' 
memory for the generated interval items. Memory performance will serve as a 
measure of the amount of information stored in memory and thus will provide a 
direct test of the storage-size hypothesis (Ornstein, 1969). 
As long as the cue card manipulation is successful in eliciting different retrieval 
experiences for participants in the two experimental conditions. the experience-based 
hypothesis predicts that retrospective duration judgments should decrease as the 
perceived difficulty of retrieval operations increase. That is, when the retrieval task is 
perceived to be difficult or demanding (i.e., cue cards absent), participants will report 
that less time was spent generating the animal names compared to when the retrieval 
task is perceived to be relatively easy (i.e., cue cards present). The content-based 
hypothesis predicts that retrospective duration judgments should closely parallel 
memory for the amount of information remembered from the task. That is, if the 
retrieval task leads to increased, decreased, or equivalent memory for the self-
generated items compared to the other task, participants will report that more, less, or 
the same amount of time was spent generating the animal names. 
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4.2.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of Bristol participated in the 
experiment and received chocolate bars as a small expression of appreciation. All 
participants were native English speakers and had normal hearing. The study had a 
single factor (cue: present or absent) between-subjects design. Four participants in 
the no-cue (difficult) condition either failed to generate an item at the appropriate 
time or used the same item more than once. Consequently, these participants were 
omitted from the data set. This strict omission criteria had to be adhered to as the 
number of items generated during the critical interval had to be same in both 
conditions so that the two competing explanations of remembered duration could be 
compared. This left 60 participants (30 men and 30 women) in the final statistical 
analyses with an equal number of men and women randomly assigned to each of the 
experimental conditions. 
Apparatus 
An electronic metronome was constructed specifically for the experiment (and the 
other experiments in this chapter) by a laboratory technician from the University of 
Bristol Psychology Department. This comprised a black plastic box measuring 12 cm 
x 10 cm x 5 cm. It was purposely designed to be discrete in appearance with no 
visible moving parts, unlike the moving pendulum of a traditional metronome. A dial 
was displayed on the side of the box ranging from 0.5 s to 15 s. The tempo of the 
metronome could be accurately set by adjusting the potentiometer in the middle of 
the dial. On this occasion, the metronome was set to beep at 2 s intervals. The beeps 
were audible through a speaker on the top of the box. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were informed that the study 
was an investigation into semantic memory. Participants' attention was then drawn to 
a metronome which was located on a table near to where the participants were asked 
to sit. The dial on the side of the metronome was not visible to partici pants. It was 
explained that the metronome would beep when it was turned on and their task was 
to generate out loud an item from a particular category to each beep of thl: 
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metronome. No information was given regarding the number of items that would 
have to be generated. The category of items chosen for the generation task was 
animal names. However, this was announced just before the metronome was turned 
on to prevent participants from thinking of examples as the rest of the procedure was 
being explained. Out of necessity because of these vague instructions, an example 
was given to ensure that participants understood what was meant by the term "a 
particular category". The experimenter gave the following instructions to all 
participants: 
F or example, if the category was food, then you would have to say out 
loud a food item every time you hear a beep. For the first beep, you 
could say 'cheese', for the second beep, 'apple', and so on. Food is not 
the category chosen for the task. You will only be told what the 
category is just before the metronome is turned on. 
Participants in the cue (easy) condition were also informed that throughout the 
generation task the experimenter would hold up a number of cue cards with 
subcategories boldly written on them. The following additional instructions were 
given to these participants: 
To explain how this will work, still imagine that the category items you 
will be generating are all types of food. When the task begins, the card 
could have the word 'fruits' written on it. Obviously fruit is a type of 
food. While this card is visible to you, you would have to say out loud 
the name of a fruit each time you hear a beep. For example, when you 
hear a beep, you could say "banana', 'apple', and so on. When another 
card appears, the same applies. If the card has the word 'meats' written 
on it, then words such as 'pork' or 'chicken' should be given when you 
hear a beep. 
Throughout the animal-generation task, five cue cards were displayed (A4 size, 
landscape orientation). Each card contained one of the following words: FARM, 
WILD, PETS, SEA, and BIRDS (handwritten in uppercase bold letters to fill the 
page). The cards were presented in this order. The first cue card was displayed as 
soon as the task began and after 7 animals relating to the named subcategory had 
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been generated, the next cue card was shown. For participants In the no-cue 
(difficult) condition, the animal-generation task was performed without the aid of cue 
cards so the above instructions were not given. 
Once the relevant instructions were understood, all participants were told that the 
generation task would begin when the first beep was heard and would finish when 
the experimenter said "stop". In this way, the task interval (i.e .. to-be-assessed 
duration) was clearly defined. The experimenter then announced that the category 
was "animals" and turned on the metronome. During the task interval, all participants 
heard 35 beeps of the metronome, so 35 animal names were generated. The beeps 
occurred at 2 s intervals giving the task a total duration of 1 min lOs. The 
experimenter noted down the animal names generated by each participant on a sheet 
of paper. This was done so that the number of animal names correctly recalled on a 
subsequent free recall test could be measured. This procedure also alerted the 
experimenter as to when the last beep would sound so the metronome could be 
turned off and the word 'stop' could be announced to delimit the end of the 
generation task. Following this, participants performed a distractor task in which they 
were required to circle all the two-digit numbers in a short booklet that were divisible 
by 7. Participants were not informed as to how long they would be given for the task. 
After 5 min had elapsed, which was accurately timed using a concealed stopwatch, 
the booklets were collected. 
Participants were then presented with a short questionnaire consisting of two 
questions that related to the animal-generation task. The order of presentation of the 
questions was counterbalanced across the two experimental conditions. Participants 
were told to answer the questions in the order presented and to be as accurate as 
possible in their responses. One question required participants to estimate how much 
time they believed had elapsed during the generation task. Below this question was 
written: --You should consider this time period to have begun when you heard the 
first beep and to have finished when you heard the word "stop'''. A duration 
judgment scale was provided ranging from 30 s to 1 min 50 s with intervals of lOs. 
Ticks to mark the 1 s intervals were also clearly indicated along its length. 
Participants were asked to estimate the duration of the task to the nearest second by 
making a mark on the scale. The other question required participants to rate how 
much difficulty they had experienced generating the animal names. Ratings were 
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made on a 9-point scale with 1 indicating . very easy' and 9 indicating . vel)' difficult'. 
Finally, participants were asked to think back to the animal names they had 
generated earlier in the experiment and to write down as many as they could 
remember in the space provided on the question sheet. Participants were told that 
they could take as much time as they required on this task, but no participant took 
any longer than five minutes. A debriefing session followed that explained the real 
purpose of the experiment and all participants were asked if they had suspected that 
time judgments would be required. No participant reported any suspicion. 
Participants were then thanked and dismissed. 
4.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To assess whether the generation task was accompanied by different retrieval 
experiences, participants' difficulty ratings were submitted to a single factor (cue: 
present or absent) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis confirmed that 
participants found it easier to generate animal names when cue cards were present 
rather than absent, F(l,58) = 254.33,p < .0001 (see Table 6 for treatment means). 
Duration Estimates 
Participants' retrospective duration estimates were converted to seconds and the 
resultant data were submitted to a single factor (cue: present or absent) between-
subjects ANOV A. As expected, this revealed an effect of cue on duration judgments, 
such that participants believed they had spent more time generating animal names 
when cue cards were present rather than absent, F(l,58) = 32.79, p < .0001 (see 
Table 6 for treatment means). This pattern of findings is consistent with what would 
be expected if participants used their experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval as a 
source of information for estimating elapsed time. 
Free Recall Performance 
The total number of animal names correctly recalled served as a measure of free 
recall performance. These scores were submitted to a single factor (cue: present or 
absent) between-subjects ANOVA. This revealed an effect of cue on participants' 
recall performance. such that more animal names were remembered from the 
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generation task when cue cards were present rather than absent, F(l.58) = -'+3.20. p < 
.0001 (see Table 6 for treatment means). Thus, as differences in recall performance 
emerged between the two experimental conditions, the time estimation results are 
also consistent with the hypothesis that participants used the amount of information 
stored in memory as a cue to guide their retrospective duration judgments. 
Table 6. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Free Recall Performance as a 
Function of Cue (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Cue Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Free Recall 
Present 67.53 (7.44) 2.43 (0.86) 18.97 (2.17) 
Absent 57.63 (5.86) 6.03 (0.89) 15.40 (2.03) 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
To analyse the relationship between participants' duration estimates and ratings of 
retrieval difficulty, a correlational analysis was conducted. This revealed that these 
two variables were correlated, such that duration estimates decreased as the 
perceived difficulty of retrieval operations increased, r(58) = -.794,p < .001. As the 
results satisfied the conditions for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), an 
ANCOVA was performed to establish if the subjective difficulty of retrieval 
operations mediated the effect of cue on participants' duration estimates. This 
analysis revealed that when task difficulty ratings were partialled out of the analysis. 
the effect of cue on duration estimates was reduced, but not eliminated, F(l,57) = 
13.92,p < .001. This finding confirms that the subjective ease or difficulty of prior 
retrieval operations exerted a mediational influence on participants' judgments of 
remembered duration. However, this effect was not as pronounced as in the initial 
experiments in this thesis when memory performance was indexed by free recall. 
The results of this experiment replicate and extend the previous findings in many 
ways. Participants' retrospective duration judgments were influenced by the ease or 
difficulty they experienced bringing items of information to mind. When the retrieval 
- 107 -
task was experienced as subjectively easy (i.e., cued version of the generation task). 
participants judged that more time had been spent generating the animal names. In 
contrast, when the retrieval task was deemed to be subjectively difficult (i.e., no-cue 
version), participants judged that less time had been spent generating the animal 
names. These differences in judged duration fit well with the hypothesis that 
participants relied on their prior retrieval experiences as a source of information to 
compute how much time had elapsed during the task. 
Further support for the experience-based hypothesis can be garnered from the results 
of the other statistical analyses. The correlational analysis revealed that judgments of 
elapsed time decreased as retrieval operations were perceived to increase in 
difficulty. In addition, the mediational analysis confirmed that participants' 
experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval played an influential role in shaping their 
retrospective duration judgments. However, as in two of the previous studies (Expts. 
4 and 5), when task difficulty ratings were partialled out of the analysis. the effect of 
the independent variable (i.e., cue) on duration estimates was not fully eliminated. 
Presumably, as before, the mediational analysis failed to completely eliminate this 
effect as the original effect was so large. Perhaps this is caused by the fact that 
participants had to deal with a large amount of information during the temporal 
interval. Taken together, this study extends the previous research as it suggests that 
experiences of ease or difficultly associated with retrieval operations can serve as 
useful information for estimating elapsed time, in the same way as experiences 
associated with encoding operations can function as an informative temporal cue. In 
addition, as a different clock time and duration judgment scale were used, the 
generality of the findings is further extended. 
There are however some obvious difficulties in interpreting the reported findings as 
unequivocal support for the experience-based hypothesis. First, unlike the previous 
studies which measured recall performance (Expts. 1-3), experiential effects on 
duration judgments emerged in the presence of memory recall differences. The cued 
version of the animal-generation task (i.e., easy task) led to increased memory for the 
self-generated items and was judged as longer in duration than the no-cue version of 
the task (i.e., difficult). Thus, as retrospective duration judgments were predictable 
from the free-recall data, participants could also have used the amount of information 
stored in memory to make their assessments of elapsed time (Ornstein. 1969). 
- 108 -
Second, as reliance on an experience-based or content-based strategy lead to the 
same duration judgments being made, it is difficult to ascertain which one is utilised 
in the decision-making process. Third and finally, Block's (l989a; Block & Reed. 
1978) contextual-change hypothesis of remembered duration can also provide an 
explanation for the observed pattern of time estimation results. 
This hypothesis asserts that retrospective duration judgments are based on the 
remembered amount of change in cognitive context that occurred during the critical 
interval. In the previous studies, it was unclear how the experimental manipulations 
(e.g., typeface or accent) would affect the amount of change experienced during the 
fixed time period. However, advocates of the contextual-change hypothesis might 
argue that the cue card manipulation in the present experiment caused a difference in 
what Block (1992) refers to as "environmental context"" to be stored in memory in 
the two experimental conditions. Accordingly, it could be claimed that duration 
estimates were longer for the cued version of the generation task because the 
presentation of cue cards caused an increase in this particular aspect of contextual 
change to be stored in memory during the interval. Although this is a reasonable 
assumption, the amount of contextual information in memory storage can only be 
inferred as the contextual-change model fails to incorporate an independent way of 
establishing the extent of contextual change. 
Despite this underlying problem, it is still feasible that differences in the amount of 
change experienced during the cue and no-cue generation tasks influenced 
participants' duration estimates rather than differences in experienced retrieval 
difficulty, or differences in memory for the generated interval items. Unfortunately, 
as a judgmental strategy based on contextual change leads to the same assessments of 
elapsed time being made as the other two strategies (experience and content), strong 
conclusions can not be drawn about which is used as the basis for judgment. Clearly 
then, more conclusive evidence is needed to show that the subjective ease or 
difficulty of prior retrieval operations can function as an informative temporal cue in 
its own right. This raises the question, of course, of how an experiment could be 
designed that would allow the experience-based account of remembered duration to 
be empirically distinguished from the traditional memory-based accounts (change 
and content). This issue will be addressed in the next experiment. 
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4.3 EXPERIMENT 7: COUNTRY-GENERATION TASK (15 ,"s. 30) 
To disentangle these competing hypotheses (experience vs. change/content), 
retrospective duration judgments need to be examined in a task context in which the\' 
" 
make alternative predictions. Only in so doing, will it be possible to conclusively 
determine the basis of people's jUdgments of remembered duration. Such a task 
context will be created in the present experiment by using an adaptation of the 
experimental paradigm devised and first used by Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991). 
As in the previous study, a semantic category generation task will be performed 
during the critical interval. However, on this occasion, the category items to-be-
generated are countries of the world. To provide a direct test of the moderating role 
of prior retrieval experiences, contextual change and informational content on 
judgments of remembered duration, it is essential that the country-generation task 
produces differences in these three factors. This will be achieved by varying the 
number of country names that participants have to generate during the task (see 
below). Half of the participants will be required to generate out loud the names of 15 
countries and the other half will be required to generate out loud the names of 30 
countries. Critically, for retrospective duration judgments to be comparable in the 
two experimental conditions, the generation task has to last for a fixed time period. 
To fulfil this objective, a metronome will be set up to beep at regular intervals 
throughout the task. Participants in the IS-generation condition will be instructed to 
generate a country name on alternate beeps of the metronome, whereas participants 
in the 30-generation condition will be instructed to generate a country name on every 
beep of the metronome. This simple procedure ensures that there are large 
differences between the two experimental conditions in the amount of information 
that is generated during the task interval, but no differences in the number of beeps 
that occur, or in the amount of time that elapses during the task. The duration of the 
task interval to be estimated will be slightly longer than that used in the previous 
study (1 min 15 s). This will assess the extent to which the reported effects generalise 
to other objective clock time durations in the second and minute range. 
With the task context explained, attention needs to be turned to how varying the 
number of items that participants have to generate in a fixed interval directly 
manipulates the subjective demands of memory retrieval, the amount of contextual 
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change experienced, and the amount of information stored in memory. Each will be 
considered in turn. First, it was anticipated that the number of country names to be 
generated (15 vs. 30) would moderate the retrieval experience (easy vs. difticult 
respectively). That is, participants would experience more difficulty generating 30 
rather than 15 country names. Second, it can reasonably be assumed that in the 
absence of any other environmental changes between the two experimental 
conditions (e.g., the same testing room, experimenter. equipment. number of beeps of 
the metronome, lighting), the number of items to be self-generated during the critical 
interval would provide a salient source of contextual change. Thus, it follows that 
more contextual change would be experienced and stored in memory after generating 
30 rather than 15 country names. Third, self-generating these items would make 
them highly accessible in memory and so it logically follows that more information 
would be stored in memory after generating 30 rather than 15 country names. This 
assumption will be checked by measuring participants' memory for the generated 
interval items by means of a free recall test. 
By eXamInIng retrospective duration judgments in this task context, it becomes 
possible to empirically distinguish the experience-based hypothesis and the 
traditional memory-based hypotheses of remembered duration as they provide 
alternative predictions. First, consider retrospective duration judgments from the 
perspective of the experience-based hypothesis. According to this account, duration 
estimates should increase as the perceived difficulty of retrieval operations decrease. 
Thus, provided that participants find it relatively easy to retrieve the names of 15 
countries from memory and considerably more difficult to retrieve 30 of these items, 
then duration estimates should be longer for the 15- rather than the 30-generation 
task. Now consider retrospective duration judgments from the perspective of each of 
the traditional memory-based models. According to the change-based hypothesis, 
duration estimates should increase as a function of the number of contextual changes 
that occur in the critical interval (Block. 1989a; Block & Reed, 1978). This 
hypothesis therefore predicts that duration estimates should be longer for the 30-
rather than the IS-generation task because more contextual change would be stored 
in memory and remembered at the time of judgment. According to the content-based 
hypothesis, duration estimates should increase with the number of items of 
information stored in memory during the critical interval (Ornstein, 1969). This 
hypothesis therefore predicts that duration estimates should be longer for the 30-
- 111 -
rather than the I5-generation task because more information would b~ stored In 
memory. 
In sum, two alternative predictions are specified. If people rely on the amount of 
information stored in memory to estimate elapsed time (i.e .. contextual change or 
generated interval items), then they will report that more time was spent generating 
the country names in the 30- rather than in the I5-generation condition. Howeyer, if 
people use their prior retrieval experiences as a basis for judgment, then this pattern 
should reverse. That is, people will report that less time was spent generating the 
country names in the 30- rather than in the I5-generation condition. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Seventy-one undergraduates from the University of Bristol agreed to participate in 
the experiment and received either a chocolate bar or course credit for taking part. 
All participants were native speakers of English and had normal hearing. The study 
had a single factor (countries generated: 15 or 30) between-subjects design. In order 
to test the competing explanations of retrospective duration estimation, it was 
imperative that each participant generated the required number of items during the 
task interval. On this basis, 11 participants from the 30-generation condition were 
excluded from the data set as they failed to generate the required number of items. 
This left 60 participants (30 men and 30 women) in the final analyses with an equal 
number of men and women randomly assigned to each of the experimental 
conditions. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were informed that the study 
was an investigation into semantic memory. Participants' attention was then dra\\TI to 
a metronome which was located on a table near to where the participants were asked 
to sit. The dial on the side of the metronome was not visible to participants. It was 
explained that the metronome would beep when it was turned on. Unbeknown to the 
participants, the metronome was set to beep every 2.5 s. Participants in the 30-
generation (difficult) condition were informed that their task was to generate out loud 
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an item from a particular category to each beep of the metronome. 1\0 information 
was given regarding the number of items that would have to be generated during the 
task. Participants in the IS-generation (easy) condition were told the same except that 
item generation was required on alternate beeps of the metronome. The category of 
items chosen for the generation task was countries of the world. Howeyer. to preyent 
participants from thinking of relevant examples prior to the start of the generation 
task, the category was announced just before the metronome was turned on. 
To ensure that participants knew what was meant by the term "a particular category" 
and to check that they fully understood the task, an example was giyen. The 
experimenter gave the following instructions to participants in the 30-generation 
condition: 
For example, if the category was food, then you would have to say out 
loud a food item every time you hear a beep. For the first beep, you 
could say 'cheese', for the second beep, 'apple', and so on. Food is not 
the category chosen for the task. You will only be told what the 
category is just before the metronome is turned on. 
The instructions were adjusted slightly for participants III the IS-generation 
condition: 
F or example, if the category was food, then you would have to say out 
loud a food item on the second beep and then on alternate beeps after 
that. So for the first beep, you would say nothing, for the second beep 
you could say 'cheese'. for the third beep you would say nothing, for 
the fourth beep, 'apple', and so on. Food is not the category chosen for 
the task. You will only be told what the category is just before the 
metronome is turned on. 
Once these instructions were understood, participants were told that the generation 
task would begin when the first beep was heard and would finish when the 
experimenter said ·"stop". This ensured that the task interval (i.e .. to-be-assessed 
duration) was clearly delimited for the participants. The experimenter then 
announced that the category was "countries of the world" and turned on the 
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metronome. During the task interval the metronome beeped 30 times. once eyery 2.5 
s. Participants in the 30-generation condition generated a country name eyery time 
they heard a beep (1/2.5 s), whereas participants in the IS-generation condition 
generated a country name on alternate beeps (l/5 s). In this way, the number of items 
generated during the task interval was different in the two conditions (30 vs. 15), but 
the number of beeps that occurred (30) and the duration of the task (1 min 15 s) were 
held constant. The experimenter noted down the names of the countries generated by 
each participant on a sheet of paper so that the number correctly recalled later in a 
free recall test could be measured. This procedure also alerted the experimenter as to 
when the last beep would sound so the metronome could be turned off and the word 
'stop' could be announced to delimit the end of the generation task. Following the 
generation task, participants performed a distractor activity in which they were 
required to circle all the two-digit numbers in a short booklet that were divisible by 
7. Participants were not informed about the length of time they would be given for 
this task. A 5 min period was accurately timed using a concealed stopwatch and then 
the booklets were collected. 
Next, participants were given a short questionnaire consisting of two questions that 
related to the country-generation task they had performed earlier in the experiment. 
The order of presentation of the questions was counterbalanced across the two 
experimental conditions. Participants were asked to answer the questions in the order 
presented and were encouraged to be as accurate as possible in their responses. One 
question required participants to estimate how much time they believed had elapsed 
during the generation task. The question sheet expressed clearly that the interval of 
time to-be-estimated began when the first beep was heard and ended when the 
experimenter said "stop". A duration judgment scale was provided ranging from 30 s 
to 1 min 50 s with intervals of lOs. Ticks to mark the 1 s intervals were also clearly 
indicated along the length of the scale. Participants were asked to use the scale to 
mark off their subjective impression of elapsed time to the nearest second. The other 
question required participants to rate on a 9-point scale how much difficulty they had 
experienced generating the countries with 1 representing "ver:v easy' and 9 
representing . very difficult'. Finally, participants were given a free recall test in 
which they were asked to recall and write down the names of all the countries they 
remembered generating in the space provided on the questionnaire. Participants were 
told that they could take as much time as they required on this task. but no participant 
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took any longer than five minutes. Participants were then debriefed as to the real 
purpose of the experiment, thanked for their assistance, and dismissed. Once again. 
none of the participants had suspected that they would be required to estimate how 
much time had elapsed during the generation task. 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To assess whether the generation task was accompanied by different retrieval 
experiences, participants' difficulty ratings were submitted to a single factor 
(countries generated: 15 or 30) between-subjects ANOV A. As expected. 
manipulating the number of countries generated had the intended effect on perceived 
task difficulty, F(1,58) = 42.77, p < .0001. Participants considered the task to be 
easier when they had generated the names of 15 rather than 30 countries (see Table 7 
for treatment means). 
Duration Estimates 
Participants' retrospective duration estimates were converted to seconds and the 
resultant data were submitted to a single factor (countries generated: 15 or 30) 
between-subjects ANOV A. This revealed an effect of number of countries generated 
on duration judgments, such that participants believed they had spent more time 
generating 15 rather than 30 country names, F(1,58) = 8.31, p < .006 (see Table 7 for 
treatment means). This pattern of time estimation results is consistent with what 
would be expected if participants used their prior retrieval experiences as a cue to 
guide their retrospective duration judgments rather than the amount of contextual 
change stored in memory. Thus, the experience-based hypothesis of remembered 
duration rather than the change-based hypothesis is needed to explain these findings. 
Free Recall Performance 
The total number of country names correctly recalled served as a measure of 
participants' free recall performance. A single factor (countries generated: 15 or 30) 
between-subjects ANOVA revealed an effect of number of countries generated on 
recall performance. F( 1.58) = 161.67, p < .0001. Participants remembered more 
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countries names when they had generated 30 rather than 15 of these items (see Table 
7 for treatment means). 
Table 7. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Free Recall Performance as a 
Function of Number of Countries Generated (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Number Generated Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Free Recall 
15 80.70 (8.99) 1.70 (0.88) 11.60 (1.59) 
30 72.63 (12.41) 5.13 (2.74) 16.93 (1.66) 
The observed pattern of time estimation results also present problems for the content-
based hypothesis of retrospective timing. The task that led to increased memory for 
the generated interval items was actually judged as shorter in duration (i.e., 30 
countries) than the task that led to decreased memory performance (i.e., 15 
countries). Thus, as retrospective duration judgments were inversely rather than 
directly related to the number of items remembered from the judged interval, 
participants could not have used the amount of information stored in memory as a 
cue to compute elapsed time. Rather it seems that participants based their temporal 
judgments on their experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval. When the retrieval task 
was deemed to be subjectively difficult (i.e., 30 countries), participants judged that 
less time had been spent generating the country names compared to when the 
retrieval task was deemed to be subjectively easy (i.e., 15 countries). 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
Further evidence for this conclusion was obtained by a correlational analysis. 
Specifically, participants' duration estimates decreased as their reported difficulty of 
retrieving the country names increased, r(58) = -.726, P < .001. As the results met 
with the conditions required for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). an 
ANOV A was performed on the data to establish if the subjective difficulty of 
retrieval operations mediated the effect of number of countries generated on 
participants' duration estimates. This analysis revealed that when task diHiculty 
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ratings were partialled out of the analysis, the effect of number of countries 
generated on duration estimates was reduced to a marginal level of significance. 
F(l,S7) = 3.1S, P < .09. This finding therefore confinns that the subjectiye ease or 
difficulty of prior retrieval operations mediated participants' retrospective duration 
judgments. 
In the previous study, it was impossible to detennine the basis of people's judgments 
of remembered duration as the time estimation results could be explained by the 
experience-based, change-based, and content-based hypotheses. The main purpose of 
the current experiment was therefore to disentangle the experience-based account of 
retrospective timing from the traditional memory-based accounts (change and 
content) by examining duration judgments in a task context in which they provide 
alternative predictions. This objective was successfully achieved. Fruitfully for the 
experience-based hypothesis, the results obtained reflect unfavourably on these 
alternative accounts of remembered duration and provide more conclusive evidence 
for the role of subjective retrieval experiences in the construction of retrospective 
duration judgments. Furthennore, as a different clock time duration was assessed 
than in the previous study and the duration judgment scale was different from that 
used in Experiments I-S, the generality of experiential influences on judgments of 
elapsed time is further extended. 
The results of this experiment show that the task which required participants to 
generate more infonnation during the critical interval (i.e .. 30 countries) was judged 
as shorter in duration than the task which required participants to generate less 
infonnation (i.e., IS countries). These findings are difficult to reconcile using a 
change-based hypothesis of retrospective timing (cf. Block, 1989a; Block & Reed, 
1978). Presumably generating more items of infonnation during the to-be-assessed 
duration would cause an increase in the number of contextual changes stored in 
memory and remembered at the time of judgment. Thus, according to this account 
the 30-generation task should have been judged as longer in duration than the lS-
generation task. As this was not the case, participants could not have based their 
judgments of elapsed time on the amount of contextual change stored in memory. 
The content-based hypothesis faces similar problems. Generating more items of 
information during the critical interval caused an increase in the number of generated 
items that were stored in memory (as ret1ected by the recall scores). Hence. if 
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duration jUdgments had been based on the amount of information in memory storage. 
then the 30-generation task should have been judged as longer than the 15-generation 
task. The failure to confirm this straightforward prediction also casts doubt on the 
content-based account of retrospective duration estimation (cf. Ornstein, 1969). 
Clearly, the experience-based hypothesis of remembered duration is needed to 
explain the observed results. The number of items to be generated during the critical 
interval was sufficient for participants to have different retrieval expenences. 
Participants found it considerably difficult to retrieve 30 country names from 
memory and relatively easy to retrieve 15 of these items from memory. When the 
retrospective duration judgment was unexpectedly requested, it appears that 
participants used their assessment of how easy or difficult it was for them to bring 
these items of information to mind as a cue to compute how much time had elapsed 
during the task. Participants who had experienced difficulty bringing 30 countries to 
mind interpreted this to mean that they must not have been given much time to 
perform the task. Thus, short retrospective duration judgments were provided by 
these participants. In contrast, participants who had experienced ease bringing 15 
countries to mind interpreted this mean that they were given a sufficient amount of 
time to perform the task in a satisfactory manner. This was reflected in their longer 
judgments of elapsed time. The results of the mediational analysis provide direct 
evidence for this experience-based account of retrospective timing. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the subjective ease or difficulty of prior retrieval operations 
influenced people's judgments of remembered duration rather than memory for 
contextual change or for the interval items per se. 
4.4 EXPERIMENT 8: LETTER 'S' WORD-GENERATION TASK (13 vs. 26) 
Given that the findings of Experiment 7 provide strong support for the experience-
based hypothesis and fail to corroborate the traditional memory-based accounts of 
retrospective duration estimation, a conceptual replication would be welcome to 
determine the generality of these ease of retrieval effects. The present experiment 
will provide this replication. It will also extend the previous study by examining 
people's retrospective duration judgments in a different task context. 
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As before, participants will be gIven the task of generating out loud items of 
information during the critical interval. However, as a modification to the preyious 
experiment, a letter naming task will be perfonned rather than a semantic category 
naming task. The items to-be-generated are words beginning with the letter ·s'. As in 
the previous study, the difficulty of retrieval operations, the amount of contextual 
change and informational content stored in memory will be manipulated by yarying 
the number of items that participants have to generate during the task. Half of the 
participants will be required to generate 13 s-words and the other half will be 
required to generate 26 s-words. To ensure that participants experience the same 
objective clock time duration during the generation task, a metronome will again be 
set up to beep at regular intervals throughout the task. Participants in the 13-
generation condition will be instructed to generate a word beginning with the letter 
's' on alternate beeps of the metronome, whereas participants in the 26-generation 
condition will be instructed to generate one of these words on every beep of the 
metronome. A final modification to the methodology involves the duration of the 
task interval to be estimated. In the current experiment, the generation task will last 
for a slightly shorter duration than in the previous study (1 min 05 s). This will assess 
the extent to which the reported effects generalise to other temporal durations in the 
second and minute range. 
The predictions deriving from the experience-based, change-based, and content-
based hypotheses were as in the previous experiment. If people rely on their 
experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval to estimate elapsed time, then they will 
report that less time was spent generating the s-words in the 26-generation condition 
(difficult task)) rather than in the I3-generation condition (easy task). In contrast, if 
people rely on the amount of information stored in memory (i.e., contextual change 
or generated interval items), then they will report that more time was spent 
generating the s-words in the 26- rather than in the I3-generation condition. 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Seventy-five undergraduates from the University of Bristol participated in the 
experiment in partial fulfilment of a course requirement. All participants were native 
speakers of English and had nonnal hearing. The study had a single factor (s-words 
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generated: 13 or 26) between-subjects design. 15 participants in the 26-generation 
condition were omitted from the data set as they failed to generate the required 
number of items during the task interval. This left 60 participants (30 men and 30 
women) in the final statistical analyses with an equal number of men and women 
randomly assigned to each of the experimental conditions. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were infonned that the study 
was an investigation into semantic memory. The experiment was basically a 
replication of the previous study, but with a few modifications. On this occasion. the 
to-be-generated items were words beginning with the letter's' (excluding proper 
nouns, numbers, and the same word with a different suffix). As in the previous study, 
to prevent participants from thinking of relevant examples prior to the start of the 
generation task the exact nature of the items to be generated was only announced just 
before the metronome was turned on. However, due to the different nature of the task 
(i.e., letter vs. category naming), the instructions and the example given to 
participants at the beginning of the experiment had to be adjusted slightly. 
Participants in the 26-generation condition were infonned that their task was to 
generate out loud a word beginning with a certain letter to each beep of the 
metronome. Participants in the I3-generation condition were told the same except 
that word generation was required on alternate beeps of the metronome. The example 
given was words beginning with the letter 'a' and the experimenter emphasised that 
proper nouns, numbers, and the same word with a different suffix could not be used 
in the generation task. 
During the task interval, the metronome beeped 26 times at 2.5 s intervals. 
Participants in the 26-generation condition generated an s-word on every beep of the 
metronome (1/2.5 s), whereas participants in the I3-generation condition generated 
an s-word on alternate beeps of the metronome (115 s). In this way, the amount of 
information generated during the task interval was different in the two conditions (26 
vs. 13), but the number of beeps that occurred (26) and the total duration of the task 
(1 min 05 s) were held constant. Apart from these necessary modifications, the 
procedure was as in Experiment 7. The dependent measures were also the same with 
the exception of a slight adjustment to the duration judgment scale. The scale ranged 
from 45 s to 1 min 25 s with intervals of 5 s. Ticks to mark the 1 s intervals were also 
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clearly indicated along its length. On completion of the experimental tasks. 
participants were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. Once again, none of the 
participants had suspected that the experiment was concerned with time estimation so 
their duration judgments were formed in retrospect as required. 
4.4.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To assess the retrieval experiences associated with the generation task, a single factor 
(s-words generated: 13 or 26) between-subjects ANOVA was performed on 
participants' difficulty ratings. This analysis confirmed that participants' experiences 
of retrieval difficulty varied as a function of the number of s-words generated, such 
that the task was considered to be easier when they had generated 13 rather than 26 
s-words, F(l,S8) = 240.94,p < .0001 (see Table 8 for treatment means). 
Duration Estimates 
Participants' retrospective duration estimates were converted to seconds and the 
resultant data were submitted to a single factor (s-words generated: 13 or 26) 
between-subjects ANOVA. As expected, this revealed an effect of number of s-
words generated on participants' duration judgments, such that more time was 
believed to have been spent generating 13 rather than 26 s-words, F(l,S8) = IS.0S,p 
< .0003 (see Table 8 for treatment means). Once again, participants' estimates of 
elapsed time varied as a function of their experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval 
rather than the amount of contextual change stored in memory. Thus, the experience-
based hypothesis of remembered duration rather than the change-based hypothesis is 
needed to explain this pattern of findings. 
Free Recall Performance 
Total correct recall scores were submitted to a single factor (s-words generated: 13 or 
26) between-subjects ANOV A. This analysis revealed an effect of number of s-
words generated on participants' recall performance, such that more s-words were 
remembered when they had generated 26 rather than 13 of these items. F( 1 ,S 8) = 
34.S3, p < .0001 (see Table 8 for treatment means). 
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Table 8. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Free Recall Perfonnance as a 
Function of Number of S-words Generated (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Number Generated Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Free Recall 
13 64.80 (6.26) 2.50 (0.73) 6.70 (1.34) 
26 58.63 (6.05) 5.60 (0.81) 8.73 (1.34) 
The content-based hypothesis of retrospective timing can also not explain the 
observed findings. The task which required the generation of 26 rather than 13 s-
words produced better recall perfonnance and shorter retrospective duration 
judgments. Finding an inverse rather than a direct relationship between participants' 
judgments of remembered duration and their memory for the interval items can be 
taken as evidence against this hypothesis. Clearly, time estimation in the present 
context was not mediated by the amount of infonnation stored in memory. Thus as in 
the previous study, the present findings are best explained by the experience-based 
hypothesis. Participants seemed to use their experiences of ease or difficulty 
associated with memory retrieval as input for their retrospective duration judgments. 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
This conclusion is further supported by the results of a correlational analysis. 
Specifically, participants' duration estimates decreased as their reported difficulty of 
retrieving the s-words increased, r(58) = -.519, P < .001. As the results satisfied the 
conditions for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), an ANOYA was perfonned 
on the data. This analysis revealed that when task difficulty ratings were partialled 
out of the analysis, the effect of number of s-words generated on duration estimates 
was completely eliminated, F(1,57) < 1, ns. Thus, the subjective ease or difficulty of 
prior retrieval operations mediated participants' judgments of remembered duration. 
The results of this experiment therefore closely replicate and extend the findings 
obtained in the previous study. Participants' retrospective duration judgments wcn~ 
influenced by the ease or difficulty they experienced bringing items of infonnation to 
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mind. When the task of retrieving information was experienced as difficult and 
demanding (i.e., 26 s-words), participants believed that they had spent less time 
performing the activity. Conversely, when the task of retrieving information was 
considered to be relatively easy (i.e., 13 s-words), participants believed that they had 
spent more time performing the activity. Hence, these findings reinforce the notion 
that people pay attention to their prior retrieval experiences and use the information 
they provide to guide their judgments of elapsed time. This experience-based account 
of retrospective timing is confirmed by the results of the mediational analysis. In 
addition, the observed results also extend the previous study as the generated items 
were of a different nature and the duration of the task was of a different length, but 
comparable effects emerged. This provides supporting evidence that ease of retrieval 
effects generalise across different task contexts and different objective clock time 
durations in the second and minute range. 
Theoretically, these results present difficulties for both Block's (1989a; Block & 
Reed, 1978) change-based account and Ornstein's (1969) content-based account of 
retrospective duration estimation. Presumably a greater number of contextual 
changes would be experienced and stored in memory as the subjectively difficult task 
of retrieving 26 s-words was performed during the critical interval. Moreover, the 
free recall scores show that this task led to increased memory for the self-generated 
interval items. Accordingly, if duration judgments had been based on the amount of 
information stored in memory (i.e., in terms of contextual information or generated 
information), then the subjectively difficult retrieval task (i.e., 26 s-words) should 
have been judged as longer in duration than the subjectively easy retrieval task (i.e., 
13 s-words). As the exact opposite pattern was found, the inference can be made that 
the contents of memory played no role in shaping people' s judgments of remembered 
duration. Rather as ease of retrieval effects emerged in the absence of these memory 
content influences, it can be strongly concluded that people's retrospective duration 
judgments were driven by their experiences of ease or difficulty associated with prior 
retrieval operations. 
4.5 CHAPTER DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 6, strong conclusions could not be drawn about whether people relied 
on an experience-based, change-based. or content-based judgmental strategy for 
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retrospectively estimating the duration of the generation task. The obtained time 
estimation results fitted the pattern expected by any of these three strategies. The 
main objective of Experiment 7 was therefore to determine more conclusi\'elv the 
basis of people's jUdgments of remembered duration. This was achie\'ed by using an 
experimental paradigm (i.e., varying the number of items to-be-generated during a 
fixed time period) that afforded a direct test between the experience-based account of 
retrospective timing and the traditional memory-based accounts (i.e., change and 
content) as they provided alternative predictions. In so doing, convincing evidence 
was obtained that subjective experiences of ease or difficulty evoked by memory 
retrieval operations serve as an important determinant of people's retrospective 
duration judgments. By conducting a conceptual replication of this study with some 
added modifications (Experiment 8), this contention was substantiated and extended 
further. Subjective ease of retrieval effects were found across different kinds of 
generation tasks and different temporal durations in the second and minute range. In 
addition, these experiential influences emerged regardless of using a different 
duration judgment scale from that employed in the earlier experiments where 
comparable effects were observed. 
In demonstrating this, the traditional memory-based accounts of how people form an 
impression of elapsed time are called in question; at least when retrospective 
duration judgments are formed in task contexts similar to those used here. In all three 
of the experiments reported in this chapter, the generation task performed during the 
to-be-judged interval provided the time estimator with three possible bases for 
judgment - the experienced ease or difficulty of retrieval, the amount of contextual 
change stored in memory, and the number of generated interval items stored in 
memory. In Experiments 7 and 8, ease of retrieval effects emerged in the absence of 
contextual change or informational content influences. This seems to strongly 
suggest that in situations of this kind, experiential information serves as a more 
revealing judgment-cue to infer elapsed time than these other sources of information. 
It must therefore be conceded that Block's (1989a, 1990; Block & Reed, 1978) 
contextual-change hypothesis and Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis can not 
predict people's judgments of remembered duration in all circumstances. 
Of course, advocates of the former account could argue that the time estimation 
results in Experiments 7 and 8 only appear problematic for the change model becaus~ 
- 124 -
these studies have misconstrued the nature of contextual changes that mediate 
judgments of remembered duration. The problem with this defence is that there is no 
precise specification of contextual change; in fact, to the contrary it is rather 
unconstrained. Until there is an agreed-upon-measure of contextual change. this 
hypothesis of retrospective duration estimation can not be directly tested. However, 
as this is one of the dominant accounts in the retrospective timing literature, a 
manipulation of contextual change had to be attempted. The reasonable assumption 
was made that the number of items self-generated during a fixed interval provides an 
index of the amount of contextual change that is experienced and stored in memory 
during that interval. It is unclear why intervals filled with more items would not be 
filled with more perceived changes. Thus, it can be strongly assumed that contextual 
influences were in operation as the generation tasks were performed. but they failed 
to directly influence people's judgments of elapsed time. 
One other issue from the retrospective temporal estimation literature merits brief 
comment. In retrospective temporal tasks, it is imperative that participants only 
acquire a temporal motive when they are given the duration judgment instructions 
after the critical interval has elapsed. If participants were aware that the experiment 
was concerned with time estimation, then they would undoubtedly pay attention to 
the passage of time during the interval and their subsequent duration judgment would 
be prospective rather than retrospective in nature. Zakay (1990) pointed out that one 
factor which might attract participants' attention to the passage of time and cause 
them to suspect that they are involved in a time experiment is the presence of 
environmental tempo, such as a metronome beat. While this is almost certainly the 
case when participants' only task is to listen to the beeps of the metronome during 
the to-be-judged interval, the same is not true when the beeps form an integral part of 
the task. In all three of the present experiments, participants were asked if they had 
suspected that they would be asked to estimate the duration of the generation task. 
None of the participants reported any suspicion, hence their duration judgments were 
formed in retrospect as required. 
Taken together, the studies in this chapter provide strong evidence that subjective 
experiences of ease or difficulty associated with prior retrieval operations guide 
people's judgments of remembered duration. As such. this research corroborates 
related work in social cognition which has shown that retrieval experiences can 
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function as a highly informative cue in the formation of social judgment (e.g .. 
Schwarz, 1998). Moreover, the present research extends previous work of this kind 
in two important ways. First, although ease of retrieval effects have been consistently 
demonstrated for judgments in subjective domains (e.g., Schwarz. Bless, et al.. 199L 
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Wanke et aI., 1996), the current studies show that 
comparable effects emerge for a judgment that is more objective in nature. Second, 
unlike other research in this domain, the information provided in the retrieval task 
did not relate in any way to the judgment under investigation. The fact that 
experiential influences still impacted on people's judgments of duration in this 
context demonstrates the generality of ease of retrieval effects. In addition, it 
suggests that these effects can emerge regardless of whether or not the information 
retrieved from memory is relevant to the subsequent judgment (i.e., subjective and 
objective judgments respectively). 
Thus, to conclude, the research reported to date provides compelling evidence that 
subjective experiences of ease or difficulty associated with both memory encoding 
(Expts. 1-5) and memory retrieval (Expts. 6-8) play an important role in retrospective 
temporal estimation. Put another way, people use subjective cues that relate to the 
experiential concomitants of prior processing operations to guide their judgments of 
remembered duration; at least for temporal durations in the second and minute range 
and in task contexts similar to those used here. Would however effects of the sort 
reported thus far emerge in more realistic (e.g., dynamic) task contexts? This 





Thus far the relationship between the subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing 
operations and jUdgments of remembered duration has been demonstrated in 
traditional laboratory-based experiments. Experiential effects were obtained in task 
contexts in which participants studied a list of written words (Expts. 1-3), listened to 
a tape-recorded passage (Expts. 4-5), and generated items of information (Expts. 6-8) 
during the judged interval. The question remains, however, whether these effects 
would extend from laboratory settings to more dynamic task environments. 
Investigating such a phenomenon in the real world would be tricky. Controlling the 
necessary experimental factors in such an environment, particularly the duration of 
the task interval to-be-estimated. would be difficult, if not impossible. New and 
exciting advancements in digital technology, however, provide a potential solution to 
this problem. 
Using immersive virtual environment technology (IVET). it is now possible to create 
and immerse people within dynamic and compelling three-dimensional virtual 
environments that mimic real world situations. Although this powerful medi urn is 
more commonly known as virtual reality in the entertainment industry, scientists 
prefer to use the term (immersive) virtual environments due to the contradictory 
nature of the former terminology (i.e., how can something be both virtual and real). 
Blascovich, Loomis, BealL Swinth, Hoyt~ and Bailenson (2002) define a 'virtual 
environment ': 
As synthetic sensory information that leads to perceptions of 
environments and their contents as if they were not synthetic (p. 105). 
This synthetic information is primarily visuaL but any single sensory modality, or a 
combination, can contribute to the perception of a \'irtual en\'ironment. Basically. 
,irtual environments can be synthetic representations of an)'1hing in the physical 
world (e.g .• theme park) or from the world of make-belie\'e (e.g .. flying carpet). An 
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· immersive virtual environment~ IS described by the same group of researchers 
(Blascovich et aI., 2002) as: 
One that perceptually surrounds an individual. Immersion in such an 
environment is characterised as a psychological state in which the 
individual perceives himself or herself to be enveloped by_ included in, 
and interacting with an environment that provides a continuous stream 
of stimuli (p. 105). 
IVET thus provides researchers with a unique and valuable tool for conducting more 
ecologically realistic experiments than would ever be possible in the traditional 
laboratory. Moreover, it allows researchers to maintain exceptional control over 
characteristics of the experimental environment, levels of control that are not 
possible in the physical world. Simply stated, IVET can create the illusion of the real 
world in a controlled experimental setting. 
For these reasons, it was anticipated that IVET would provide a useful forum to 
investigate whether the subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing operations 
also guides people~s retrospective duration judgments in task contexts that are more 
dynamic than those previously studied. Luckily for me, this research was made 
possible by the Economic and Social Research Council who funded an overseas 
research visit to the University of California, Santa Barbara, home to one of the 
leading Virtual Environment Research Centres in the world. Although only recently 
established in 1998, the "Research Center for Virtual Environments and Behavior~ 
(RECVEB) has already conducted pioneering research in multi-disciplinary areas of 
psychology (e.g., social, vision. spatial cognition, education) making clever use of 
IVET (Co-Directors: James Blascovich and Jack Loomis). It was here that I made 
use of the latest technology (with the technical and methodological support of the 
research staff) to create my very own virtual environment. 
Extending on the previous laboratory-based studies. the experiment in this chapter 
will test the experience-based hypothesis of retrospective timing further by 
examining people's judgments of remembered duration after they have perfonned an 
easy or a difficult memory task in an immersive virtual environment. In this way. 
subjective experiences associated with memory encoding rather than memory 
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retrieval will be manipulated. Obviously, in such an experimental setting. a task that 
requires participants to visually encode information from the yirtual enyironment 
makes their immersive sensory experience far more compelling than a task that 
requires the retrieval of information from memory. Specifically then. when 
participants are immersed within a virtual environment in which they are required to 
commit items to memory, will they rely on their experienced ease or difficulty of 
encoding as a cue to compute how much time has elapsed during the task? A 
successful replication of the results from the previous studies that utilised this ease of 
encoding paradigm (Expts. 1-5) would demonstrate the robustness of experiential 
effects across different experimental settings (i.e.. laboratory and virtual 
environments). As in all the experiments to date, the experience-based hypothesis 
will be competitively tested against Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis of 
remembered duration. However, before the details of the experiment can be 
discussed, it is necessary to explain the technology that is used to create a virtual 
environment and to consider how the IVET enables participants to become immersed 
within a virtual world (for a more detailed and technical description, see Blascovich 
et aI., 2002; Loomis, Blascovich, & Beall, 1999). 
5.1.1 Overview of Technology 
Virtual environments are created using specialised multimedia development software 
programs (i.e., a three-dimensional world construction toolkit). Like physical 
environments, virtual ones can appear to have fixed dimensions (e.g., the inside of a 
casino) or unlimited dimensions (e.g. a mountain top view). To create such a virtual 
environment, high-level computer languages are used to construct a three-
dimensional model of a superordinate space (e.g., a room), with the same principles 
applying to the contents within it (e.g., tables, picture frames, people). The object 
models can be positioned anywhere within the superordinate space. These models do 
not have to be visual. but can be based on sound and with more difficulty. smell or 
touch. This three-dimensional information makes up a database, which is stored 
digitally and represents the virtual environment itself. Once the basic model has been 
created. various surface patterns can be added such as colours, textures. photographs. 
and translucencies to make the environment and the objects appear realistic. Light 
sources to illuminate the virtual world must also be added. but the physical laws of 
nature (i.e .. gravity and magnetic field) are optional depending on whether the yirtual 
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environment is earthlike or not. The objects within the virtual en ironment need not 
be stationary; they can be programmed to move around react naturally to the forces 
of nature, and interact with other objects. 
Now consider the technology that is used to immerse participants within the virtual 
environment. Several IVET systems have been created for scientists to utilise, but the 
one described here was developed by Andrew Beall at the Research Center for 
Virtual Environments and Behavior (RECVEB) at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara. Simply stated, compelling immersive virtual environments are derived from 
the careful integration of the aforementioned software and hardware. The hardware 
includes three major components- display devices, tracking systems, and computers. 
Figure 1 depicts the IVET system at the RECVEB. 
Figure 1. 
The IVET System at the RECVEB, University of California Santa Barbara 
A - Tracking System, B - Rendering Computer, C - Head Mounted Display (HMO) 
Participants wear a head mounted display (C) that includes a position and orientation 
tracking system (A). This system comprises three small tracking devices. An LED is 
tracked by an external video-based system (i.e., cameras in the comer of the 
physical room) to detennine the participant's overall body po ition in thr e 
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dimensions in the physical room where the immersive virtual experience is taking 
place. An inertial device tracks the orientation of the participant's head in three 
dimensions and an optical device tracks the participant's eye-movements. The 
resultant data from the position and orientation tracking system is then sent to the 
rendering computer (B) which identifies and selects the appropriate visual 
information from the three-dimensional graphics database of the virtual environment. 
This updated visual information is then rendered back to the participant via the 
stereoscopic video displays in the head mounted display (C) which allows a three-
dimensional view of the virtual environment. This completes the cycle of 
information transfer, but the process of tracking and rendering continues repeatedly 
until the immersive virtual experience is over. Undoubtedly, the most important 
factor that determines the overall effectiveness of the immersive virtual experience is 
the time taken for the position and orientation tracking information to be updated and 
rendered back to the display of the headset, or more technically, the lag. For 
example, when a participant's head moves up or down to view the virtual ceiling or 
floor in the virtual environment, the computer must rapidly provide new information 
so that he or she can see that particular viewpoint. Generally, a lag of less than 40 
milliseconds exists between tracking and rendering which is undetectable to 
participants. 
When participants are immersed within a virtual environment, this whole technology 
system creates the illusion that they are in a different world altogether from the 
laboratory entered only moments ago. Participants no longer see anything in the real 
world, because their senses are deceived by sensory input from the illusionary 
physical environment that surrounds them. This sensory experience is made all the 
more real for participants as digital immersive virtual environments allow for 
exploration of the surroundings. Participants can move around freely in the same way 
as in the physical world, by walking, running, jumping, and so on. Researchers at the 
RECVEB believe this significantly adds to the participant's overall immersive 
experience in the virtual environment (Blascovich, 2002). Moreover, as participants 
move around they receive kinesthetic and vestibular feedback cues that work in 
harmony with their experiences in the virtual environment which increases their 
belief that they are present in the simulated environment (i.e., their sense of 
"personal presence"; Heeter. 1992). 
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In addition, as the immersive virtual environment and the objects within it ha\e the 
same size, appearance, and behaviour as their counterparts in the physical world, the 
illusion of a real and natural environment is created. These factors contribute to the 
participant's sense of "environmental presence" (Heeter. 1992). In this way. both 
personal and environmental presence play an important role in creating a compelling 
immersive sensory experience for participants. In sum, IVET can produce dynamic. 
engaging, and compelling experimental settings that mimic real life situations within 
the confines of the laboratory. It is therefore not surprising that psychologists from 
many disciplines have been quick to utilise this exciting medium as a tool for 
research purposes (see Blascovich et aI., 2002; Loomis et aI., 1999; for re\iews). 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 9: 
IMMERSIVE VIRTUAL PHOTOGRAPHIC GALLERY 
FACE-MEMORY TASK (VISUAL NOISE ABSENT vs. PRESENT) 
Making use of the flexible processing environments that can be created using IVET, 
a virtual photographic gallery was designed and constructed for the present 
experiment. Although researchers conducting virtual environment-based experiments 
can let their imaginations run riot, on this occasion, the environment created was 
inspired by real life events. This was of critical importance to the present research so 
that retrospective duration estimates could be obtained for a situation that is similar 
to one in which people estimate elapsed time in everyday life. 
Thus, in the current study. participants wearing a head mounted display (HMD) will 
be immersed within a virtual room that resembles a photographic gallery. From a 
seated position in the physical room, participants will take a virtual journey through 
the gallery on a moving walkway for a fixed duration. That is, despite being 
stationary, participants will have the visual sensation of moving forward through the 
gallery. Undoubtedly, this will increase participants' engagement with the 
experimental situation. Throughout this journey, participants will sequentially see 20 
photographic colour portraits of people' s faces suspended from the centre of the 
ceiling. Participants will be given the task of carefully inspecting and memorising 
these faces for a subsequent memory test. As in Experiments -+ and 5, this test \\-ill 
assess recognition memory. Recognition accuracy will sen-e as a measure of the 
amount of infomlation stored in memory during the to-be-judged interval and thus 
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will provide a direct test of Ornstein's (1969) storage-size hypothesis of retrospective 
timing. 
To investigate the moderating role of prior encoding experiences on judgments of 
remembered duration, it is essential that the memory task places differential demands 
on the encoding process (i.e .. easy vs. difficult). As in the previous ease of encoding 
experiments (Expts. 1-5), this will be achieved independently from the infonnational 
content that occurs during the critical interval. In the present context, the subjective 
demands of memory encoding will be manipulated by varying the manner in which 
the to-be-remembered items are presented to participants. Specifically. half of the 
participants will be required to memorise 20 faces that are degraded with visual 
noise, whereas the other participants will be required to memorise the same 20 faces 
without any visual noise. It was anticipated that participants would experience more 
difficulty memorising the faces from the virtual photographic gallery when visual 
noise was present rather than absent. 
In addition to creating a dynamic and compelling experimental environment for 
participants to engage in a memory task, consider two other ways in which the 
present methodology develops the procedures used previously. First, in all the earlier 
studies, participants retrospectively estimated the duration of a task that they 
perfonned in a static mode. In the present experiment however. when participants 
become immersed within the virtual photographic gallery, the continuous stream of 
visual input that is projected on the retina by the HMD (i.e .. optic flow) creates the 
illusion of movement for participants during the critical task interval (note that 
participants will not receive vestibular or propioceptic feedback cues as they will be 
seated in the physical room). In everyday life, people frequently estimate the 
duration of events that they experienced whilst stationary or moving. In this way. the 
use of IVET allows the generality of the reported effects to be examined across 
different types of situations in which time is computed on a daily basis. Second. in 
Experiments 1-3, ease of encoding effects on judgments of remembered duration 
were obtained in task contexts in which participants were required to visually encode 
written words during the critical interval. It is important however to consider 
different types of stimulus events that people experience in the real world. By using 
pictorial visual stimuli in the present experiment. it becomes possible to detennine 
whether these ~ffects gen~ralise to other ecological stimulus events. 
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Other modifications to the previous methodology involve the duration of the task 
interval to-be-estimated and the horizontal interval scale used for participants' 
retrospective duration estimates. In the current study. the memory task in the 
immersive virtual photographic gallery will last for a total duration of 1 min 15 s. As 
this is a different objective clock time duration from any used previously. this \\ill 
assess the extent to which the reported effects generalise to other temporal durations 
in the second and minute range. In the earlier ease of encoding laboratory-based 
experiments (Expts. 1-5), duration estimates were made via a circled response at a set 
point along the horizontal interval scale. However, in this experiment (as in the 
previous chapter), retrospective duration estimates will be made by making a mark 
along a fixed line length scale. As such. participants will be able to estimate the 
duration of the task to the nearest second. This alternation makes it possible to 
determine whether the ease of encoding effects reported thus far extend to other 
duration judgment scales. 
As long as the visual noise manipulation is successful in eliciting different encoding 
experiences for participants in the two experimental conditions, the experience-based 
hypothesis predicts the following. If people use their prior encoding experiences to 
compute elapsed time, then duration estimates should decrease as the perceived 
difficulty of encoding operations increase. That is. when the encoding task is 
perceived to be difficult (i.e., visual noise present), people will report that less time 
was available to commit the faces to memory compared to when the encoding task is 
perceived to be relatively easy (i.e., visual noise absent). The content-based 
hypothesis predicts that if people draw on the amount of stimulus information stored 
in memory to compute elapsed time, then duration estimates should closely parallel 
memory for the amount of information remembered from the task. That is. if the 
encoding task leads to increased, decreased, or equivalent memory for the presented 
faces compared to the other task, people will report that more, less, or the same 
amount of time was available to commit these items to memory. 
5.2.1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty undergraduate students (18 men and 22 women) from the University of 
California. Santa Barbara participated in the experiment in partial fulfilment of a 
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course requirement. All participants were Caucasian, native speakers of English and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of the participants had a self-
reported history of epilepsy or a medical condition that affected their spatial/visual 
abilities. The study had a single factor (visual noise: absent or present) between-
subjects design. An equal number of men and women were randomly assigned to 
each of the experimental conditions. 
Materials and Apparatus 
The physical room (i.e., laboratory) III which the experiment took place was 
approximately 3 m x 2.4 m x 3 m. A non-swivel chair was positioned in the centre of 
the room for participants. From this position, the virtual photographic gallery was 
modelled as 56 m x 5 m x 5 m. As such, the length of the drtual room was over 11 
times greater than the width which ensured that the illusion of a long hallway in the 
gallery was created. The virtual photographic gallery comprised golden brown wood 
panelling for the two side walls (east and west in the virtual room) and the ceiling. 
The north facing wall at the end of the gallery hallway was coloured black with no 
added texture. The floor had a green marble effect. 20 photographic portraits framed 
in dark wood (1.3 m x 2.8 m) were suspended from the centre of the ceiling (0.5 m) 
by dark wooden beams: each beam was attached to the top midpoint of each frame. 
The framed portraits were stationary and were positioned at 2.8 m intervals along the 
length of the gallery hallway. 
The photographic portraits were in colour and each comprised a frontal view of a 
person's face with a neutral expression (i.e., eyes open, mouth closed, no smile). 90 
students at the University of California, Santa Barbara consented to be photographed 
and signed a form granting the experimenter permission to use the image of their 
face for research purposes. All photographs were shot on campus using a digital 
camera. 20 of these photographs of people's faces (10 men and 10 women) were 
selected and resized (l.2 m x 2.7 m) to appear within the virtual photographic 
gallery. In one condition, the photographic portraits of people' s faces were presented 
without visual noise (see Appendix 6 for the stimuli used). In the other condition, the 
same faces were presented in the same order with visual noise (a dot density mask of 
65%: see Appendix 7). It was anticipated that visual noise (absent vs. present) would 
moderate the encoding experience (easy vs. difficult respectively). Figure 2 shows a 
snapshot of the virtual photographic gallery in each of the experimental conditions. 
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Figure 2. 
Snapshots of the Virtual Photographic Gallery in the Two Experimental Conditions 
Visual noise absent 
Visual noise present 
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Virtual movement forwards through the length of the gallery hallwav at a velocity of 
. . 
0.75 m1s allowed the 20 photographic portraits of people's faces to be viewed 
sequentially (see Appendix 6 or 7 for the order of presentation). Each portrait \vas 
viewed frontally and was only visible for 3.75 s before it was passed under and the 
next one appeared. The virtual environment turned pitch black when all 20 portraits 
had been presented. The total duration of the virtual journey through the virtual 
photographic gallery was 1 m 15 s. 
An additional 20 photographs of people' s faces were selected to serve as distractors 
in the recognition test (see Appendix 8 for the stimuli used). Each distractor item was 
chosen to match a target item (i.e., gallery photographs) based on gender. race. hair 
colour, and neutral expression. In the recognition memory test, the 40 photographs of 
people's faces (20 targets and 20 distractors) were presented sequentially and in a 
random order in a PowerPoint slide presentation on a computer monitor. The 
photographs measured 14.07 cm x 16.12 cm and were presented in colour on a white 
background without visual noise or wooden portrait frames. 
The technology used to render the immersive virtual photographic gallery is shown 
in Figure 1 (see page 130). Participants wore a Virtual Research V8 Head Mounted 
Display (HMD) that comprised stereoscopic LCD panels over each eye with a 
resolution of 1280 x 480 and a refresh rate of 72 Hz. This ensured that the virtual 
photographic gallery could be viewed separately by each eye to give stereoscopic 
depth. While immersed within the virtual gallery by wearing the HMO, participants 
could not see any part of their own body or anything in the physical room. The eye 
height of participants in the immersive virtual gallery was set at 0.7 m to control for 
height differences. The displayed images in the HMD were generated using a 450 
MHz Pentium III dual-processor computer with an Evans & Sutherland Tornado 
3000 graphics card. A tracking system was utilised to determine the position, 
orientation, and eye movement of the participant in the physical room. This allowed 
the participant's field of view in the virtual room to be continuously updated by the 
rendering computer so that realistic three-dimensional visual stimuli were 
experienced in the immersive virtual photographic gallery. For example. when the 
participant looked up to view the portrait of a person's face just before passing 
underneath it. that particular viewpoint would be made visihle on the stereoscopic 
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displays of the headset. The time delay, or lag between tracking and rendering was 
almost negligible (40 ms). 
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and were asked to sit on a chair 
positioned in the centre of the room. Participants were informed that the study was an 
investigation into human memory. Attention was then drawn to the head mounted 
display (HMD) which was located on a stand near to where the participants were 
sitting. It was explained that when the HMD is worn, a person can see three-
dimensional virtual environments and that people often describe this experience as 
"being inside a movie". Participants were told that they would be wearing the HMD 
as they sat on the chair for part of the experiment and whilst wearing it, they would 
feel as if they were inside a photographic gallery. The experimenter then gave the 
following instructions to participants: 
When you are inside the photographic gallery, you will be taking a 
virtual journey through the gallery hallway on a moving walkway. On 
this journey, you will see a number of photographic colour portraits of 
people's faces hanging from the centre of the ceiling. Your task is to 
carefully study and memorise these faces as later you will be given a 
memory test to see how many of them you remember. The portraits of 
people's faces will be directly in front of you, but you will only be able 
to see one of them at a time. When you see one of these portraits, focus 
on the face for as long as you can, because you will pass underneath it 
and the next one will appear in front of you. As such, you should look 
straight ahead at all times during your journey through the photographic 
gallery, but you will need to move your head upwards and downwards 
so you can inspect each face until it disappears out of sight and the next 
face appears in view. The virtual photographic gallery will turn pitch 
black when you have seen all the portraits of people's faces. 
No information was given regarding the number of faces that would be presented 
during the virtual journey through the photographic gallery or the length of time that 
would be spent performing the memory task (1 min 15 s). Once these instructions 
were understood. participants were told that it was now time to tryon the H~lD 
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whilst they were seated. Before the experimenter helped participants to do this. they 
were informed that some people can experience mild dizziness or nausea (so called 
simulator sickness) when they view virtual environments through the H\10 
equipment. It was explained to participants that if they felt uncomfortable in any 
way, they should say so immediately and the experiment would be stopped. The 
experimenter then carefully adjusted the HMO and asked participants to look straight 
ahead. Participants were then told that the face-memory task in the yirtual 
photographic gallery would begin when the experimenter said "start" and would end 
when the experimenter said "finish". By using these signals, the task interval (i.e .. 
to-be-assessed duration) was clearly delimited for participants. ~uring the task 
interval, all participants were given 1 min 15 s to memorise the 20 photographic 
portraits of people's faces in the virtual gallery. Half of the participants studied the 
faces presented without visual noise; the other participants studied the same faces 
presented with visual noise. 
After the encoding task in the immersive virtual photographic gallery was completed. 
the experimenter helped participants to remove the HMO. Once the experimenter had 
checked that participants were not feeling dizzy or nauseous, the Remote Associates 
Test (Mednick & Mednick, 1967) was performed as a distractor actiyity. This 
comprised a booklet of words that were clustered in groups of threes. Participants 
were required to write down a word in the space provided that had a remote 
association to the 3 listed words. This filler task was carried out to clear short-term 
memory and again, participants were not informed as to how long they would be 
given for the task. A 5 min period was accurately timed using a concealed stopwatch 
and then the booklets were collected. 
Next, participants were presented with a short questionnaire consisting of two 
questions that related to the face-memory task performed in the immersi ve \'irtual 
photographic gallery. The order of presentation of the questions was counterbalanced 
across the two experimental conditions. Participants were told to answer the 
questions in the order presented and to be as accurate as possible in their responses. 
One question required participants to estimate how much time they believed had 
elapsed during the memory task in the photographic gallery. The question sheet 
stated that the duration to-be-estimated began when the experimenter said "start" and 
ended when the experimenter said "finish". A duration judgment scale was provided 
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ranging from 45 s to 1 min 35 s with intervals of lOs. Ticks to mark the 1 s intervals 
were also clearly indicated along its length. Participants were asked to use the scale 
to mark off their subjective impressions of elapsed time to the nearest second. The 
other question required participants to rate how much difficulty they had experienced 
memorising the faces from the photographic gallery. Ratings \\ere made on a 9-point 
scale ranging from 1 ('very easy') to 9 ('very difjicu/t'). 
Finally, a visual recognition memory test was administered to assess participants' 
recollections of the faces from the immersive virtual photographic gallery. This 
involved participants viewing 40 photographs of people's faces (20 targets & 20 
distractors) in a PowerPoint slide presentation on a computer monitor. The order of 
presentation of the faces was randomised. Participants were instructed to tell the 
experimenter whether each face had been seen earlier in the photographic gallery 
(say "OLD") or had not been seen earlier in the gallery (say ·'NE\V'"). The 
recognition test was performed at a participant-paced rate and the experimenter noted 
down the participants' responses on the relevant questionnaire. On completion of the 
task, participants were asked if they had recognised any of the faces because they 
knew the individuals personally. None of the participants indicated so. Participants 
were then debriefed as to the real purpose of the experiment, thanked for their 
assistance, and dismissed. None of the participants reported or appeared to suffer 
from simulator sickness during the experiment and none had guessed that their time 
estimation abilities were under investigation. All participants believed that human 
memory was the main area of interest and thus duration judgments were formed in 
retrospect as required. 
5.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Perceived Task Difficulty 
To assess whether the memory task was accompanied by different encoding 
experiences, participants' difficulty ratings were submitted to a single factor (visual 
noise: absent or present) between-subjects ANOV A. This analysis confirmed that 
visual noise had the intended effect on perceived task difticulty. F(l ,38) = 13.90. P < 
.0006. Participants found it easier to memorise the faces from the virtual 
photographic gallery when visual noise was absent rather than present (see Table 9 
for treatment means). 
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Duration Estimates 
Participants' retrospective duration estimates were converted to seconds and the 
resultant data were submitted to a single factor (visual noise: absent or present) 
between-subjects ANOVA. As expected, this revealed an effect of yisual noise on 
participants' duration judgments, such that more time was belieyed to ha\'e been 
available to memorise the faces from the virtual photographic gallery when noise 
was absent rather than present, F(l,38) = 26.70,p < .0001 (see Table 9 for treatment 
means). As participants' estimates of elapsed time varied as a function of their 
experienced ease or difficulty of encoding. this provides further support for the 
experience-based hypothesis of retrospective duration estimation. 
Recognition Accuracy 
For each participant the number of correctly recognised faces was corrected for 
guessing by subtracting the false-alarm rate from the hit rate. The corrected number 
was then converted into a proportional score which served as a measure of 
recognition accuracy. The resultant scores were submitted to a single factor (visual 
noise: absent or present) between-subjects ANOV A. This analysis revealed no effect 
of visual noise on recognition accuracy, F(l,38) < 1. ns (see Table 9 for treatment 
means). Participants correctly recognised the same number of faces from the virtual 
photographic gallery regardless of whether visual noise had been absent or present. 
This suggests that participants must have expended greater effort memorising the 
faces that were degraded with noise (see difficulty ratings below). 
Table 9. 
Mean Ratings of Duration (s), Task Difficulty, and Recognition Accuracy as a 
Function of Visual Noise (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Visual Noise Duration Estimates Task Difficulty Recognition 
Absent 72.65 (8.55) 3.60 (1.60) .385 (.15) 
Present 60.35 (6.34) 5.30 (1.26) ,350 (.12) 
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The observed pattern of time estimation results again presents problems for a 
content-based hypothesis of retrospective timing (Ornstein, 1969). The two face-
memory tasks performed in the immersive virtual photographic gallery produced 
equivalent recognition accuracy, but they were not judged as equal in remembered 
duration. Thus, as retrospective duration judgments were not directly related to the 
number of items remembered from the judged interval, participants could not have 
used the amount of information stored in memory as a cue to compute elapsed time. 
As the only physical difference between the two memory tasks was the absence or 
presence of visual noise, the experience-based hypothesis proYides the best 
explanation of the current findings. Visual noise (absence vs. presence) was 
sufficient to elicit different encoding experiences (easy vs. difficult respectively) and 
participants seemed to use this experience of ease or difficulty as input for their 
subsequent duration judgment. When the encoding task was considered to be 
subjectively difficult or demanding (i.e., visual noise present). participants believed 
that less time had been available to commit the gallery faces to memory compared to 
when the encoding task was considered to be relatively easy (i.e .. visual noise 
absent). 
Duration Estimates and Difficulty Ratings 
Further evidence for this conclusion was obtained by a correlational analysis. 
Participants' duration estimates decreased as their reported difficulty of encoding the 
faces increased, r(38) = -.628. p < .001. As the results fulfilled the conditions 
required for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), an ANCOVA was performed 
to assess whether the subjective difficulty of encoding operations mediated the effect 
of visual noise on participants' duration estimates. This analysis revealed that when 
task difficulty ratings were partialled out of the analysis, the effect of visual noise on 
duration estimates was reduced, but not eliminated, F(L37) = 10.88, P < .002. Thus. 
as in the previous encoding studies (Expts. 1-5), the experienced ease or difficulty 
evoked by encoding operations exerted a mediational influence on participants' 
retrospective duration judgments. This effect however was not as pronounced as in 
Experiments 1-3, when performance was indexed by free recall rather than 
recognition accuracy. 
The current results therefore replicate and extend those observed in Experiments 1·5. 
As before. participants' judgments of remembered duration were influenct:d h: tht: 
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sUbjective ease or difficulty of a prior encoding episode. More time \\'as reported to 
be available to memorise the faces from the virtual photographic gallery when the 
task of placing this information into mind was considered to be a relatively effortless 
activity (i.e., visual noise absent). Conversely, less time was reported to be available 
to memorise the gallery faces when the task of placing this information into mind 
was experienced as effortful and demanding (i.e .. visual noise present). Thus. these 
findings are again consistent with the hypothesis that people use their prior encoding 
experiences as a cue to estimate how much time has elapsed during a task. As these 
ease of encoding effects were obtained in the absence of memory recognition 
differences, this conclusion is further supported. 
The results of the correlational and mediational analyses also confirm this 
experience-based account of retrospective timing. The correlational analysis revealed 
that judgments of elapsed time decreased as encoding operations were perceived to 
increase in difficulty and the mediational analysis verified the influential role played 
by the experienced ease or difficulty of encoding in retrospective duration 
estimation. However, as in the mediational analyses conducted for Experiments 4 
and 5, the effect of the independent variable (i.e., visual noise) on duration estimates 
was attenuated rather than eliminated when task difficulty ratings were partialled out 
of the analysis. Presumably as before. this failure to completely eliminate the effect 
of visual noise on participants' duration estimates is undoubtedly due to the 
magnitude of the original effect. 
Taken together, the results of the present experiment show that people pay attention 
to their experiences of ease or difficulty associated with memory encoding and use 
the information they provide to guide their retrospective duration judgments. The 
current findings also extend the previous encoding studies in a number of important 
ways. Critically, these experiential influences on judgments of remembered duration 
were obtained in an immersive virtual photographic gallery rather than in the 
traditional laboratory environment. This clearly demonstrates the generality of 
experiential effects across different experimental settings (i.e .. laboratory and \'irtual 
environments). Moreover. in contrast to the earlier laboratory-based experiments. 
duration judgments were returned for an easy or difficult encoding task that had been 
performed whilst moving (albeit. "virtually"). This provides supporting e\idence that 
ease of encoding effects emerge for situations that are experienced in a moving or in 
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a stationary mode. The observed findings also extend the previous work as the 
visually encoded items were of a different nature. the duration of the task interval 
was of a different length, and the horizontal interval scale used for the duration 
estimates was of a different type, nevertheless comparable effects emerged. Thus. 
ease of encoding effects generalise to different stimulus types, objective clock time 
durations in the second and minute range, and duration judgment scales. Evidently_ 
experiential effects on judgments of elapsed time are remarkably robust. 
5.3 CHAPTER DISCUSSION 
The prime objective of Experiment 9 was to determine whether ease of encoding 
effects on jUdgments of remembered duration extend from traditional laboratory 
settings to more dynamic task environments. Immersive virtual environment 
technology (IVET) was used to create an engaging and compelling synthetic 
experimental environment so this issue could be investigated in a situation similar to 
one experienced in the real world. While the immersive virtual environment (i.e .. 
photographic gallery) simulated the essential characteristics and richness of the 
natural social environment, this came at no expense to experimental control. 
Under these umque experimental conditions, strong evidence was obtained that 
subjective experiences of ease or difficulty evoked by memory encoding operations 
play an important role in the construction of retrospective duration judgments. When 
the task of encoding the faces presented in the immersive virtual photographic 
gallery was experienced as easy (i.e., visual noise absent), participants interpreted 
this to mean that they were given a sufficient amount of time to commit these items 
to memory. Thus, long retrospective duration judgments were provided by these 
participants. In contrast, when the task of encoding the gallery faces was experienced 
as difficult (i.e .. visual noise present), participants interpreted this to mean that they 
were not given enough time to commit these items to memory. This was reflected in 
their shorter judgments of elapsed time. This pattern of findings again shows that the 
subjective experience of finding it relatively easy or considerably difficult to commit 
items of information to memory elicits a distinctive experiential mental state that 
conveys useful information to the time estimator. Moreover. as these ease of 
encoding effects emerged in a digital immersive virtual environment rather than in 
the traditional laboratory environment (Expts. 1-5). the generality and importance of 
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the findings reported in this thesis is highlighted. Experiential effects readily extend 
across different experimental situations (i.e .. physical and virtual). In demonstrating 
this, positive implications arise for IVET at a general level. Valid and valuable 
experimental social psychological research can be conducted using digital IVET. 
Undoubtedly, it is a powerful research tool for augmenting the traditional methods of 
studying human behaviour in more dynamic experimental settings - in the present 
context, people's time estimation abilities. 
While the results of the virtual environment-based experiment further confirm the 
experience-based hypothesis, the observed findings once again fail to corroborate the 
content-based account of retrospective duration estimation (cf. Ornstein, 1969). The 
expected positive relationship between judgments of remembered duration and 
memory for the presented interval items was not found. There were large differences 
in remembered duration between the two face-memory tasks, whilst recognition 
accuracy for the gallery faces was equivalent. Thus, the conclusion can be made that 
the amount of information stored in memory played no role in shaping people' s 
retrospective duration judgments. Unlike the studies in the previous chapter, no 
deliberate attempt was made in the current experiment to manipulate the amount of 
contextual change that was experienced during the to-be-judged interval. Despite this 
however, varying amounts of contextual change might have been in operation as the 
two face-memory tasks were performed and this in tum might have affected people' s 
judgments of elapsed time. For this reason. the contextual-change hypothesis of 
retrospective timing (Block, 1989a~ Block & Reed, 1978) warrants brief discussion. 
Can this hypothesis provide an explanation for the obtained results? 
In the present experiment, the subjectively easy encoding task (i.e .. faces without 
visual noise) performed in the immersive virtual photographic gallery was judged as 
longer in duration than the subjectively difficult encoding task (i.e .. faces with visual 
noise). The contextual-change hypothesis would have to explain this pattern of 
findings by assuming that the easy task caused more contextual change to be encoded 
and stored in memory than the more difficult version of the same task. As the only 
physical difference between the two encoding tasks was the absence or presence of 
visual noise, advocates of the contextual-change hypothesis would have to argue that 
this manipulation was responsible for causing this memory-change ditTerence. It 
seems more likely. however. that performance on the ditlicult task would cause more 
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contextual change to be stored in memory than performance on the easy task. In the 
difficult task, the presence of visual noise over the to-be-remembered faces would 
presumably cause participants to encode a greater number of different interpretations 
of these faces than in the easy task when visual noise was absent. \' arious 
interpretations of the presented faces should therefore lead to more changes in 
processing context (Block, 1990). Of course, as the contextual-change hypothesis 
fails to incorporate any independent way of establishing the extent of contextual 
change, time researchers are left with no alternative but to infer the amount of change 
in memory storage. If this reasonable assumption is accepted, the change-based 
hypothesis also encounters problems as the difficult task should have produced 
longer rather than shorter retrospective duration judgments. It can thus be assumed 
that unintentional contextual influences were in operation during the two face-
memory tasks, but they failed to directly influence people's judgments of elapsed 
time. 
In sum, although the traditional memory-based accounts (i.e., content and change) of 
retrospective duration estimation have been considered, the experience-based 
hypothesis continues to provide the best explanation of the observed findings. People 
use their experiences of ease or difficulty associated with prior encoding operations 
as a cue to guide their retrospective duration judgments. As such, the present 
research is compatible with related work in social cognition that highlights the role of 
subjective experiences in other domains of judgment (e.g., Clore. 1992; Kelley & 




How people make their assessments of elapsed time is a question that has captured 
the attention of many cognitive psychologists (e.g., Block, 1978: Fraisse. 1963; 
Frankenhaeuser, 1959; James, 1890; Ornstein, 1969). Undoubtedly. interest in this 
topic stems from the fact that retrospective timing plays such a pivotal role in daily 
life. The assumption in this domain of research is that people use the contents of 
memory (i.e., products of retrieval) to guide their retrospectiYe duration judgments 
(e.g., Block, 1989a; Block & Reed, 1978; Ornstein, 1969): an assumption that has 
also dominated the general area of social judgment (e.g., Higgins. 1989; Wyer & 
Srull, 1989). Although this postulation has been useful for guiding a considerable 
amount of research on retrospective temporal estimation, a poor understanding of 
how people compute elapsed time still remains. 
In the social judgment research, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that an 
analysis of decision-making based solely on the accessible contents of memory 
retrieval is incomplete. Alternative lines of research in social cognition have now 
shown that subjective experiences that accompany information processing also 
convey useful information that people rely on when they make judgments. 
evaluations, and appraisals (e.g., Clore, 1992; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Kelley & 
Jacoby, 1996a; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz, Bless. et aI., 1991: Schwarz & Clore, 1996; 
Strack, 1992). Thus, as it turns out, not only are the products of cognitive operations 
influential in shaping people's judgmental decisions, but so too are subjective 
experiences associated with these operations. 
Given therefore the importance of subjective experiences in the derivation of social 
judgment, I began this thesis with the belief that it was time to investigate the 
usefulness of this experience-based approach in the retrospectiYe timing domain. It 
was hoped that by extending the retrospective duration judgment research in this 
way, valuable new insights would emerge into the cognitive dynamics of 
retrospective duration estimation. The primary goal of the current research was 
therefore to detennine the extent to which subjective experiences of ease or difficulty 
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associated with prior processing operations (i.e., memory encoding and memory 
retrieval) would influence people's retrospective duration judgments. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF CURRENT FINDINGS 
Of critical importance to the rationale of the present research was that the current 
studies satisfied the requirements of retrospective timing tasks. The defining 
characteristic of such tasks is that participants only acquire a ""temporal moti \'e" 
(Doob, 1971) when they are unexpectedly given the duration judgment instructions 
after the critical interval has elapsed. In all nine of the current experiments. 
participants were asked if they had suspected that the experiment was concerned with 
time estimation. None of the participants reported any suspicion. hence their duration 
judgments were formed in retrospect as required. 
With regard to the primary objective, the observed results from all nine experiments 
show that participants' retrospective duration judgments were influenced by their 
experiences of ease or difficulty associated with prior processing operations. Longer 
duration judgments were returned when the encoding or retrieval task was 
experienced as subjectively easy compared to when the encoding or retrieval task 
was experienced as subjectively difficult. These experiential effects were found to be 
remarkably robust as they readily generalised across different task contexts, 
manipulations of processing difficulty, stimulus types, perceptual modalities, 
intentional/incidental memory tasks (i.e., participants knew/did not know that 
memory would be assessed for the encoded or generated items). and memory 
measures. In addition, these effects were consistent across various objective clock 
time durations, all within the second and minute range. typically used in 
retrospective timing research, and across two different duration judgment scales. 
Moreover. these experiential influences on judgments of remembered duration also 
emerged in a dynamic environment that mimicked a real world situation, specifically 
in an immersive virtual photographic gallery. This uniquely demonstrated the 
generality of these effects across different experimental settings (i.e., laboratory and 
virtual environments). 
This consistent pattern of findings provides strong support for the assumption that 
people use their inferences about the subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing 
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operations as a cue to guide their judgments of remembered duration. When items of 
information were encoded into memory or retrieved from memory with relative ~ase. 
participants interpreted this experience of ease to mean that sufficient time must han? 
been available to perform the task. Thus, long retrospective duration judgments were 
provided by these individuals. Conversely, when items of information w~re encoded 
into memory or retrieved from memory with considerable difficulty. participants 
interpreted this experience of difficulty to mean that insufficient time was ayailable 
to perform the task in a satisfactory manner (e.g., performance may haye fdt 
pressurised or rushed). This caused shorter retrospective duration judgments to be 
reported. In this way, participants considered the ease or difficulty they experienced 
placing items into the mind, or bringing items to mind as a reliable and predictiye 
indicator of how much time was available to perform the task. Simply stated. 
individuals seem to perceive their experienced processing ease or difficulty to be a 
relevant and highly informative source of information for their retrospective duration 
judgments and so they use it to guide their temporal outputs. 
In line with this assumption, the results of the correlational analyses corroborated the 
relationship between participants' retrospective duration judgments and their ratings 
of processing difficulty. Judgments of elapsed time decreased as processing 
operations were perceived to increase in difficulty. Most importantly. the mediational 
analyses provided direct evidence for this experience-based account of retrospective 
timing. In all nine experiments, the subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing 
operations was found to either mediate (Expts. 1-3. 7-8) or to play an influential 
mediational role (Expts. 4-5. 6, 9) in people's judgments of remembered duration. 
That is, when participants' ratings of processing difficulty were partialled out of the 
analysis, experiential effects on their assessments of elapsed time were eliminated or 
attenuated respectively. With the exception of Experiment 6. in the experiments in 
which subjective experiences were found to exert a less pronounced mediational 
influence on people's temporal outputs, memory performance was indexed by 
recognition accuracy rather than free recall. Interestingly, there seems to be a 
fundamental difference between these two memory measures. Future research is 
clearly needed to identify the source of this difference. 
A clear take-home message therefore emerges from the current research. Subjective 
experiences of ease or difficulty associated with both memory encoding (Expts. 1-5. 
- 1-l9-
9) and memory retrieval (Expts. 6-8) play an important role in retrospective duration 
estimation. Put another way, people use their experiential cognitive state as a cue to 
guide their retrospective duration judgments: at least for temporal durations in the 
second and minute range and in task contexts similar to those used here. Before the 
theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. a summary of 
the results would not be complete without considering the impact of experiential 
effects on judgmental accuracy. In fact, one of the main reasons for investigating the 
processes mediating retrospective duration judgments is that there is an objective 
standard (i.e., clock time) against which their level of accuracy can be assessed. 
When the encoding or retrieval task was deemed to be subjectively easy. participants 
showed remarkable precision in estimating how much time had elapsed. In general. 
they only slightly underestimated the task's objective clock time duration. However. 
when the encoding or retrieval task was deemed to be subjectively difficult, 
participants' estimates of elapsed time were somewhat shorter. That is, they 
underestimated objective time to a much larger degree. These findings show that 
reliance on an experience-based judgmental strategy under easy processing 
conditions produces fairly accurate retrospective duration estimates. In contrast, 
under difficult processing conditions, reliance on such a strategy actually causes 
inaccurate duration estimates to be produced; an issue that will be considered in more 
detail later. Some general similarities in participants' retrospective duration 
judgments will also be pointed out as a matter of interest. 
Remembered duration was affected by the actual length of the task interval as 
judgments became more inaccurate as the interval lasted for a longer duration. That 
is, retrospective timing performance was better when shorter rather than longer 
durations were estimated (e.g .. 1 min 30 s vs. 3 min 18 s). However, regardless of the 
actual length of the time period under investigation, retrospective duration judgments 
were almost always underestimates of clock time, with underestimates becoming 
more pronounced as objective duration increased. Both are typical findings in this 
area of research (e.g., Block & Zakay, 1997; Brown & Stubbs, 1988: Predebon. 
2002). In general then, it seems that when assessments of elapsed time are made for 
intervals in the second and minute range, there is a strong tendency to underestimate 
the interval's objecth'e duration and greater inaccuracy characterises longer time 
periods. 
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6.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
6.2.1 Implications for Research on Retrospective Timing 
By demonstrating the influential role played by subjectiye expenences m the 
construction of retrospective duration judgments, important theoretical implications 
arise for retrospective duration estimation research. The present work suggests that 
the traditional memory-based duration judgment models that focus exclusiyely on the 
contents of memory (i.e., products of retrieval) can not predict people' s judgments of 
remembered duration in all tasks contexts or situations. Throughout the current 
research, the predictive utility of the two dominant memory-based models in the 
retrospective timing literature were tested and the message that emerged was 
straightforward. The observed pattern of time estimation results could not be 
adequately explained by either of these traditional duration judgments models. 
According to Ornstein's (1969) long-established storage-size model. people base 
their retrospective duration judgments solely on the amount of stimulus information 
stored in memory during the critical task interval. This hypothesis therefore predicts 
that a positive relationship between these two variables should always emerge. That 
is, duration judgments should closely parallel memory for the amount of information 
remembered from the time period. In the present experiments, however, despite 
using memory measures of both free recall and recognition, evidence of this positive 
relationship was rather limited. In fact, in seven of the nine experiments. judgments 
of remembered duration were found to be unrelated (Expts. 1-3. 5, 9) or inversely 
related (Expts. 7-8) to the amount of information recalled or recognised from the 
critical interval. Obviously. such findings cast doubt on a purely content-based 
account of retrospective duration estimation. 
In stark contrast to the aforementioned hypothesis. the predictive utility of the other 
dominant explanation of how people form an impression of elapsed time was only 
tested in two of the experiments in this thesis. Block' s (1989a~ Block & Reed. 1978) 
contextual-change model postulates that people base their retrospectiye duration 
judgments solely on the amount of contextual change that is experienced and stored 
in memory during the critical interval. As such, this hypothesis predicts a positiye 
relationship between judgments of remembered duration and the numb\.?(' of 
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contextual changes that are remembered from the time period. As already explained. 
difficulty in testing this change-based account of retrospective timing stems from the 
fact that this model fails to incorporate any independent way of establishing the 
extent of contextual change in a given situation. Time researchers are therefore left 
with no alternative but to infer the amount of contextual information in memory 
storage. This ambiguity is further exasperated as no precise specification of 
contextual change is offered. Until there is an agreed-upon-measure of contextual 
change, this hypothesis of retrospective timing can not be tested directly. 
Despite these problems, a manipulation of contextual change was attempted in the 
present research (Expts. 7-8). The reasonable assumption was made that the number 
of items self-generated during the critical interval (i.e., many vs. few) provides an 
index of the amount of contextual change that is experienced and stored in memory 
(i.e., more vs. less respectively). The results obtained were the exact opposite to what 
the contextual-change hypothesis would predict. That is, retrospective duration 
judgments were found to be inversely rather than directly related to the number of 
contextual changes that occurred during the judged interval. These findings therefore 
call into question the idea that contextual change serves as the sole determinant of 
remembered duration. 
What is abundantly clear from the lack of supporting evidence for either of the 
traditional memory-based models of retrospective timing is that that these models 
provide an incomplete view of how people estimate elapsed time. That is, they fail to 
fully capture the complexity involved when people make retrospective duration 
judgments. Whilst the contents of memory (i.e., the amount of stimulus information 
or contextual information remembered) can presumably serve as an informative 
judgmental cue in some time estimation situations, the current work strongly 
suggests that this is not the only cue that people use. The consistent pattern of results 
obtained throughout this thesis provides compelling evidence that people use 
subjective cues to guide their judgments of elapsed time. cues that relate to their 
experiences of ease or difficulty associated with memory processing operations. 
The theoretical implications of these findings are straightforward. In order to gain a 
more complete understanding of how memory-based operations drive people's 
retrospective duration judgments. time researchers need to broaden the scope of their 
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investigations. Rather than simply paying attention to the products of the retri~\al 
process (i.e., what information is brought to mind). experiences of recollectiye ease 
or difficulty that derive from the actual process of encoding and/or retrieyal also n~~d 
to be considered (i.e., how information is placed into the mind or brought to mind). 
In social cognition research, the causal significance of subjective experiences in the 
construction of social judgment is now acknowledged (e.g .. Schwarz. 1998) and the 
present research strongly suggests that it is time for retrospectiYe temporal estimation 
research to do the same. 
In summary, retrospective duration judgment formation is far more complicated than 
originally presumed. In contrast to what the traditional memory-based models 
suggest, the current work shows that people do not always rely on the quantity of 
information they can remember as a cue to guide their judgments of elapsed time. 
Rather it seems that in task contexts similar to those used in the current studies. 
people derive informational input for their temporal judgments from the experiential 
quality of mental operations (i.e .. encoding, retrieval) that furnish their minds with 
these inputs. That is, retrospective duration judgments are made by assessing the ease 
or difficulty with which a relevant mental operation can be carried out. It seems that 
an understanding of the underlying processes mediating judgments of remembered 
duration will only come from acknowledging the importance of both of these sources 
of information. 
6.2.2 Implications for Research on Subjective Experiences 
The current research also has a number of important theoretical implications for 
previous experience-based research in social cognition. In this domain. a larg~ 
number of studies have investigated the effects of subjective experiences of ease or 
difficulty evoked by memory retrieval operations on everyday social judgments (e.g .. 
Rothman & Hardin, 1997; Schwarz. 1998; Schwarz, Bless, et aI., 1991). Whilst this 
body of work provides compelling evidence that subjective retrieval experiences can 
function as a highly informative judgmental cue, the judgments under inyestigation 
have pertained, in large part, to subjective domains. Namely. self-related judgments 
that have no objectively correct answer. For example. ease of retrieval has been 
found to influence judgments of self-perception (e.g .. Schwarz. Bless. et al.. 1991). 
judgments of health risk (e.g .. Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). judgments of childhood 
- 153 -
memory (e.g., Winkielman et al.. 1998), judgments of attitude strength (e.g .. 
Haddock et al.. 1999), and other attitude-related judgments (e.g., \\'ankc et al.. 1996). 
By demonstrating that the same experiential influences emerge for a judgment more 
objective in nature, specifically people' s judgments of remembered duration. the 
present research confirms that ease of retrieval effects are not restricted to self-
related judgment. Rather, it seems that one and the same kind of subjective 
experience can influence judgments of very different natures, that is, judgments in 
both subjective and objective domains. 
In addition to uniquely showing that experiences of ease or difficulty associated with 
retrieval operations can serve as a useful source of information for judgments of 
elapsed time, the current research also shows that even when these experiences are 
elicited by encoding operations they still function as an informative judgmental 
temporal cue. Ease of retrieval effects therefore readily extend to the first stage in the 
memory process, namely encoding. As such, it becomes clear that it is not the 
memory processing operation that acts as input to the retrospective duration 
judgment, but rather the experience of ease or difficulty that was associated with the 
cognitive process. This is an important extension of previous research in this domain 
as investigations have focused exclusively on determining the extent to which 
experiential aspects of memory retrieval hold informational value for the judgmental 
process (e.g., Schwarz, 1998). In this body of work. participants are required to 
retrieve a specified number of items of information that already reside in long-term 
memory (e.g., few vs. many self-assertive behaviours: Schwarz, Bless, et al.. 1991). 
The nature of the task can thus cause participants to have different retrieval 
expenences (i.e .. easy vs. difficult respectively), but encoding experiences are 
completely absent. 
By continually using this experimental paradigm, no interest has been paid to 
whether people's judgmental outcomes can also be affected by experiential aspects 
of memory encoding (i.e., by assessing how easy or difficult it was to commit items 
of information to memory). The present research however demonstrates the utility of 
considering subjective experiences of ease or difficulty associated with both memory 
encoding and memory retrieval operations in an attempt to understand people' s 
retrospective duration judgments. Thus, from a theoretical viewpoint it appears that 
social cognition research would also benefit from paying attention to the experiential 
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concomitants of both of these memory processing operations. After all. it is likely 
that the subjective ease or difficulty of encoding operations will inform a \'ariety of 
judgments in the same way already observed for subjectiye experiences 
accompanying retrieval operations. 
At a more general level, the present work also converges on the conclusion that 
subjective experiences accompanying information processing playa larger and more 
direct role in human judgment and decision-making than originally presumed (e.g .. 
Clore, 1992; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996a; Schwarz. 1998: 
Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Strack, 1992). It has been shown that subjective experiential 
states of different types, specifically, affective. bodily, and cognitiye feelings. all 
serve as useful and valid information that people rely on when they make a wide 
range of everyday judgments. When one considers that such feelings (e.g., "I'm hoC, 
"I'm hungry", or "That task was really difficult .. ) are commonly evoked. 
immediately accessible, and therefore easily read. it is not that surprising to learn that 
we pay attention to the informational cues they convey to us (Strack, 1992). What is 
more, not only are our feelings important and meaningful to us, but we generally 
believe them wholeheartedly, so it makes sense that we make use of the information 
they provide to guide our judgmental outputs (Clore. 1992). 
With the rise of research in this experiential domain and the strong evidence that 
accompanies it, the early view of decision-makers as rational and logical information 
processors has changed (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Rather than only using systematic content-based processing strategies before 
reporting a jUdgment, as the initial work suggested, it is now clear that decision-
makers can opt to rely on heuristic strategies based on their subjective experiences. 
The benefits of such a strategy are obvious. Instead of basing judgments on the result 
of an exhaustive search of memory which takes time and effort. people can use their 
subjective experiences to furnish a wide range of everyday judgments in a rapid and 
efficient manner. Basically, reliance on an experience-based judgmental strategy 
serves a simplifying cognitive function. It must be noted howeyer that although 
people have direct awareness of their subjective experiences or feelings. this does not 
imply that they are consciously aware of using the information they deriye from them 
when they make a judgmental decision (Schwarz & Clore, 1996: Strack, 1992). In a 
sense. using subjective experiences as a heuristic cue to arrive at a particular 
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judgment can be compared with how first-rate chess players or carpenters use their 
skills. These people would find it extremely difficult to explain the rules goycming 
their decisions, but the end result is generally as required (Sherman & Corty. 198.+). 
In summary, people are far more sophisticated than previously realised when it 
comes to the judgmental strategies they employ in decision-making situations. 
People do not only use systematic strategies based on the products of cognitiyc 
operations, but they also adopt heuristic strategies or shortcuts based on their 
subjective experiences associated with cognitive operations. Social cognition 
research in a number of different areas corroborates this latter view by demonstrating 
that subjective experiences playa central role in various spheres of human judgment 
and the present research reveals that the domain of retrospective duration judgment is 
no exception. Clearly, to move forward in our understanding of the cognitiye 
dynamics of human judgment, the study of subjective experiences must long 
continue. 
6.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Next consider the practical implications of the current research. The practice of using 
the subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing operations as a cue to judge 
elapsed time provides a way for social perceivers to function adaptively and 
efficiently. This heuristic-based strategy guarantees that these judgments are formed 
quickly and easily which undeniably serves a useful function in our busy and 
complex world. Despite these benefits however, this is a downside, one with 
important practical implications. When the experienced ease or difficulty of 
information processing is used as a basis for judgment, people can easily be led 
astray in the inferences they make. The reason why this judgmental process can be 
misleading is that the experience of ease or difficulty that serves as input to the 
judgment is prone to misattribution (Clore & Parrott, 1991). That is, people very 
often fail to recognise the true source of their cognitive experience and instead 
attribute it to the judgment under investigation. When this is not understood and all 
relevant information is not considered, people's judgments can be unconsciously 
influenced and they can be biased or inaccurate as a direct result. 
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In the present research, participants misattributed their experiences of ease or 
difficulty evoked by processing operations as cognitive reactions to the object of 
judgment (i.e., the duration of the task) rather than correctly attributing them to the 
nature of the information processing task (i.e., task conditions). This resulted in 
shorter retrospective duration judgments being provided in the presence of difficult 
rather than easy processing experiences. Undoubtedly, in the present context. 
(mis)attributing the difficulty experienced to a shorter task interval rather than to the 
nature of the set task serves a moral-boosting function as it giyes participants no 
reason to question their own abilities. After all, this way, participants can believe that 
they only experienced difficulty on the task because they were not giyen enough time 
to perform it in a satisfactory manner. While this attribution process might be 
successful in maintaining self-belief in their own cognitive abilities, it actually 
caused participants to make inaccurate assessments of elapsed time. 
When participants found the encoding or retrieval task to be considerably difficult or 
demanding, this experience of difficulty prompted them to significantly 
underestimate the objective clock time duration of the task. For these participants, 
time seemed to pass with unusual rapidity which caused them to misremember the 
task's duration as shorter than it actually was. Thus, simply increasing the difficulty 
of the information processing task was sufficient to erroneously decrease people's 
perceptions of elapsed time. Conversely, when participants found the encoding or 
retrieval task to be relatively easy, this experience of ease caused the task interval to 
appear subjectively longer in duration. It is important to point out that the same 
judgmental inaccuracies were not evident under these subjectively easy task 
conditions. In fact, participants who relied on their experienced processing ease as a 
cue to judge elapsed time showed remarkable precision in their retrospective duration 
estimates. Generally, participants only slightly underestimated the task's objective 
duration. Clearly. under such conditions, reliance on this heuristic strategy is 
particularly useful as fairly accurate duration judgments are produced. 
Thus, people's judgments of temporal duration in retrospect are malleable to the 
context in which they are formed. When easy or difficult processing experiences 
were elicited and used as input for the judgment. people's subjective impressions of 
elapsed time were altered. This finding it congruent with other experienced-based 
research which has highlighted the misleading effects of ease or difficulty in a \\ide 
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range of social judgments (e.g., self-perception. Schwarz. Bless, et aL 1991; risk 
perception, Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; attitudes. Haddock et al.. 1999; Wanke. et 
aI., 1996; people, Dijksterhuis et aL 1999; Rothman & Hardin, 1997) and non-social 
judgments (e.g., frequency and probability estimates Tyersky & Kahneman 1973' 
'", ." 
Wanke et aI., 1995; noise, Jacoby et aI., 1988). The prevalence of such systematic 
judgmental biases shows that people who use their experiences of ease or difficulty 
accompanying information processing as a judgmental cue fail to appreciate how 
their judgments and evaluations can substantially change and falter as conditions 
vary. The same is true for other subjective experiences. such as moods (e.g., Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983) and arousal states (e.g .. Zillman, 1978) when they are used for 
evaluative and physical judgments respectively. In combination, this research 
strongly suggests that the use of experiential information as a heuristic cue for 
judgment and the typical errors associated with its usage are an inevitable part of the 
cognitive dynamics of human judgment and decision-making. 
With regards to the present research, it is worrying to find that people'sjudgments of 
remembered duration can be so inaccurate and biased when they take on board the 
information provided by their subjective processing experiences. After all, people's 
ability to estimate time accurately is essential for everyday functioning (Boltz, 1998; 
Michon, 1985). The results of the present research suggest however that people will 
only misjudge the temporal extent of a prior processing episode. to a large degree, 
when they experience difficulty processing the available information. Undeniably, 
many of our daily activities are demanding and challenging, hence difficult 
processing experiences are commonly elicited. This gives rise to an important 
question. Are there any ramifications for everyday behaviour when a person uses his 
or her experienced processing difficulty as a cue to compute elapsed time in daily 
life? It would seem so. Consider for example, a situation in which a person witnesses 
a crime (e.g., two armed robbers entering a bank) and is later asked by the police 
how long the event lasted. A number of factors in this situation could compromise 
that person's processing experience of the event (e.g., gun fire, screaming). Thus, it 
follows that if the difficulty of the processing episode influences his or her 
computation of the retrospective duration estimate, then that person is likely to 
dramatically underestimate the duration of the past event. In this instance. 
inaccurately estimating the event's duration could directly affect how the police 
would act and pursue their inyestigations into this crime. Thus, it becomes clear that 
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using one's subjective experiences to make such judgments can intluence people' s 
behavioural outcomes, in this case, those of another person. However. by 
understanding that judgments of remembered duration are biased in predictable ways 
when experiential information is used to furnish these outputs, it at least becomes 
possible to predict whether people will dramatically underestimate the temporal 
duration of some event in their recent past. 
At a more general level, systematic time distortions like the one observed here as so 
common that metaphors about time flying by or inching along have crept into 
everyday language. Take for example the well known adage "time flies by when 
you're having fun". This implies that differences in judged duration \\-ill arise 
depending on whether the events filling the time period are interesting or boring. 
Whilst interesting and absorbing tasks often cause an apparent shortening (or 
speeding up) of objective time, boring tasks have the exact opposite effect; an 
apparent lengthening (or slowing down) of objective time. These common subjective 
impressions have been confirmed in various laboratory studies (e.g.. De Wolfe & 
Duncan, 1959; Hawkins & Tedford, 1976). Expectation and anticipation are other 
experiences like boredom that can cause time to appear lengthened, just as the adage 
"a watched pot never boils" implies. Again many timing studies have veritied 
impressions of this kind (e.g., Block et aI., 1980; Cahoon & Edmonds, 1980; 
Edmonds, Cahoon, & Bridges, 1981). Taken together this research shows that 
although people have rather distinct impressions of temporal duration, these 
impressions are vulnerable to distortion. Many cognitive factors including perceived 
processing difficulty in the present context are responsible for these time distortions. 
Clearly then, although time is fixed, the duration judgments that people make rest 
heavily on the conditions of the type of infonnation processing task they are 
performing. Simply stated, time is relative to what a person is doing. 
6.4 SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND DURATION JUDGMENTS 
6.4.1 Why is this the Preferred Route to Judgment? 
In addition to developing our understanding of retrospective timing, the present 
research also raises some important issues that need to be addressed. In all the 
experiments reported in this thesis, the encoding and retrieval tasks in which 
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participants engaged rendered two, or perhaps three, distinct sources of information 
available for use in constructing their judgments of elapsed time - the subjectively 
experienced ease or difficulty of processing operations, the amount of stimulus 
information stored in memory, and perhaps, the amount of contextual change stored 
in memory. Despite the fact that each type of data offers relevant information for the 
judgment at hand, the clear pattern emerged that participants relied on their cognitive 
experiences of ease or difficulty evoked by memory processing rather than on the 
cognitive contents that came to mind when they formed their retrospective duration 
judgments. Thus, one issue to consider is why these individuals preferred to use an 
experience-based strategy to furnish their judgments? Three possible explanations 
will be offered. The first two relate to conclusions that have arisen from preyious 
experience-based research and the final explanation focuses on methodological 
differences between the present studies and previous retrospective duration judgment 
research. 
First, in the social judgment literature, a number of studies have demonstrated that 
personal relevance and involvement with the object of jUdgment can play an 
important role in determining which judgmental strategy people choose to utilise 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis et aI., 1999; Haddock et aL 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). A 
finding that is compatible with the dual-process models of judgment as these 
variables can directly affect the level of processing motivation that people bring to a 
judgment task (e.g., Chaiken et aI., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). According to this 
body of research, when the judgment task is perceived as personally relevant and 
involving, individuals tend to rely on a content-based strategy reflecting on what 
information comes to mind as they are sufficiently motivated to engage in this kind 
of effortful and systematic processing. In contrast, when the task at hand is perceived 
as less self-relevant and involving, individuals seem to prefer to use an experience-
based strategy drawing on how easy or difficult it was to bring information to mind 
as they are unmotivated to spend considerable time and effort attending to. 
scrutinising, and integrating all the available and relevant information. Processing 
information in this heuristic manner guarantees that unmotivated individuals can 
arrive at a judgmental decision quickly and with minimal effort. 
From the perspective of the current research, it is difficult to think of reasons why 
participants would have perceived the duration judgment task as either personally 
- 160 -
relevant or involving. After all, they were required to retrospectivel: estimate the 
length of some experimentally-defined target interval filled with information that 
was unimportant to them (e.g., high-frequency words, words beginning with s). As a 
result, time estimators may not have been sufficiently motivated to process 
judgment-relevant information systematically. Instead, they were content to rely on a 
heuristic processing strategy drawing on their subjective experiences of ease or 
difficulty evoked by memory processing operations. In line with this reasoning. it 
could be suggested that individuals' preference to base their retrospective duration 
judgments on their elicited experiences over the accessible information stored in 
memory may at least in part be explained by the low personal relevance and low 
involving nature of the judgment task. In fact, in everyday life, people are often far 
too busy to become highly involved in many of the judgments they make which is 
indicative that such heuristic-based strategies may be more the rule than the 
exception. That is not to say, however, that the level of personal relevance and 
involvement with a retrospective temporal judgment task is always low. Situational 
factors (e.g., offering incentives, processing information of a more important nature) 
and individual differences (e.g., a time expert) can presumably increase the 
importance of such a task which would mean that the goal of accurately forming an 
impression of elapsed time would be taken more seriously. Under such conditions, 
people are likely to forego a heuristic judgmental strategy based on their subjective 
experiences and instead use a more effortful systematic strategy drawing on the 
numerical amount of relevant and accessible information stored in memory. One task 
for future research will be to investigate this possibility. 
A second explanation for the observed preferential use of experiential information in 
judgments of remembered duration bears on research showing that people have 
chronic tendencies to rely on certain types of information for particular judgments 
(e.g., Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Gollwitzer. 1994; Higgins, 1990, 1996; Smith, 1990. 
1994). Relevant to the present discussion, Rothman and Hardin (1997) have recently 
proposed that individuals may develop habits of relying on feeling- and content-
based information for judgment as a result of using that particular type of 
information in the past. For example, repeatedly using the subjectin~ ease or 
difficulty of retrieval as input for a particular kind of judgment may signify that this 
type of information is more applicable to that judgment than equally accessible 
content-based information. In this way. learned patterns of information use in a 
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particular domain of judgment may actually bias people to rely upon that infonnation 
again when the same type of judgment is called for. 
Take for example a domain of judgment studied by Rothman and Hardin (1997, 
Expt. 3). Participants were asked to evaluate either a close friend or a causal 
acquaintance after they had recalled judgment-relevant infonnation from memory. It 
was predicted that people would base their judgments of close friends on feeling-
based information, in this instance, the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of 
retrieval, even though the highly involving nature of the task should motivate them to 
process the judgment-relevant infonnation systematically. The rationale was that in 
everyday life, it is often the case that judgments of our close friends are based on 
how we feel about them so this type of infonnation should be considered highly 
applicable. In contrast, it was hypothesised that this feeling-based infonnation would 
seem less applicable when evaluating a causal acquaintance for the simple reason 
that it is not as commonly used for such judgments. The prediction was therefore 
made that people would consider content-based infonnation to be more applicable 
for their judgments of causal acquaintances and so they would use it even though the 
less involving nature of the task should cause them to process the judgment-relevant 
information heuristically. Consistent with Rothman and Hardin's (1997) 
applicability-based hypothesis, judgments of close friends were based on the 
subjective ease or difficulty of retrieving judgment-relevant infonnation from 
memory, whereas judgments of causal acquaintances were based on the number of 
judgment-relevant units of information retrieved. Thus, it seems that habitually 
relying on feeling- and content-based information for particular judgments increases 
the applicability of that information when the same kind of judgment has to be 
formed. 
In much the same way, it could be suggested that people's preferential use of their 
feelings of ease or difficulty elicited by infonnation processing to estimate elapsed 
time results from an habitual tendency to use this type of infonnation for such 
judgments. It could be argued that life long experience has taught us that this feeling-
based information is highly applicable when time has to be estimated. Consider for 
example a situation in which a task has to be perfonned that demands infonnation 
processing. As soon as a person is faced with such a task, he or she makes an 
estimate of its difficulty. That is, the person decides if the task will be relatively 
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straightforward or mentally demanding and effortful. This estimate of task difficulty 
then automatically elicits an assessment of how much time is needed for its 
completion. Indeed an assessment that is highly functional in today's busy world. As 
such, there is clearly a relationship between experiences of ease or difficulty and 
judgments of time. In fact, in all the reported experiments. participants' estimates of 
task difficulty and their assessments of elapsed time were inversely related. \\'hen 
processing operations were taxing, participants felt that there was insufficient time to 
complete the task in a satisfactory manner. Thus. it could be the case that people 
pragmatically learn to use the mental effort they have experienced in actiYities they 
perform to infer the amount of time that has elapsed. In the present research. such 
learned patterns of information use may have caused perceivers to fayour this readily 
accessible experiential information over equally accessible content-based 
information when their retrospective duration judgments were constructed. Simply 
stated, past experience may have defined experienced ease or difficulty as more 
applicable to this kind of judgment. 
A third and final possible explanation for individuals' preference to base their 
judgments of elapsed time on their prior processing experiences rather than on the 
amount of information stored in memory concerns the way in which time was 
measured in the present studies. To adhere to the previous experience-based 
judgment research (e.g., Schwarz. Bless, et aL 1991 ~ Rothman & Schwarz. 1998). a 
horizontal interval scale was chosen. Participants were required to make their 
retrospective duration judgment either via a circled response at a set point along the 
scale (Expts. 1-5) or by making a mark along its length (Expts. 6-9). Whilst the 
former scale closely parallels the measurement judgment method utilised by Schwarz 
and his colleagues, the latter scale is a slight modification of this to allow a temporal 
response to the nearest second. It is feasible that reliance on an experience-based 
strategy for judgment may be tied to this particular type of time measurement method 
and possibly. variants of it. 
This assumption is based on the fact that both the memory-based models of Ornstein 
(1969) and Block (1978. 1989a: Block & Reed, 1978) which emphasise the role of 
the contents of memory (i.e., stimulus and contextual information respectiYely) in 
judgments of remembered duration have been tested using a different time 
measurement method. namely. the method of comparison. In such studies. two 
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temporal intervals are presented in succession and the set task is to judge the duration 
of the target interval by comparing it with a standard interval that either preced~s or 
follows it. This is nonnally done by providing participants with a time estimation 
response sheet that contains two parallel horizontal lines (note that the lin~s are not 
labelled with conventional temporal units, i.e., seconds and minutes). The line at the 
top of the sheet represents the length of the standard interval (e.g .. 50 mm) and 
participants are required to divide the bottom longer line (e.g., 100 mm) into two 
segments so that the left segment represents the estimated duration of the target 
interval relative to the standard interval. For example, if the target interval is 
perceived as longer than the standard interval, then the left segment of the bottom 
line would extend beyond the end of the standard line. As this comparative method 
requires two intervals of time to be judged relative to one another. relative duration 
judgments are produced (Clausen, 1950: Zakay, 1990). 
When a retrospective duration judgment is made under these conditions. there is little 
doubt that a highly salient and infonnative temporal cue comes from directly 
comparing the contents of memory for each of the presented intervals. If more 
stimulus infonnation (Ornstein, 1969) or contextual infonnation (Block, 1989a) is 
remembered from one interval than the other, then that interval's duration will be 
judged as relatively longer in retrospect. Despite continually using this comparative 
measurement method, the contents of memory has been emphasised as the principal 
detenninant of retrospective duration estimation. Of potential relevance. however. is 
whilst there is strong evidence that the amount of infonnation in memory serves as a 
cue to infer how much time has elapsed in a relative duration judgment situation, 
other retrospective timing studies have shown that this type of infonnation appears to 
be less important when other time estimation methods are employed (e.g., Brown, 
1985; Brown & Stubbs, 1992; Kikkawa, 1983). Although not as commonly used. 
these methods include verbal estimation (i.e., the duration of the target interval is 
estimated verbally in conventional temporal units) and reproduction (i.e .. the 
duration of the target interval has to be reproduced by pressing a button for an 
equivalent period of time). What is fundamentally different about these two methods 
from the relative approach is that absolute duration judgments are produced as only 
one interval is presented and judged (Clausen. 1950; Zakay, 1990); a methodology 
also common to the present studies. 
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Interestingly, this has led some researchers to assume that different cognitive 
processes may be involved in relative and absolute retrospective duration judgments 
(e.g .. Predebon, 1988; Zakay, 1993). In relative time estimation situations. it is 
strongly believed that the process of estimating duration in retrospect in\'ohes an 
assessment of the number of stimulus events or contextual changes that are 
remembered. However, no conclusions have been made as to the nature of the time 
estimation process that mediates absolute remembered duration. This is primarily due 
to the fact that the comparative judgment method has dominated this research area 
and thus the memory-based models were developed to explain how people form 
relative retrospective duration judgments. At the present time. these researchers 
simply assume that when time is estimated in an absolute manner. the contents of 
memory do not play such a prominent role in determining people' s retrospective 
temporal outputs. After all, in this situation the duration of an interval is estimated in 
isolation. There is no reference to another external interval. so how can quantity 
comparisons be made? 
The current research not only corroborates this view, but provides a potential answer 
to how absolute retrospective duration judgments are constructed. Specifically, when 
the duration of only one interval is judged in task contexts similar to those used here. 
people may use their inferences about the SUbjective ease or difficulty of prior 
processing operations as a judgment-relevant cue. Obviously, as only one kind of 
absolute time estimation method is used in the present work (i.e., a horizontal 
interval scale), further research is needed to empirically test this assumption with the 
other two absolute methods (i.e., verbal estimation and reproduction). However. if 
this turns out to be true and it is also shown that these experiential effects are absent 
in relative duration judgment tasks, the notion would be supported that reliance on an 
experience-based or content-based judgmental strategy is highly dependent on the 
nature of the time estimation method employed (i.e., absolute and relative methods 
respectively). 
Thus. in this section, three factors have been highlighted that appear to enhance the 
impact of SUbjective experiences on people's retrospective duration judgments. 
These include low personal relevance and involvement with the judgment task, past 
experience with this type of information in this judgment domain. and the use of an 
absolute duration judgment method. Given that retrospective temporal estimation 
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research focuses on memory content, it is imperative to determine when and under 
what conditions people are likely to use their prior processing experiences as a basis 
for judgment. This is a task for future research, although it does appear that an 
understanding of this issue will only come from paying close attention to attributes of 
both the person and the situation. An assumption that is compatible with conclusions 
derived from previous experience-based judgment research (e.g .. Rothman & 
Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz, 1998). 
6.4.2 Individual Differences 
Another issue that warrants discussion is whether individual differences can atfect 
the influence of subjective processing experiences in judgments of remembered 
duration. The critical determining factor in the causation of experiential effects is that 
the information processing activity elicits feelings of ease or difficulty in the 
performer. In the present research, such processing experiences were elicited using 
various manipulations (e.g., varying the nature or appearance of the to-be-encoded 
items, varying the number of items to-be-retrieved from memory) and once evoked, 
participants attended to the information they provided to guide their judgments of 
elapsed time. Undoubtedly, these individuals perceived this experiential information 
to be highly relevant and informative by virtue that it occurred in the right place and 
at the right time to be implicated in the judgment. 
Individual differences, however, could impact on whether the current manipulations 
of task difficulty are successful in eliciting these distinctive cognitive experiences in 
some people. Consider for example, the task of committing twenty low-frequency 
words to memory (Expt. 1). Although participants considered this encoding task to 
be difficult and demanding, this would surely not be the case for individuals who are 
capable of amazing feats of memory (i.e., memory experts). Such people would 
presumably use their expertise and engage in various mnemonic strategies to imbue 
these rare words with meaning by integrating them with pre-existing knowledge that 
already resides in memory. In a similar vein, the task of retrieving thirty-five animal 
names from memory (Expt. 6) proved to be a mentally demanding and effortful task 
for participants, but it is unlikely that zoo-keepers would experience the same 
difficulty. In both instances, attributes of the person (i.e., level of knowledge in the 
content domain) would cause the subjective experience of processing difficulty to be 
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absent. Thus, it becomes apparent that under such conditions, experiential ~ffects on 
judgments of elapsed time would not haye emerged among th~se indiyiduals. This 
does not imply, however, that this should always happen. It is conc~iyable to assume 
that if the difficulty of the task was increased by haying these individuals encode or 
retrieve a larger number of items, then they would also show experiential effects on 
their retrospective duration jUdgments. This is another possible route of investigation 
for future research. 
The important lesson to take away from this is that the relative difficulty of an 
infonnation processing task varies for different people and within different domains. 
For this reason, it is necessary to consider individual differences when choosing 
manipulations of task difficulty. Pretesting provides a useful avenue through which 
to establish what constitutes an easy or a difficult task for performers. If. however. 
the difficulty of the task is set at the appropriate level, then experiential effects on 
people's judgments of remembered duration should be remarkably robust and 
widespread. After all, we automatically assume that our subjective experiences are 
caused by whatever occupies our minds at the time and thus, it becomes extremely 
difficult not to use the infonnation they provide when we consider the judgment at 
hand - in this instance. when we make an assessment of elapsed time. One exception. 
perhaps, is individuals who are particularly adept at estimating time periods in their 
recent past due to their vocations (e.g., time experts, athletes, shift-workers). The 
constant requirement to estimate time accurately might make such individuals less 
susceptible to these experiential effects. Future research should investigate this 
possibility, in addition to charting the generality of ease of processing effects across 
different samples of the general population (e.g., children, older adults). 
6.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Throughout this discussion. attention has been drawn to various issues that have 
arisen from the current research which warrant further investigation. However. some 
other issues will be considered here. Whilst the present results provide compelling 
evidence that people use the subjective ease or difficulty of prior processing 
operations (e.g .. encoding, retrieval) as a cue to guide their retrospective duration 
judgments. this finding can only be generalised to objective clock time durations in 
the second and minute range. The shortest duration studied was 46 s and the longest 
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was 4 min 47 s. In daily life, however, people routinely make judgments of duration 
that run to seconds, minutes, and hours. The question remains, therefore. whether 
comparable effects would emerge for retrospective estimates of extended temporal 
episodes. At the present time, little is known about the cognitive processes that 
mediate people's assessments of elapsed time from about 6 minutes into the hour 
range (Block, 1989a; Zakay, 1990). Thus, it becomes apparent that if our 
understanding of retrospective timing is to increase further, this is a necessary route 
of exploration. 
As well as investigating the extent to which experiences of ease or difficulty evoked 
by memory processing operations influence people's retrospective judgments of 
longer durations, future research should continue to determine the generality of these 
effects across different task contexts, manipulations of processing difficulty, and 
duration judgment methods. Another task for future work will be to determine the 
underlying processes and neural substrates of the judgments observed in the current 
research. At a more general leveL the experiential concomitants of cognitive 
operations are likely to inform a variety of judgments in a wide range of domains. 
Future research should therefore continue to investigate the extent and boundary 
conditions of these powerful effects. 
Finally, the results of the last experiment in this thesis highlight the utility of 
conducting retrospective temporal estimation research using immersive virtual 
environment technology (IVET). In trying to gain an understanding of the underlying 
processes of retrospective timing, researchers have stayed within the narrow confines 
of the laboratory. Whilst the activities that participants are required to perform in 
laboratory-based studies are representative of tasks encountered in everyday life, it is 
impossible in this setting to fully capture the range of events we experience and 
retrospectively estimate on a daily basis. IVET. however, provides a relatively new 
and exciting forum for researchers to create virtual environments that simulate the 
essential characteristics and richness of the real world in a controlled experimental 
setting. One can reasonably surmise from this that IVET holds great promise for 
experinlental research on retrospective duration timing as people's time estimation 
abilities can be studied in a wide range of dynamic social situations. Researchers in 
this domain should therefore take advantage of the benefits that this powerful and 
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unique digital tool has to offer and no doubt theoretical advances into the problem of 
retrospective temporal estimation will follow. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the present research shows that the traditional memon-based models 
of retrospective duration estimation fail to fully capture the complexity involved 
when people make assessments of elapsed time. Although people undoubtedly use 
the contents of memory as a cue to guide their retrospective duration judgments in 
some time estimation situations, the current findings provide compelling evidence 
that this is not the only cue that people use. The consistent pattern of results obtained 
throughout this work convincingly demonstrates that people also derive 
informational input for their temporal judgments from their experiences of ease or 
difficulty evoked by memory processing operations. That is, individuals consider 
whether the informational content that fills the relevant interval was placed into the 
mind or brought to mind with ease or with difficulty. This conclusion is consistent 
with a large body of research in social cognition which has shown that subjective 
experiences that accompany information processing play an important and central 
role in determining people's judgmental outcomes in a wide range of domains. Thus, 
I can end this thesis with a powerful statement. To move forward in our 
understanding of the cognitive dynamics of human judgment and decision-making, 
the study of subjective experiential states must long continue. 
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APPENDIX 2. Stimulus Words Used in Experiment 2 






















APPENDIX 3. Stimulus Words t'sed in Experiment 3 
Typed Trait Words Handwritten Trait "'ords 






















Stimulus Passage Used in Experiment 4 
As I had some spare time on my hands, I decided that it would be a great laugh to 
visit some of my friends who lived all over the country. So I packed my bags and left 
Guildford for a few weeks. My first port of call was Staines, where I'd arranged to 
meet up with my friend Laura. We both decided to go out on the to\vTI for a few 
drinks and a bite to eat. She suggested that the following day we should yisit her 
mother in St. Albans as she'd spoil us with a slap-up home-cooked meal! 
Having recharged our batteries with lots of home delicacies, we decided to take a trip 
to Luton, as we'd heard that the biggest indoor circus was being held there. We 
definitely weren't disappointed - the show was spectacular. The day was made even 
more worthwhile, when we accidentally bumped into another of our friends. Charlie. 
He invited us back to his house in Ipswich and said we could stay over for the night. 
The following morning, Laura travelled back to Richmond and after saying my 
goodbyes, I set off to Cambridge to see Fiona. We had a really relaxing day together 
watching the regatta on the river. It was a shame that I had to leave later that 
afternoon, as I'd already arranged to meet up with my Aunt and Uncle in 
Peterborough for an evening meal. 
My cousin, Guy was planning to visit Loughborough the next day to have a look 
around the university there. He was trying to decide which university to study at after 
he'd finished his A-levels, so I decided to go with him. I didn't mind because it 
meant that I could visit Leicester at the same time. On our journey. I remember him 
telling me that he'd already visited the Universities of Reading, Birmingham and 
Chester, but he was keen to get a feel for all the universities he'd applied to. As he 
was really excited about the prospect of going to university, I kept him entertained by 
telling him lots of stories about my life in St. Andrews as a student. I explained how 
it was surrounded by many places that I'd never been to before, like Dundee and 
Aberdeen and being a student around there gave me the opportunity to explore all its 
nearby towns and cities. The conversation reminded me that I'd still like to yisit 
Inverness and Paisley. 
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However for the time being, my plans were to visit my boyfriend. Paul in Colwyn 
Bay. I was going to stay with him for a few days before heading further north. That 
night, we went to see the latest James Bond movie in Crewe which we thoroughly 
enjoyed. The following day, we browsed round the shops in Birkenhead. quite near 
to Liverpool and stopped off at a casino there to try our luck. Then we returned back 
to Paul's house later that evening. I got up quite early the next morning because a big 
party had been organised by some of my friends in Huddersfield. It was great to 
catch up with them all and after the party, I accompanied Julie back to her house in 
Bradford. She was going to a big carnival in Blackpool the following day. so I 
stayed at hers so I could go along too. 
Surprisingly, Julie asked if she could be my travelling companion for the rest of my 
tour around the UK, because she'd never been further north than Harrogate before. I 
loved this idea, so we set off to the old Roman town of York together. After 
discussing where we'd like to go next, we decided that the East Coast of England 
would be a scenic place to visit. We chose the seaside town of Scarborough, where 
we fished for crabs off the pier. Whitby was our next port of call. We climbed the 99 
steps up to the castle giving us the most amazing view - we could see for miles 
around! 
Having had so much sea-breeze fresh air, the road ahead took us to Durham, where 
the cathedral dominated the skyline. We spoilt ourselves by buying clothes, 
souvenirs and some presents for our friends. We couldn't leave the north-east 
without going to a football match with my favourite team. Newcastle United, so to 
Newcastle we went. To my delight, they beat Middlesbrough 2-1 giving them top 
place in the Premiership above Southampton who lost to Bolton. 
Scotland bound, we drove to Jedburgh. We stayed in a quaint B&B and took the 
opportunity to explore the nearby National Park. After spending a few days walking, 
cycling and canoeing, a much needed rest was on the agenda. Fortunately. our friend. 
Ally only lived a short drive away in Berwick-upon-Tweed, so we packed our bags 
and set off in that direction. After living in the lap of luxury for a couple of days. our 
itchy feet wanted to travel again. Heading further northwards, this time to North 
Berwick, we were amazed by the beautiful scenery. I even managed a hole-in-one on 
the local golf course. In fact. the weather was so clear, we could see Kirkcald)' and 
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Dunfermline on the other side of the bay. This view was the perfect ending to my 
trip around Great Britain. All that remained for me to do was to drop Julie off and to 
head home myself. However, I decided to make one last stop in Doncaster to see my 
parents first, so I could tell them all about my great adventure and how it was an 
experience that I will never forget! 
Distractor Items Used in the Recognition Test in Experiment 4 
Ashford, Slough, St. Ives, Hertford, Harwich, Hounslow, Stevenage, 
Wellingborough, Gainsborough, Worcester, Oxford, Nottingham, Wrexham, 
Glenrothes, Perth, Edinburgh, Inveraray, Greenock, Llandudno, Leigh, 
Warrington, Manchester, Sheffield, Barnsley, Blackburn, Wetherby, Leeds, 
Knaresborough, Saltburn, Gateshead, Sunderland, Darlington, Winchester, 




Stimulus Passage Used in Experiment 5 
Pre-heat the oven to gas mark S, 190°C (37S0F). Slice a red pepper into long strips 
and chop 2 onions into small pieces. Put them in an ovenproof dish together wi th 
two crushed garlic cloves, then cover with IS0ml (Sfl oz) of olive-oil. two 
tablespoons of red wine and a pinch of sugar. Bake for 40 minutes or until slightly 
coloured. 
Cut 1 courgette into 2cm slices and do the same with 1 small aubergine. Then chop 
2 small carrots and 2 leeks into thick slices. Also, shred half a Savoy cabbage and 
divide a cauliflower into small florets. Trim 1 small fennel bulb and cut into -+ 
pieces lengthways. Place all the ingredients in an ovenproof dish with 1 tablespoon 
of lemon juice, 2 tablespoons of double cream and SOg (20z) of finely chopped 
walnut pieces. Season generously with fresh coriander. cayenne pepper and half a 
teaspoon of dried oregano. Mix well and bake for 30 minutes or until tender. Then 
remove from the heat and leave to cool. 
Peel and dice 2 large potatoes and plunge them into a large pan of water with a few 
fresh mint leaves. Cook for 12-1S minutes or until soft when pierced with the point 
of a sharp knife. Meanwhile, cut a lamb neck fillet into small cubes. Place IS0g 
(Soz) of plain flour, 4 egg-yolks and 1 teaspoon of milk in a food processor and 
process for 1 minute until the mixture resembles fine breadcrumbs. Toss the meat in 
1 dessertspoon of paprika and 1 tablespoon of chopped fresh sage. Then cover each 
piece in the mixture from the food processor. Then place them in a heavy-based pan 
and fry until lightly browned. 
Stir 1 dessertspoon each of chopped fresh basil. tarragon, thyme and rosemary into 
the mixture which was prepared first. Season generously and marinate for up to 2 
hours. Melt the butter in a frying pan and cook 4 sliced mushrooms, 2Sg (1 oz) of 
black olives and some baby tomatoes over a high heat for 2-3 minutes. Divide 1 
small cooked beetroot and 1 heaped teaspoon of sultanas between 2 serving plates. 
Then put all the other ingredients on the two plates and sprinkle with 1 tablespoon of 
chopped fresh parsley. Serve at room temperature with some crusty bread if 
preferred. 
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Distractor Items Used in the Recognition Test in Experiment 5 
Chilli, turnips, root ginger, sunflower oil, white wine, honey, marrow, artichoke, 
parsnips, peas, spinach, asparagus, nutmeg, lime juice, single cream, almonds. 
cinnamon, chilli powder, vanilla, broccoli, chives, pork, self-raising flour, egg-
whites, cheese, croutons, cardamom, dill, chervil, turmeric, bay, marjoram, 
margarine, pumpkin, capers, celery, sweetcorn, raisins, cumin, rice. 
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APPENDIX 6. Stimulus Faces Used in Experiment 9 
Visual Noise Absent 
1 2 3 
5 6 7 
9 10 1 1 
13 14 15 





APPENDIX 7. Stimulus Faces Used in Experiment 9 
Visual Noise Present 
1 2 3 
5 6 7 
9 10 11 
14 15 






APPENDIX 8. Distractor Faces Used in the Recognition Test in Experiment 9 
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